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Re: [libvirt] Updated James Morris patch to apply to libvirt-0.6.0 version
- From: "Daniel P. Berrange" <berrange redhat com>
- To: James Morris <jmorris namei org>
- Cc: libvir-list redhat com, Daniel J Walsh <dwalsh redhat com>
- Subject: Re: [libvirt] Updated James Morris patch to apply to libvirt-0.6.0 version
- Date: Mon, 2 Mar 2009 11:09:17 +0000
On Mon, Mar 02, 2009 at 09:18:05AM +1100, James Morris wrote:
> On Fri, 27 Feb 2009, Daniel J Walsh wrote:
>
> > I think we need a mechanism in libvirtd.conf to turn this off. And
> > allow perhaps three modes.
> >
> > svirt=Disabled. No Security Driver.
> > svirt=MLS (Requires context in xml, no relabel of disks)
> > svirt=Standard, (If no XML label, then random generate one and reset
> > file context).
>
> I wouldn't call these MLS and Standard. The simple isolation scheme with
> automatic labeling is just one way to do things. Down the track, we'll
> want to be able to specify arbitrary types for guests, not just for MLS.
I think perhaps we should make this a QEMU driver config option (ie be
in /etc/libvirt/qemu.conf) and have 2 flags
security_driver="selinux|none"
security_autolabel="yes|no"
If security_autolabel is set to 'no', then the app must pass an explicit
security context in the domain XML, otherwise the domain is unconfined.
If security_autolabel is set to 'yes', then if the app passes an explicit
security context this is used, otherwise it will auto-generate one at
startup of the VM.
Regards,
Daniel
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