Secrecy and user trust

[Les Mikesell]

Ed Greshko wrote:
> 

>>> I think you have no concept of public/private encryption or signing.
>>>
>> My concept is that if I can fool you into accepting a false public
>> key, I can sign packages with the matching false private key, and when
>> you install the first such package it may (probably will) include evil
>> things of some nature.
>>
>> Do you disagree? Or feel that if I can get you to run one evil package
>> I can't put in a root kit, or rend personal information from your
>> systems, or otherwise attack your system?
>>
>> If you feel that line of attack is not possible do tell me how your
>> concept of encryption and signing prevents it.
>>
> I thought you were talking "real world" as opposed to purely hypothetical.

I think it is a reasonable real world assumption that some users could 
have their DNS compromised in a way that would make them pull packages 
from somewhere other than the official repositories.  Can any key trust 
scenario where they have to obtain a new key protect against installing 
modified packages? (i.e. assume that the fake key and packages come from 
the same place(s) pretending to be the official repositories and mirrors).

-- 
   Les Mikesell
    lesmikesell at gmail.com