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Re: Delays



Michael K. Johnson:
> Passwords are not restricted to the pam_unix modules.  Just because
> most of the other modules currently available don't have anything to
> do with passwords doesn't mean that we should ignore the possibility
> of others having passwords later.  For instance, the kerberos and
> s/key modules will work with passwords.

Passwords are not restricted to pam_unix, but they are (the traditional
reusable ones anyway) considered obsolete, so most new authentication
methods probably won't use them.  Don't know about kerberos, but s/key
uses one-time passwords - guessing doesn't make much sense...

> Overhead is hardly a problem for a delay module, is it?

Except for additional disk I/O caused by loading it :-).  My comment
about overhead was general, not just about that particular module.

> Hm.  Sounds like they implemented it in their version of libpam.
> That's a possibility, but I prefer to give the sysadmin the control
> over the policy.  Isn't that one of the goals of PAM?  I know sysadmins

I'm not suggesting that we just hardcode sleep(3) or whatever.  On
Solaris it is controlled by SLEEPTIME=seconds (default 4 seconds)
in /etc/default/login.  Shadow has FAIL_DELAY in /etc/login.defs.
So the sysadmin does have control over the policy.

Regards,

Marek



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