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Re: Hierarchy for sensitivity levels
- From: Stephen Smalley <sds tycho nsa gov>
- To: Forrest Taylor <ftaylor redhat com>
- Cc: Fedora SELinux List <fedora-selinux-list redhat com>
- Subject: Re: Hierarchy for sensitivity levels
- Date: Wed, 13 Jun 2007 09:10:49 -0400
On Tue, 2007-06-12 at 15:42 -0600, Forrest Taylor wrote:
> I am teaching class this week and I had an interesting question from a
> student. We were discussing sensitivities and categories, and a student
> wondered about the hierarchical nature of sensitivities and categories.
> Assuming that s0 is unclassified, s1 is classified, s2 is secret and s3
> is top secret, and s0<s1<s2<s3. If I have access to s3, I assume that
> you also have access to s2, s1, s0. Is there a way to throw categories
> in here so that users who have access to s3 do not necessarily have
> access to all of s2 and lower?
The dominance function is based on both the sensitivities and the
category sets. A dominates B iff A's sensitivity >= B's sensitivity and
A's category set is a superset of B's category set. The possible
relationships are dominates, dominated by, equivalent, or incomparable.
Under BLP/MLS, A can only read from B if A dominates B, and A can only
write to B if A is dominated by B. Many MLS systems further limit A to
only allow writing to B if A is equivalent to B, even though that isn't
strictly required for BLP. To violate those properties (no read up, no
write down), A has to be in a TE domain that is marked with one of the
type attributes used as exceptions in the MLS constraints.
--
Stephen Smalley
National Security Agency
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