rpms/openssh/devel openssh-4.5p1-mls.patch, 1.2, 1.3 openssh.spec, 1.105, 1.106
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fedora-cvs-commits at redhat.com
Thu Mar 1 08:28:25 UTC 2007
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Author: tmraz
Update of /cvs/dist/rpms/openssh/devel
In directory cvs.devel.redhat.com:/tmp/cvs-serv21980
Modified Files:
openssh-4.5p1-mls.patch openssh.spec
Log Message:
* Thu Feb 27 2007 Tomas Mraz <tmraz at redhat.com> - 4.5p1-4
- reject connection if requested mls range is not obtained (#229278)
openssh-4.5p1-mls.patch:
misc.c | 10 +
openbsd-compat/port-linux.c | 284 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------
session.c | 4
sshd.c | 3
4 files changed, 259 insertions(+), 42 deletions(-)
Index: openssh-4.5p1-mls.patch
===================================================================
RCS file: /cvs/dist/rpms/openssh/devel/openssh-4.5p1-mls.patch,v
retrieving revision 1.2
retrieving revision 1.3
diff -u -r1.2 -r1.3
--- openssh-4.5p1-mls.patch 16 Jan 2007 21:20:04 -0000 1.2
+++ openssh-4.5p1-mls.patch 1 Mar 2007 08:28:22 -0000 1.3
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
---- openssh-4.5p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c.mls 2007-01-16 22:08:06.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssh-4.5p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c 2007-01-16 22:11:05.000000000 +0100
-@@ -33,12 +33,22 @@
+--- openssh-4.5p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c.mls 2007-01-16 22:13:32.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh-4.5p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c 2007-03-01 09:04:17.000000000 +0100
+@@ -33,12 +33,23 @@
#include "key.h"
#include "hostfile.h"
#include "auth.h"
@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@
#include <selinux/flask.h>
+#include <selinux/context.h>
#include <selinux/get_context_list.h>
++#include <selinux/get_default_type.h>
+#include <selinux/av_permissions.h>
+
+#ifdef HAVE_LINUX_AUDIT
@@ -23,7 +24,7 @@
/* Wrapper around is_selinux_enabled() to log its return value once only */
static int
-@@ -54,17 +64,107 @@
+@@ -54,17 +65,172 @@
return (enabled);
}
@@ -93,30 +94,99 @@
+get_user_context(const char *sename, const char *role, const char *lvl,
+ security_context_t *sc) {
+#ifdef HAVE_GET_DEFAULT_CONTEXT_WITH_LEVEL
-+ if (role != NULL && role[0])
-+ return get_default_context_with_rolelevel(sename, role, lvl, NULL, sc);
-+ else
-+ return get_default_context_with_level(sename, lvl, NULL, sc);
-+#else
-+ if (role != NULL && role[0])
-+ return get_default_context_with_role(sename, role, NULL, sc);
-+ else
-+ return get_default_context(sename, NULL, sc);
++ if (get_default_context_with_level(sename, lvl, NULL, sc) != 0) {
++ /* User may have requested a level completely outside of his
++ allowed range. We get a context just for auditing as the
++ range check below will certainly fail for default context. */
+#endif
++ if (get_default_context(sename, NULL, sc) != 0) {
++ *sc = NULL;
++ return -1;
++ }
++#ifdef HAVE_GET_DEFAULT_CONTEXT_WITH_LEVEL
++ }
++#endif
++ if (role != NULL && role[0]) {
++ context_t con;
++ char *type=NULL;
++ if (get_default_type(role, &type) != 0) {
++ error("get_default_type: failed to get default type for '%s'",
++ role);
++ goto out;
++ }
++ con = context_new(*sc);
++ if (!con) {
++ goto out;
++ }
++ context_role_set(con, role);
++ context_type_set(con, type);
++ freecon(*sc);
++ *sc = strdup(context_str(con));
++ context_free(con);
++ if (!*sc)
++ return -1;
++ }
++#ifdef HAVE_GET_DEFAULT_CONTEXT_WITH_LEVEL
++ if (lvl != NULL && lvl[0]) {
++ /* verify that the requested range is obtained */
++ context_t con;
++ security_context_t obtained_raw;
++ security_context_t requested_raw;
++ con = context_new(*sc);
++ if (!con) {
++ goto out;
++ }
++ context_range_set(con, lvl);
++ if (selinux_trans_to_raw_context(*sc, &obtained_raw) < 0) {
++ context_free(con);
++ goto out;
++ }
++ if (selinux_trans_to_raw_context(context_str(con), &requested_raw) < 0) {
++ freecon(obtained_raw);
++ context_free(con);
++ goto out;
++ }
++
++ debug("get_user_context: obtained context '%s' requested context '%s'",
++ obtained_raw, requested_raw);
++ if (strcmp(obtained_raw, requested_raw)) {
++ /* set the context to the real requested one but fail */
++ freecon(requested_raw);
++ freecon(obtained_raw);
++ freecon(*sc);
++ *sc = strdup(context_str(con));
++ context_free(con);
++ return -1;
++ }
++ freecon(requested_raw);
++ freecon(obtained_raw);
++ context_free(con);
++ }
++#endif
++ return 0;
++ out:
++ freecon(*sc);
++ *sc = NULL;
++ return -1;
+}
+
/* Return the default security context for the given username */
- static security_context_t
- ssh_selinux_getctxbyname(char *pwname)
+-static security_context_t
+-ssh_selinux_getctxbyname(char *pwname)
++static int
++ssh_selinux_getctxbyname(char *pwname,
++ security_context_t *default_sc, security_context_t *user_sc)
{
- security_context_t sc = NULL;
-+ security_context_t defsc = NULL;
+- security_context_t sc = NULL;
char *sename, *lvl;
+ const char *reqlvl = NULL;
char *role = NULL;
- int r = 0;
+- int r = 0;
++ int r = -1;
+ context_t con = NULL;
+
++ *default_sc = NULL;
++ *user_sc = NULL;
+ if (the_authctxt) {
+ if (the_authctxt->role != NULL) {
+ char *slash;
@@ -133,7 +203,7 @@
#ifdef HAVE_GETSEUSERBYNAME
if ((r=getseuserbyname(pwname, &sename, &lvl)) != 0) {
sename = NULL;
-@@ -72,23 +172,49 @@
+@@ -72,37 +238,56 @@
}
#else
sename = pwname;
@@ -142,60 +212,76 @@
#endif
if (r == 0) {
--#ifdef HAVE_GET_DEFAULT_CONTEXT_WITH_LEVEL
+ #ifdef HAVE_GET_DEFAULT_CONTEXT_WITH_LEVEL
- if (role != NULL && role[0])
- r = get_default_context_with_rolelevel(sename, role, lvl, NULL, &sc);
- else
- r = get_default_context_with_level(sename, lvl, NULL, &sc);
--#else
++ r = get_default_context_with_level(sename, lvl, NULL, default_sc);
+ #else
- if (role != NULL && role[0])
- r = get_default_context_with_role(sename, role, NULL, &sc);
- else
- r = get_default_context(sename, NULL, &sc);
--#endif
-+ r = get_user_context(sename, role, lvl, &defsc);
++ r = get_default_context(sename, NULL, default_sc);
+ #endif
}
+- if (r != 0) {
+- switch (security_getenforce()) {
+- case -1:
+- fatal("%s: ssh_selinux_getctxbyname: "
+- "security_getenforce() failed", __func__);
+- case 0:
+- error("%s: Failed to get default SELinux security "
+- "context for %s", __func__, pwname);
+- default:
+- fatal("%s: Failed to get default SELinux security "
+- "context for %s (in enforcing mode)",
+- __func__, pwname);
+ if (r == 0) {
+ /* If launched from xinetd, we must use current level */
+ if (inetd_flag && !rexeced_flag) {
+ security_context_t sshdsc=NULL;
+
-+ if (getcon(&sshdsc) < 0)
++ if (getcon_raw(&sshdsc) < 0)
+ fatal("failed to allocate security context");
+
+ if ((con=context_new(sshdsc)) == NULL)
+ fatal("failed to allocate selinux context");
+ reqlvl = context_range_get(con);
+ freecon(sshdsc);
++ if (reqlvl !=NULL && lvl != NULL && strcmp(reqlvl, lvl) == 0)
++ /* we actually don't change level */
++ reqlvl = "";
+
+ debug("%s: current connection level '%s'", __func__, reqlvl);
+ }
+
-+ if (reqlvl != NULL && reqlvl[0]) {
-+ r = get_user_context(sename, role, reqlvl, &sc);
++ if ((reqlvl != NULL && reqlvl[0]) || (role != NULL && role[0])) {
++ r = get_user_context(sename, role, reqlvl, user_sc);
+
-+ if (r == 0) {
-+ if (mls_range_allowed(defsc, sc)) {
-+ send_audit_message(1, defsc, sc);
++ if (r == 0 && reqlvl != NULL && reqlvl[0]) {
++ /* verify that the requested range is contained in the user range */
++ if (mls_range_allowed(*default_sc, *user_sc)) {
+ logit("permit MLS level %s (user range %s)", reqlvl, lvl);
+ } else {
-+ send_audit_message(0, defsc, sc);
-+ if (security_getenforce() > 0)
-+ fatal("deny MLS level %s (user range %s)", reqlvl, lvl);
-+ else
-+ error("deny MLS level %s (user range %s). Continuing in permissive mode", reqlvl, lvl);
++ r = -1;
++ error("deny MLS level %s (user range %s)", reqlvl, lvl);
+ }
+ }
-+ freecon(defsc);
+ } else {
-+ sc = defsc;
-+ }
++ *user_sc = *default_sc;
+ }
+ }
++ if (r != 0) {
++ error("%s: Failed to get default SELinux security "
++ "context for %s", __func__, pwname);
+ }
- if (r != 0) {
- switch (security_getenforce()) {
- case -1:
-@@ -110,6 +236,10 @@
+
+ #ifdef HAVE_GETSEUSERBYNAME
+ if (sename != NULL)
+@@ -110,14 +295,20 @@
if (lvl != NULL)
xfree(lvl);
#endif
@@ -204,9 +290,67 @@
+ if (con)
+ context_free(con);
- return (sc);
+- return (sc);
++ return (r);
+ }
+
+ /* Set the execution context to the default for the specified user */
+ void
+ ssh_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *pwname)
+ {
++ int r = 0;
++ security_context_t default_ctx = NULL;
+ security_context_t user_ctx = NULL;
+
+ if (!ssh_selinux_enabled())
+@@ -125,21 +316,39 @@
+
+ debug3("%s: setting execution context", __func__);
+
+- user_ctx = ssh_selinux_getctxbyname(pwname);
+- if (setexeccon(user_ctx) != 0) {
++ r = ssh_selinux_getctxbyname(pwname, &default_ctx, &user_ctx);
++ if (r >= 0) {
++ r = setexeccon(user_ctx);
++ if (r < 0) {
++ error("%s: Failed to set SELinux execution context %s for %s",
++ __func__, user_ctx, pwname);
++ }
++ }
++ if (user_ctx == NULL) {
++ user_ctx = default_ctx;
++ }
++ if (r < 0 || user_ctx != default_ctx) {
++ /* audit just the case when user changed a role or there was
++ a failure */
++ send_audit_message(r >= 0, default_ctx, user_ctx);
++ }
++ if (r < 0) {
+ switch (security_getenforce()) {
+ case -1:
+ fatal("%s: security_getenforce() failed", __func__);
+ case 0:
+- error("%s: Failed to set SELinux execution "
+- "context for %s", __func__, pwname);
++ error("%s: SELinux failure. Continuing in permissive mode.",
++ __func__);
++ break;
+ default:
+- fatal("%s: Failed to set SELinux execution context "
+- "for %s (in enforcing mode)", __func__, pwname);
++ fatal("%s: SELinux failure. Aborting connection.",
++ __func__);
+ }
+ }
+- if (user_ctx != NULL)
++ if (user_ctx != NULL && user_ctx != default_ctx)
+ freecon(user_ctx);
++ if (default_ctx != NULL)
++ freecon(default_ctx);
+
+ debug3("%s: done", __func__);
}
-@@ -157,7 +287,10 @@
+@@ -157,7 +366,10 @@
debug3("%s: setting TTY context on %s", __func__, tty);
@@ -218,8 +362,8 @@
/* XXX: should these calls fatal() upon failure in enforcing mode? */
---- openssh-4.5p1/sshd.c.mls 2007-01-16 21:43:11.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssh-4.5p1/sshd.c 2007-01-16 21:48:37.000000000 +0100
+--- openssh-4.5p1/sshd.c.mls 2007-01-16 22:13:32.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh-4.5p1/sshd.c 2007-01-16 22:13:32.000000000 +0100
@@ -1833,6 +1833,9 @@
restore_uid();
}
@@ -231,7 +375,7 @@
if (options.use_pam) {
do_pam_setcred(1);
--- openssh-4.5p1/misc.c.mls 2006-08-05 04:39:40.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-4.5p1/misc.c 2007-01-16 21:56:40.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh-4.5p1/misc.c 2007-01-16 22:13:32.000000000 +0100
@@ -418,6 +418,7 @@
colon(char *cp)
{
@@ -256,8 +400,8 @@
}
return (0);
}
---- openssh-4.5p1/session.c.mls 2007-01-16 21:43:11.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssh-4.5p1/session.c 2007-01-16 21:46:35.000000000 +0100
+--- openssh-4.5p1/session.c.mls 2007-01-16 22:13:32.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh-4.5p1/session.c 2007-01-16 22:13:32.000000000 +0100
@@ -1347,10 +1347,6 @@
#endif
if (getuid() != pw->pw_uid || geteuid() != pw->pw_uid)
Index: openssh.spec
===================================================================
RCS file: /cvs/dist/rpms/openssh/devel/openssh.spec,v
retrieving revision 1.105
retrieving revision 1.106
diff -u -r1.105 -r1.106
--- openssh.spec 22 Feb 2007 13:00:51 -0000 1.105
+++ openssh.spec 1 Mar 2007 08:28:22 -0000 1.106
@@ -61,7 +61,7 @@
Summary: The OpenSSH implementation of SSH protocol versions 1 and 2
Name: openssh
Version: 4.5p1
-Release: 3%{?dist}%{?rescue_rel}
+Release: 4%{?dist}%{?rescue_rel}
URL: http://www.openssh.com/portable.html
#Source0: ftp://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/OpenSSH/portable/openssh-%{version}.tar.gz
#Source1: ftp://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/OpenSSH/portable/openssh-%{version}.tar.gz.sig
@@ -459,6 +459,9 @@
%endif
%changelog
+* Thu Feb 27 2007 Tomas Mraz <tmraz at redhat.com> - 4.5p1-4
+- reject connection if requested mls range is not obtained (#229278)
+
* Wed Feb 22 2007 Tomas Mraz <tmraz at redhat.com> - 4.5p1-3
- improve Buildroot
- remove duplicate /etc/ssh from files
- Previous message (by thread): rpms/autofs/FC-6 autofs-5.0.1-rc3-check-user-info-return.patch, NONE, 1.1 autofs-5.0.1-rc3-export-check-network-fix-2.patch, NONE, 1.1 autofs-5.0.1-rc3-file-map-allow-white-space-only-line.patch, NONE, 1.1 autofs.spec, 1.174, 1.175
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