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Re: Security policy oversight needed?



Am 2009-11-19 00:58, schrieb Chris Adams:
After seeing two conflicts over PolicyKit default policies allowing
unprivileged to do things that previously only root could do, it seems
to me that there needs to be some kind of oversight on security policy
for the distribution.  Right now, any package maintainer can make
changes to system security policy, without announcing it, getting any
approval, etc.

In the two cases I've seen, the maintainers decided that their way was
the right way and closed the bug reports without any real discussion,
which just seems unacceptable to me.

Any package (whether new or an update) that adds/changes PolicyKit,
consolehelper, or PAM configuration, and anything that installs new
setuid/setgid executables, should require some additional third-party
review.  Any significant changes that passes review should require some
minimum amount of advance notice and documentation on how to revert
(preferably in some common easy-to-find place in the wiki).

Is this feasible?  Who needs to look at this?

I would like to see this discussion separate from discussion about the
current issue with PackageKit.


I would like to see (and I brought this up on the list before) a page listing selinux exceptions. That is: applications which are essentially untrusted because of weird things they do with memory or whatever. The list would be in two parts: apps that have to be like this because of how they work (e.g. Java, mono) and apps that are badly written and should be fixed (firefox was/is one culprit).

The list would ensure two things:
1. That there is visibility of what selinux does not cover
2. That bad applications get attention or at least exposure


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