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Re: /sbin/restorecon and hard links
- From: John Reiser <jreiser BitWagon com>
- To: fedora-selinux-list redhat com
- Subject: Re: /sbin/restorecon and hard links
- Date: Wed, 15 Feb 2006 07:44:43 -0800
Stephen Smalley wrote:
> BTW, it is important to remember here that targeted policy doesn't try
> to confine users (just specific programs and daemons) and that
> relabeling /etc/passwd or other system files doesn't give the user any
> greater access since he is already unconfined as far as SELinux is
> concerned.
That's true for SELinux policy itself. However, the linux kernel _does_
confine users, independent of "external [to the kernel]" SELinux policy,
as an unavoidable part of the complete selinux package. Namely, the
restrictions on execmod and execmem can make life difficult for legitimate
software which uses non-mainstream techniques to achieve higher performance
and/or create a richer debugging environment. Even in targeted mode,
SELinux has greater-than-zero operational costs for non-targeted software.
--
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