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Re: /sbin/restorecon and hard links
- From: Stephen Smalley <sds tycho nsa gov>
- To: Erik Sjölund <erik sjolund gmail com>
- Cc: fedora-selinux-list redhat com
- Subject: Re: /sbin/restorecon and hard links
- Date: Wed, 15 Feb 2006 10:19:08 -0500
On Wed, 2006-02-15 at 09:01 -0500, Stephen Smalley wrote:
> Yes, running restorecon on /home by root considered harmful,
> particularly under targeted policy. Under strict policy, a user can't
> create hard links to system files (controlled by the 'link' permission),
> which helps avoid the problem, and restorecon and setfiles aren't
> allowed to follow untrustworthy symlinks by the policy. setfiles also
> contains code to check for multiple hard links with conflicting matches,
> so if you run setfiles on /, it should complain about the discrepancy,
> but restorecon doesn't do that and even if it did it naturally can't
> tell that when it is just run on /home.
BTW, it is important to remember here that targeted policy doesn't try
to confine users (just specific programs and daemons) and that
relabeling /etc/passwd or other system files doesn't give the user any
greater access since he is already unconfined as far as SELinux is
concerned.
--
Stephen Smalley
National Security Agency
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