Fwd: CERT Advisory CA-98.10 - mime_buffer_overflows

[Gary Stanley <ancient nws net>]

>Date: Tue, 11 Aug 1998 13:21:06 -0400
>From: CERT Advisory <cert-advisory cert org>
>To: cert-advisory coal cert org
>Subject: CERT Advisory CA-98.10 - mime_buffer_overflows
>Reply-To: cert-advisory-request cert org
>Organization: CERT(sm) Coordination Center -  +1 412-268-7090
>
>-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
>
>=============================================================================
>CERT* Advisory CA-98.10
>Original issue date: August 11, 1998
>
>Topic: Buffer Overflow in MIME-aware Mail and News Clients
>
>-
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>
>The CERT Coordination Center has received reports of a vulnerability in some
>MIME-aware mail and news clients.
>
>The CERT/CC team recommends updating any vulnerable mail or news clients
>according to the information provided in Appendix A. In addition, network
>administrators may be able to employ some risk mitigation strategies until
>they are able to update all the vulnerable clients. These strategies are
>described in Appendix B.
>
>We will update this advisory as we receive additional information. Please
>check our advisory files regularly for updates that relate to your site.
>
>As of the publication date of this advisory, we have not received any
>reports indicating this vulnerability has been successfully exploited.
>
>-
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>
>I.   Description
>
>A vulnerability in some MIME-aware mail and news clients could allow
>an intruder to execute arbitrary code, crash the system, or gain
>administrative rights on vulnerable systems. The vulnerability has
>been discovered by Marko Laakso and Ari Takanen of the Secure
>Programming Group of the University of Oulu. It has received
>considerable public attention in the media and through reports
>published by Microsoft, Netscape, AUSCERT, CIAC, NTBugTraq, and
>others.
>
>The vulnerability affects a number of mail and news clients in
>addition to the ones which have been the subjects of those reports.
>
>
>II.  Impact
>
>An intruder who sends a carefully crafted mail message to a vulnerable
>system can, under some circumstances, cause code of the intruder's
>choosing to be executed on the vulnerable system. Additionally, an
>intruder can cause a vulnerable mail program to crash unexpectedly.
>
>Depending on the operating system on which the mail client is running
>and the privileges of the user running the vulnerable mail client, the
>intruder may be able to crash the entire system. If a privileged user
>reads mail with a vulnerable mail user agent, an intruder can gain
>administrative access to the system.
>
>
>III. Solution
>
>     A.  Obtain and install a patch for this problem as described in
>         Appendix A.
>
>
>     B.  Until you are able to install the appropriate patch, you may wish to
>         install patches to sendmail or to use procmail filtering as
described
>         in Appendix B.
>
>
>~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
>
>Appendix A - Vendor Information
>
>Below is a list of the vendors who have provided information for this
>advisory. We will update this appendix as we receive additional information.
>If you do not see your vendor's name, the CERT/CC did not hear from that
>vendor. Please contact the vendor directly.
>
>
>Caldera Inc.
>============
>
>Caldera is currently investigating these issues and in the process of
>releasing a fix. Updated RPMs will be uploaded to:
>
>        ftp://ftp.caldera.com/pub/OpenLinux/updates/1.2/011
>
>                9d2a8ca516c3bbbe920a72d365780fe3  mutt-0.93.1-2.i386.rpm
>                a20383c9c6f73aac56731ab65c9525fd  mutt-0.93.1-2.src.rpm
>
>
>Data General Corporation
>========================
>
>DG/UX is not vulnerable to this report as it includes no native utilities
with
>mime support.
>
>
>Fujitsu
>=======
>
>Fujitsu's operating system, UXP/V, does not support any mail client
>which can handle MIME encoding/decoding. Therefore, Fujitsu UXP/V is
>not vulnerable.
>
>
>Hewlett-Packard Company
>=======================
>
>The version of dtmail supplied by HP, as part of HP's CDE product, is
>vulnerable. Patches in process.
>
>
>Iris
>====
>
>Iris is aware of this problem and is investigating to determine if Lotus
Notes
>is vulnerable.
>
>
>Microsoft Corporation
>=====================
>
>Previously released information regarding this vulnerability is
>available from Microsoft at
>
>      http://www.microsoft.com/security/bulletins/ms98-008.htm
>
>
>NCR
>====
>
>No products are affected.
>
>
>NetBSD Foundation
>=================
>
>The NetBSD Foundation package system contains packages for mutt and pine. All
>users should upgrade to the latest version of these packages as soon as
>possible. Updated binary packages will become available on the NetBSD FTP
>server as soon as possible, and will be announced on the
>netbsd-announce netbsd org list. To join this list, or more information about
>NetBSD, please see http://www.NetBSD.ORG/
>
>
>Netscape
>========
>
>Previously released information regarding this vulnerability is
>available from Netscape at
>
>http://www.netscape.com/products/security/resources/bugs/longfile.html
>
>
>OpenBSD
>=======
>Not affected. OpenBSD does not ship any of the affected products.
>
>
>QUALCOMM Incorporated
>=====================
>
>Eudora Pro Email, Eudora Pro CommCenter and Eudora Light not
>susceptible to buffer overflow security problem
>
>QUALCOMM tested its line of Eudora email software after becoming aware
>of the buffer overflow security problems recently found in Microsoft
>and Netscape email programs. QUALCOMM is pleased to announce that its
>Eudora email products are not susceptible to the types of attacks that
>can harm the computers of users of these other products. QUALCOMM
>tested the latest versions of Eudora Pro and Eudora CommCenter
>versions 4.0, 4.0.1 and 4.1 (beta), as well as Eudora Pro and Eudora
>Light versions 3.0 through 3.0.5 (Windows) and 3.1.3 (Mac). In all
>cases, Eudora does not allow any unauthorized programs to be
>automatically executed on a user's system by exploiting buffer
>overflow flaws.
>
>Internally, Eudora 4.0.1 (shipping) and 4.1 (beta) checks incoming
>header sizes and in particular attachment name lengths and truncates
>where appropriate to avoid buffer overrun. Previous versions of
>Eudora, specifically the Windows Eudora versions 3.0 through 3.0.5 and
>4.0, long attachment names under certain conditions could cause the
>program to terminate prematurely, but most importantly, not in such a
>way as to allow unauthorized execution of code. Upgrading to Windows
>Eudora 4.0.1 or 4.0.2 (both shipping) or 4.1 (beta) resolves that
>particular issue.
>
>An unrelated security issue has recently been made public regarding
>the use of Java scripts and attachments in email messages received by
>Eudora 4.x.  Full details of this issue, along with links to Eudora
>Pro 4.0.2 and 4.1 updaters is available at
><http://eudora.qualcomm.com/security.html>.  The available Eudora Pro
>4.0.2 and 4.1 updaters correct the potential security risk.
>
>
>The Santa Cruz Operation, Inc. (SCO)
>====================================
>
>The following SCO products are not vulnerable:
>
>- - SCO CMW+
>- - SCO Open Desktop / Open Server 3.0, SCO UNIX 3.2v4
>- - SCO OpenServer 5, SCO Internet FastStart
>- - SCO UnixWare 2.1
>
>SCO UnixWare 7 dtmail may be vulnerable - investigation is
>continuing.  Pending this investigation, SCO recommends that
>dtmail not be used on UnixWare 7; mail may be safely read
>using mailx or Netscape Navigator.
>
>
>Sun Microsystems, Inc.
>======================
>
>Sun Microsystems is working on patches for the following products:
>
>        dtmail
>                * CDE versions 1.0.1, 1.0.2 and 1.2.
>                * Patches will be available within three weeks
>
>        mailtool
>                * Openwindows versions 3.0, 3.3, 3.4, 3.5 and 3.6.
>                * Patches will be available within one week.
>
>
>University of Washington
>========================
>
>Pursuant to recent reports of vulnerability to mal-formed or malicious
>MIME attachments, the UW Pine Team has corrected a few cases of
>potential buffer overrun in the latest Pine Message System release,
>version 4.02, that might cause Pine to crash when inordinately long
>MIME-header information is encountered.
>
>It has been speculated that these problems could be exploited to allow
>a message sender to execute an arbitrary command on behalf of the
>receiving user, although with no more privilege than the receiving
>user.  While the UW Pine Team is not aware of any specific attacks
>involving this bug, they have made a source patch available to address
>this threat.
>
>The source patch is available from:
>
>        ftp://ftp.cac.washington.edu/pine/pine4.02A.patch
>
>Or via links found within the Pine Information Center at:
>
>        http://www.washington.edu/pine/
>
>The patch is intended for the Pine Mail System version 4.02 (released
>21 July 1998).  The file is in context-diff format, and should be
>understood by the "patch" utility.  To update Pine 4.02 source, simply
>copy the patch file into the same directory as the pine4.02 source
>tree and type:
>
>        patch -p < pine4.02A.patch
>
>The UW Pine Team strongly encourages sites running version 4.00 or
>greater to upgrade to the latest release, and apply the published
>patch.  While versions prior to 4.00 are less sensitive to malicious
>messages, upgrading to version 4.02A (including the patch) is
>recommended.
>
>
>
>~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
>
>Appendix B - Risk Mitigation
>
>Although the vulnerability described in this advisory affects mail
>user agents, it may be possible to reduce the risk by modifying mail
>transfer agents to detect the vulnerability before it reaches the mail
>user agent, or by filtering the message.
>
>Below is a list of vendors who have provided us information on
>strategies that can mitigate the risk. Note that these vendors are not
>themselves vulnerable to this problem.
>
>Sendmail, Inc.
>==============
>
>Sendmail, Inc. has produced a patch for version 8.9.1 of sendmail
>as a service to their user base to assist system administrators
>in proactively defending against these problems.
>Sites who choose not to install the patch at this time will
>not increase their exposure to the problem in this case.
>
>This patch and installation instructions are available at
>http://www.sendmail.com/sendmail.8.9.1a.html .
>
>Note that the patch is specific to sendmail version 8.9.1 only.
>If you are unable to upgrade to this version, do not attempt to
>use the patch.
>
>John Hardin
>===========
>
>John Hardin has modified his procmail Filters Kit to include filters
>which may be able to assist sites in defending against these problems.
>
>More information about the procmail Filters Kit is available at
>
>http://www.wolfenet.com/~jhardin/procmail-kit.html
>
>
>-
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>Our thanks go to Marko Laakso and Ari Takanen of the Secure Programming
>Group of the University of Oulu; Eric Allman and Gregory Shapiro
>of Sendmail, Inc; AUSCERT; DFN-CERT; John Hardin; and Gene Spafford of
>Purdue University for their input.
>-
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>
>NO WARRANTY
>- -----------
>
>Any material furnished by Carnegie Mellon University and the Software
>Engineering Institute is furnished on an "as is" basis. Carnegie
>Mellon University makes no warranties of any kind, either expressed or
>implied as to any matter including, but not limited to, warranty of
>fitness for a particular purpose or merchantability, exclusivity or
>results obtained from use of the material. Carnegie Mellon University
>does not make any warranty of any kind with respect to freedom from
>patent, trademark, or copyright infringement.
>
>- ---------
>
>If you believe that your system has been compromised, contact the CERT
>Coordination Center or your representative in the Forum of Incident
>Response and Security Teams (see http://www.first.org/team-info/).
>
>CERT/CC Contact Information
>- ----------------------------
>Email    cert cert org
>
>Phone    +1 412-268-7090 (24-hour hotline)
>                CERT personnel answer 8:30-5:00 p.m. EST(GMT-5) / EDT(GMT-4)
>                and are on call for emergencies during other hours.
>
>Fax      +1 412-268-6989
>
>Postal address
>         CERT Coordination Center
>         Software Engineering Institute
>         Carnegie Mellon University
>         Pittsburgh PA 15213-3890
>         USA
>
>Using encryption
>   We strongly urge you to encrypt sensitive information sent by email. We
can
>   support a shared DES key or PGP. Contact the CERT/CC for more information.
>   Location of CERT PGP key
>         ftp://ftp.cert.org/pub/CERT_PGP.key
>
>Getting security information
>   CERT publications and other security information are available from
>        http://www.cert.org/
>        ftp://ftp.cert.org/pub/
>
>   CERT advisories and bulletins are also posted on the USENET newsgroup
>        comp.security.announce
>
>   To be added to our mailing list for advisories and bulletins, send
>   email to
>        cert-advisory-request cert org
>   In the subject line, type
>	SUBSCRIBE  your-email-address
>
>- ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
>
>Copyright 1998 Carnegie Mellon University. Conditions for use, disclaimers,
>and sponsorship information can be found in
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>"copyright" in the subject line.
>
>*CERT is registered in the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office.
>
>- ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
>
>This file:
>
>	ftp://ftp.cert.org/pub/cert_advisories/CA-98.10.mime_buffer_overflows
>
>	http://www.cert.org/advisories/CA-98.10-mime-buffer-overflows.html
>
>
>
>~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
>Revision history
>
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