[redhat-lspp] Re: [PATCH 1/2] audit: rename AUDIT_SE_* constants

[Stephen Smalley <sds tycho nsa gov>]

On Thu, 2006-06-29 at 16:56 -0500, Darrel Goeddel wrote:
> This patch renames some audit constant definitions and adds
> additional definitions used by the following patch.  The renaming
> avoids ambiguity with respect to the new definitions.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Darrel Goeddel <dgoeddel trustedcs com>
> 
>  include/linux/audit.h          |   15 ++++++++----
>  kernel/auditfilter.c           |   50 ++++++++++++++++++++---------------------
>  kernel/auditsc.c               |   10 ++++----
>  security/selinux/ss/services.c |   32 +++++++++++++-------------
>  4 files changed, 56 insertions(+), 51 deletions(-)

Looks ok, although I'm not sure I'd have bothered renaming the old ones
(and I'm not sure why you add the new definitions here rather than in
the second patch).

> 
> diff --git a/include/linux/audit.h b/include/linux/audit.h
> index f7883ec..c5cbd4d 100644
> --- a/include/linux/audit.h
> +++ b/include/linux/audit.h
> @@ -152,12 +152,17 @@ #define AUDIT_LOGINUID	9
>  #define AUDIT_PERS	10
>  #define AUDIT_ARCH	11
>  #define AUDIT_MSGTYPE	12
> -#define AUDIT_SE_USER	13	/* security label user */
> -#define AUDIT_SE_ROLE	14	/* security label role */
> -#define AUDIT_SE_TYPE	15	/* security label type */
> -#define AUDIT_SE_SEN	16	/* security label sensitivity label */
> -#define AUDIT_SE_CLR	17	/* security label clearance label */
> +#define AUDIT_SUBJ_USER	13	/* security label user */
> +#define AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE	14	/* security label role */
> +#define AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE	15	/* security label type */
> +#define AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN	16	/* security label sensitivity label */
> +#define AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR	17	/* security label clearance label */
>  #define AUDIT_PPID	18
> +#define AUDIT_OBJ_USER	19
> +#define AUDIT_OBJ_ROLE	20
> +#define AUDIT_OBJ_TYPE	21
> +#define AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW	22
> +#define AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH	23
>  
>  				/* These are ONLY useful when checking
>  				 * at syscall exit time (AUDIT_AT_EXIT). */
> diff --git a/kernel/auditfilter.c b/kernel/auditfilter.c
> index e98db08..40a9931 100644
> --- a/kernel/auditfilter.c
> +++ b/kernel/auditfilter.c
> @@ -470,11 +470,11 @@ static struct audit_entry *audit_data_to
>  		case AUDIT_ARG2:
>  		case AUDIT_ARG3:
>  			break;
> -		case AUDIT_SE_USER:
> -		case AUDIT_SE_ROLE:
> -		case AUDIT_SE_TYPE:
> -		case AUDIT_SE_SEN:
> -		case AUDIT_SE_CLR:
> +		case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER:
> +		case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE:
> +		case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE:
> +		case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN:
> +		case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR:
>  			str = audit_unpack_string(&bufp, &remain, f->val);
>  			if (IS_ERR(str))
>  				goto exit_free;
> @@ -611,11 +611,11 @@ static struct audit_rule_data *audit_kru
>  		data->fields[i] = f->type;
>  		data->fieldflags[i] = f->op;
>  		switch(f->type) {
> -		case AUDIT_SE_USER:
> -		case AUDIT_SE_ROLE:
> -		case AUDIT_SE_TYPE:
> -		case AUDIT_SE_SEN:
> -		case AUDIT_SE_CLR:
> +		case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER:
> +		case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE:
> +		case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE:
> +		case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN:
> +		case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR:
>  			data->buflen += data->values[i] =
>  				audit_pack_string(&bufp, f->se_str);
>  			break;
> @@ -654,11 +654,11 @@ static int audit_compare_rule(struct aud
>  			return 1;
>  
>  		switch(a->fields[i].type) {
> -		case AUDIT_SE_USER:
> -		case AUDIT_SE_ROLE:
> -		case AUDIT_SE_TYPE:
> -		case AUDIT_SE_SEN:
> -		case AUDIT_SE_CLR:
> +		case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER:
> +		case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE:
> +		case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE:
> +		case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN:
> +		case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR:
>  			if (strcmp(a->fields[i].se_str, b->fields[i].se_str))
>  				return 1;
>  			break;
> @@ -774,11 +774,11 @@ static struct audit_entry *audit_dupe_ru
>  	 * the originals will all be freed when the old rule is freed. */
>  	for (i = 0; i < fcount; i++) {
>  		switch (new->fields[i].type) {
> -		case AUDIT_SE_USER:
> -		case AUDIT_SE_ROLE:
> -		case AUDIT_SE_TYPE:
> -		case AUDIT_SE_SEN:
> -		case AUDIT_SE_CLR:
> +		case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER:
> +		case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE:
> +		case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE:
> +		case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN:
> +		case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR:
>  			err = audit_dupe_selinux_field(&new->fields[i],
>  						       &old->fields[i]);
>  			break;
> @@ -1537,11 +1537,11 @@ static inline int audit_rule_has_selinux
>  	for (i = 0; i < rule->field_count; i++) {
>  		struct audit_field *f = &rule->fields[i];
>  		switch (f->type) {
> -		case AUDIT_SE_USER:
> -		case AUDIT_SE_ROLE:
> -		case AUDIT_SE_TYPE:
> -		case AUDIT_SE_SEN:
> -		case AUDIT_SE_CLR:
> +		case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER:
> +		case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE:
> +		case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE:
> +		case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN:
> +		case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR:
>  			return 1;
>  		}
>  	}
> diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
> index b32ccfa..e183a6f 100644
> --- a/kernel/auditsc.c
> +++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
> @@ -321,11 +321,11 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct tas
>  			if (ctx)
>  				result = audit_comparator(ctx->loginuid, f->op, f->val);
>  			break;
> -		case AUDIT_SE_USER:
> -		case AUDIT_SE_ROLE:
> -		case AUDIT_SE_TYPE:
> -		case AUDIT_SE_SEN:
> -		case AUDIT_SE_CLR:
> +		case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER:
> +		case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE:
> +		case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE:
> +		case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN:
> +		case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR:
>  			/* NOTE: this may return negative values indicating
>  			   a temporary error.  We simply treat this as a
>  			   match for now to avoid losing information that
> diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/services.c b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
> index d82898c..112484f 100644
> --- a/security/selinux/ss/services.c
> +++ b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
> @@ -1855,15 +1855,15 @@ int selinux_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u
>  		return -ENOTSUPP;
>  
>  	switch (field) {
> -	case AUDIT_SE_USER:
> -	case AUDIT_SE_ROLE:
> -	case AUDIT_SE_TYPE:
> +	case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER:
> +	case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE:
> +	case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE:
>  		/* only 'equals' and 'not equals' fit user, role, and type */
>  		if (op != AUDIT_EQUAL && op != AUDIT_NOT_EQUAL)
>  			return -EINVAL;
>  		break;
> -	case AUDIT_SE_SEN:
> -	case AUDIT_SE_CLR:
> +	case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN:
> +	case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR:
>  		/* we do not allow a range, indicated by the presense of '-' */
>  		if (strchr(rulestr, '-'))
>  			return -EINVAL;
> @@ -1884,29 +1884,29 @@ int selinux_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u
>  	tmprule->au_seqno = latest_granting;
>  
>  	switch (field) {
> -	case AUDIT_SE_USER:
> +	case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER:
>  		userdatum = hashtab_search(policydb.p_users.table, rulestr);
>  		if (!userdatum)
>  			rc = -EINVAL;
>  		else
>  			tmprule->au_ctxt.user = userdatum->value;
>  		break;
> -	case AUDIT_SE_ROLE:
> +	case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE:
>  		roledatum = hashtab_search(policydb.p_roles.table, rulestr);
>  		if (!roledatum)
>  			rc = -EINVAL;
>  		else
>  			tmprule->au_ctxt.role = roledatum->value;
>  		break;
> -	case AUDIT_SE_TYPE:
> +	case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE:
>  		typedatum = hashtab_search(policydb.p_types.table, rulestr);
>  		if (!typedatum)
>  			rc = -EINVAL;
>  		else
>  			tmprule->au_ctxt.type = typedatum->value;
>  		break;
> -	case AUDIT_SE_SEN:
> -	case AUDIT_SE_CLR:
> +	case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN:
> +	case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR:
>  		rc = mls_from_string(rulestr, &tmprule->au_ctxt, GFP_ATOMIC);
>  		break;
>  	}
> @@ -1958,7 +1958,7 @@ int selinux_audit_rule_match(u32 ctxid, 
>  	/* a field/op pair that is not caught here will simply fall through
>  	   without a match */
>  	switch (field) {
> -	case AUDIT_SE_USER:
> +	case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER:
>  		switch (op) {
>  		case AUDIT_EQUAL:
>  			match = (ctxt->user == rule->au_ctxt.user);
> @@ -1968,7 +1968,7 @@ int selinux_audit_rule_match(u32 ctxid, 
>  			break;
>  		}
>  		break;
> -	case AUDIT_SE_ROLE:
> +	case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE:
>  		switch (op) {
>  		case AUDIT_EQUAL:
>  			match = (ctxt->role == rule->au_ctxt.role);
> @@ -1978,7 +1978,7 @@ int selinux_audit_rule_match(u32 ctxid, 
>  			break;
>  		}
>  		break;
> -	case AUDIT_SE_TYPE:
> +	case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE:
>  		switch (op) {
>  		case AUDIT_EQUAL:
>  			match = (ctxt->type == rule->au_ctxt.type);
> @@ -1988,9 +1988,9 @@ int selinux_audit_rule_match(u32 ctxid, 
>  			break;
>  		}
>  		break;
> -	case AUDIT_SE_SEN:
> -	case AUDIT_SE_CLR:
> -		level = (field == AUDIT_SE_SEN ?
> +	case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN:
> +	case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR:
> +		level = (field == AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN ?
>  		         &ctxt->range.level[0] : &ctxt->range.level[1]);
>  		switch (op) {
>  		case AUDIT_EQUAL:
> 
-- 
Stephen Smalley
National Security Agency