clock riddle

[Chris Adams]

Once upon a time, Chris Adams <cmadams at hiwaay.net> said:
> What mechanism is there to keep track of these policies?  There should
> be a Fedora policy to control RPMs adding new policies to PolicyKit.  As
> a system admin, I look for setuid/setgid binaries and open sockets, but
> now there's a new method to bypass that for root-level access.

As a follow-up, I see on F10 that a user can also increase their process
priority level (which is normally a privilege reserved for root).  This
is often useful in timing attacks and should not be allowed.

If I'm reading the policy right, users can change PackageKit proxy
settings and force a refresh of metadata.  How much has PackageKit's
(and yum's) code been audited for security?  If I can point it at a
proxy and force it to download data, how secure is it against attack
(e.g. via corrupted data)?

-- 
Chris Adams <cmadams at hiwaay.net>
Systems and Network Administrator - HiWAAY Internet Services
I don't speak for anybody but myself - that's enough trouble.