On Wed, 5 Dec 2012 10:33:04 -0500 Matthew Miller <mattdm fedoraproject org> wrote: > On Wed, Dec 05, 2012 at 08:58:44AM -0600, Troy Dawson wrote: > > Not volunteering at the moment because I don't have the cycles, but > > I really like that idea. > > Something similar, except opposite, of the security plugin. If a > > package has the "breakable update" option set, then don't update it > > unless they do the "--reallyupdate" option. But also give them a > > nag that says the package has an update. > > +1 to this -a lot. ;) Anything that requires someone to read output from updates is doomed. If I update 100 machines, I am not going to look at all the spew from yum, and if I don't specifically look at my logs often am I going to notice this. If I install a new machine with updates enabled, would I notice this before the machine was deployed? I don't think this is a good solution... still trying to think of one. ;) kevin
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