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Re: more fine grained access in /etc
- From: Daniel J Walsh <dwalsh redhat com>
- To: Torbjørn Lindahl <torbjorn lindahl gmail com>
- Cc: fedora-selinux-list redhat com
- Subject: Re: more fine grained access in /etc
- Date: Fri, 21 Sep 2007 09:24:05 -0400
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Torbjørn Lindahl wrote:
> I see. In that case I am not going to push this topic much further. Thanks
> for your assistance!
>
> But wouldn't it be nice to have an allow mechanism in SELinux in which I
> could grant access based on it's existing access. What I want to achieve is
> to be able to add a rule like "If process can read etc_t, then it can also
> read etc_foo_t"
>
> That would allow me to change context of individual files, and grant access
> to them by process who already have etc_t, and I wouldn't have to redefine
> almost the entire selinux context tree just to target a few individual files
> in /etc for my app.
>
> T.
>
> On 9/18/07, Daniel J Walsh <dwalsh redhat com> wrote:
> Torbjørn Lindahl wrote:
>>>> Good point.
>>>> I probably can live with that.
>>>>
>>>> Still I am not sure if I would like it to have full access to all files
>>>> labelled etc_t . It would be nice to be able to single out only a few of
>>>> them. Perhaps I should look at something other than the targeted policy.
>>>>
>>>> On 9/17/07, Daniel J Walsh <dwalsh redhat com> wrote:
>>>> Torbjørn Lindahl wrote:
>>>>>>> Hello, I am writing an application that I want to limit using
> selinux.
>>>>>>> audit.log shows that it wants access to /etc/nsswitch.conf and
>>>> /etc/hosts -
>>>>>>> which doesn't seem to unreasonable, however both these have types
> etc_t
>>>> ,
>>>>>>> and allowing myapp_t to read etc_t would also give it access to for
>>>> example
>>>>>>> /etc/passwd, which i do not want.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Do I have to invent a new type for these two files to be able to keep
> my
>>>>>>> application from the other etc_t files in /etc ?
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
> ------------------------------------------------------------------------
>>>>>>> --
>>>>>>> fedora-selinux-list mailing list
>>>>>>> fedora-selinux-list redhat com
>>>>>>> https://www.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/fedora-selinux-list
>>>> Yes you can, but the more different file_context that you have in /etc,
>>>> the harder they will be to maintain.
>>>>
>>>> Reading /etc/passwd is not as dangerous as being able to read
>>>> /etc/shadow. So consider if this is really necessary.
>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------
>>>> --
>>>> fedora-selinux-list mailing list
>>>> fedora-selinux-list redhat com
>>>> https://www.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/fedora-selinux-list
> All of the current policies including mls allow reading of etc_t for
> most domains, and /etc/passwd is labeled etc_t.
>>
> ------------------------------------------------------------------------
> --
> fedora-selinux-list mailing list
> fedora-selinux-list redhat com
> https://www.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/fedora-selinux-list
We could do something like this with attributes.
If you created an attribute of etc_filetype
Then gave etc_t this attribute, change the interfaces that say
files_read_etc_files()
to use the attribute instead of the file.
Now when you create new file types, you could define them as etc_filetype.
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