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Re: auditd went crazy
- From: Daniel J Walsh <dwalsh redhat com>
- To: fedora-selinux-list redhat com
- Subject: Re: auditd went crazy
- Date: Tue, 08 Jul 2008 14:35:22 -0400
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Todd Zullinger wrote:
> Daniel J Walsh wrote:
>> Seems like you have a mislabeld program running as initrc_t?
>>
>> ps -eZ | grep initrc_t
>
> Are there some docs on how to fix up an programs running as initrc_t
> (and when it is required to do so)? I notice that puppetd is in this
> situation on my system, but I don't know if that's a potential problem
> nor how to correct it if it is.
>
>
>
> ------------------------------------------------------------------------
>
> --
> fedora-selinux-list mailing list
> fedora-selinux-list redhat com
> https://www.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/fedora-selinux-list
No any system daemon that does not have policy will run as initrc_t, if
these daemons executed confined applications, you could see AVC's. But
ordinarily an initrc_t domains will run as "unconfined". It is the
equivalent of the unconfined_t domain for a logged in user.
We could write policy for puppetd and it would run under a different
context. Puppetd probably needs to do just about anything, so writing a
standard policy for it to work everywhere is impossible, so it would
have to be uncofined.
A lot of times AVC's for a confined domain referrring to initrc_t
indicates a leaked file descriptor.
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