[Date Prev][Date Next]   [Thread Prev][Thread Next]   [Thread Index] [Date Index] [Author Index]

Re: auid



Steve G wrote:
so in the absence of SELinux (e.g. CAPP-only configuration), any uid 0 process
can mutate its loginuid later to mask the original one,


Or it can delete the audit logs or re-write syslog or install a rootkit covering
everything up. The only defence against this kind of tampering is remote logging.


and in the presence of SELinux, any program authorized for audit_control can mutate its loginuid later (so a smaller exposure, but still a possibility).


So...why doesn't policy restrict this even further so that the 10 apps that need
to set this are the *only* ones that can do so?

The list is: login, sshd, vsftpd, postfix, procmail, cron, at, gdm, kdm, & xdm.

That might break any alternatives to these programs, e.g. from Fedora Extras, such as proftpd, wouldn't it?

Paul.


[Date Prev][Date Next]   [Thread Prev][Thread Next]   [Thread Index] [Date Index] [Author Index]