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rpms/exim/devel exim-csa.patch, NONE, 1.1 .cvsignore, 1.3, 1.4 exim.spec, 1.2, 1.3 sources, 1.3, 1.4 exim-4.51-csa.2c.patch, 1.1, NONE



Author: dwmw2

Update of /cvs/extras/rpms/exim/devel
In directory cvs-int.fedora.redhat.com:/tmp/cvs-serv31017/devel

Modified Files:
	.cvsignore exim.spec sources 
Added Files:
	exim-csa.patch 
Removed Files:
	exim-4.51-csa.2c.patch 
Log Message:
auto-import exim-4.51-2 on branch devel from exim-4.51-2.src.rpm

exim-csa.patch:

--- NEW FILE exim-csa.patch ---
--- doc/ChangeLog	4 May 2005 10:17:28 -0000	1.133
+++ doc/ChangeLog	10 May 2005 10:19:11 -0000	1.134
@@ -1,7 +1,13 @@
-$Cambridge: exim/exim-doc/doc-txt/ChangeLog,v 1.133 2005/05/04 10:17:28 ph10 Exp $
+$Cambridge: exim/exim-doc/doc-txt/ChangeLog,v 1.134 2005/05/10 10:19:11 ph10 Exp $
 
 Change log file for Exim from version 4.21
 -------------------------------------------
+
+
+Exim version 4.52
+-----------------
+
+TF/01 Added support for Client SMTP Authorization. See NewStuff for details.
 
 
 Exim version 4.51
--- doc/NewStuff	3 May 2005 14:20:00 -0000	1.39
+++ doc/NewStuff	10 May 2005 10:19:11 -0000	1.40
@@ -7,6 +7,66 @@
 but have not yet made it into the main manual (which is most conveniently
 updated when there is a relatively large batch of changes). The doc/ChangeLog
 file contains a listing of all changes, including bug fixes.
+
+
+Exim version 4.52
+-----------------
+
+TF/01 Support for checking Client SMTP Authorization has been added. CSA is a
+      system which allows a site to advertise which machines are and are not
+      permitted to send email. This is done by placing special SRV records in
+      the DNS, which are looked up using the client's HELO domain. At this
+      time CSA is still an Internet-Draft.
+
+      Client SMTP Authorization checks are performed by the ACL condition
+      verify=csa. This will fail if the client is not authorized. If there is
+      a DNS problem, or if no valid CSA SRV record is found, or if the client
+      is authorized, the condition succeeds. These three cases can be
+      distinguished using the expansion variable $csa_status, which can take
+      one of the values "fail", "defer", "unknown", or "ok". The condition
+      does not itself defer because that would be likely to cause problems
+      for legitimate email.
+
+      The error messages produced by the CSA code include slightly more
+      detail. If $csa_status is "defer" this may be because of problems
+      looking up the CSA SRV record, or problems looking up the CSA target
+      address record. There are four reasons for $csa_status being "fail":
+      the client's host name is explicitly not authorized; the client's IP
+      address does not match any of the CSA target IP addresses; the client's
+      host name is authorized but it has no valid target IP addresses (e.g.
+      the target's addresses are IPv6 and the client is using IPv4); or the
+      client's host name has no CSA SRV record but a parent domain has
+      asserted that all subdomains must be explicitly authorized.
+
+      The verify=csa condition can take an argument which is the domain to
+      use for the DNS query. The default is verify=csa/$sender_helo_name.
+
+      This implementation includes an extension to CSA. If the query domain
+      is an address literal such as [192.0.2.95], or if it is a bare IP
+      address, Exim will search for CSA SRV records in the reverse DNS as if
+      the HELO domain was e.g. 95.2.0.192.in-addr.arpa. Therefore it is
+      meaningful to say, for example, verify=csa/$sender_host_address - in
+      fact, this is the check that Exim performs if the client does not say
+      HELO. This extension can be turned off by setting the main
+      configuration option dns_csa_use_reverse = false.
+
+      If a CSA SRV record is not found for the domain itself, then a search
+      is performed through its parent domains for a record which might be
+      making assertions about subdomains. The maximum depth of this search is
+      limited using the main configuration option dns_csa_search_limit, which
+      takes the value 5 by default. Exim does not look for CSA SRV records in
+      a top level domain, so the default settings handle HELO domains as long
+      as seven (hostname.five.four.three.two.one.com) which encompasses the
+      vast majority of legitimate HELO domains.
+
+      The dnsdb lookup also has support for CSA. Although dnsdb already
+      supports SRV lookups, this is not sufficient because of the extra
+      parent domain search behaviour of CSA, and (as with PTR lookups)
+      dnsdb also turns IP addresses into lookups in the reverse DNS space.
+      The result of ${lookup dnsdb {csa=$sender_helo_name} } has two
+      space-separated fields: an authorization code and a target host name.
+      The authorization code can be "Y" for yes, "N" for no, "X" for explicit
+      authorization required but absent, or "?" for unknown.
 
 
 Version 4.51
--- src/acl.c	6 Apr 2005 14:03:53 -0000	1.28
+++ src/acl.c	10 May 2005 10:19:11 -0000	1.29
@@ -505,6 +505,45 @@
   { US"submission",             CONTROL_SUBMISSION, TRUE}
   };
 
+/* Support data structures for Client SMTP Authorization. acl_verify_csa()
+caches its result in a tree to avoid repeated DNS queries. The result is an
+integer code which is used as an index into the following tables of
+explanatory strings and verification return codes. */
+
+static tree_node *csa_cache = NULL;
+
+enum { CSA_UNKNOWN, CSA_OK, CSA_DEFER_SRV, CSA_DEFER_ADDR,
+ CSA_FAIL_EXPLICIT, CSA_FAIL_DOMAIN, CSA_FAIL_NOADDR, CSA_FAIL_MISMATCH };
+
+/* The acl_verify_csa() return code is translated into an acl_verify() return
+code using the following table. It is OK unless the client is definitely not
+authorized. This is because CSA is supposed to be optional for sending sites,
+so recipients should not be too strict about checking it - especially because
+DNS problems are quite likely to occur. It's possible to use $csa_status in
+further ACL conditions to distinguish ok, unknown, and defer if required, but
+the aim is to make the usual configuration simple. */
+
+static int csa_return_code[] = {
+  OK, OK, OK, OK,
+  FAIL, FAIL, FAIL, FAIL
+};
+
+static uschar *csa_status_string[] = {
+  US"unknown", US"ok", US"defer", US"defer",
+  US"fail", US"fail", US"fail", US"fail"
+};
+
+static uschar *csa_reason_string[] = {
+  US"unknown",
+  US"ok",
+  US"deferred (SRV lookup failed)",
+  US"deferred (target address lookup failed)",
+  US"failed (explicit authorization required)",
+  US"failed (host name not authorized)",
+  US"failed (no authorized addresses)",
+  US"failed (client address mismatch)"
+};
+
 /* Enable recursion between acl_check_internal() and acl_check_condition() */
 
 static int acl_check_internal(int, address_item *, uschar *, int, uschar **,
@@ -938,6 +977,304 @@
 
 
 /*************************************************
+*   Check client IP address matches CSA target   *
+*************************************************/
+
+/* Called from acl_verify_csa() below. This routine scans a section of a DNS
+response for address records belonging to the CSA target hostname. The section
+is specified by the reset argument, either RESET_ADDITIONAL or RESET_ANSWERS.
+If one of the addresses matches the client's IP address, then the client is
+authorized by CSA. If there are target IP addresses but none of them match
+then the client is using an unauthorized IP address. If there are no target IP
+addresses then the client cannot be using an authorized IP address. (This is
+an odd configuration - why didn't the SRV record have a weight of 1 instead?)
+
+Arguments:
+  dnsa       the DNS answer block
+  dnss       a DNS scan block for us to use
+  reset      option specifing what portion to scan, as described above
+  target     the target hostname to use for matching RR names
+
+Returns:     CSA_OK             successfully authorized
+             CSA_FAIL_MISMATCH  addresses found but none matched
+             CSA_FAIL_NOADDR    no target addresses found
+*/
+
+static int
+acl_verify_csa_address(dns_answer *dnsa, dns_scan *dnss, int reset,
+                       uschar *target)
+{
+dns_record *rr;
+dns_address *da;
+
+BOOL target_found = FALSE;
+
+for (rr = dns_next_rr(dnsa, dnss, reset);
+     rr != NULL;
+     rr = dns_next_rr(dnsa, dnss, RESET_NEXT))
+  {
+  /* Check this is an address RR for the target hostname. */
+
+  if (rr->type != T_A
+    #if HAVE_IPV6
+      && rr->type != T_AAAA
+      #ifdef SUPPORT_A6
+        && rr->type != T_A6
+      #endif
+    #endif
+  ) continue;
+
+  if (strcmpic(target, rr->name) != 0) continue;
+
+  target_found = TRUE;
+
+  /* Turn the target address RR into a list of textual IP addresses and scan
+  the list. There may be more than one if it is an A6 RR. */
+
+  for (da = dns_address_from_rr(dnsa, rr); da != NULL; da = da->next)
+    {
+    /* If the client IP address matches the target IP address, it's good! */
+
+    DEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("CSA target address is %s\n", da->address);
+
+    if (strcmpic(sender_host_address, da->address) == 0) return CSA_OK;
+    }
+  }
+
+/* If we found some target addresses but none of them matched, the client is
+using an unauthorized IP address, otherwise the target has no authorized IP
+addresses. */
+
+if (target_found) return CSA_FAIL_MISMATCH;
+else return CSA_FAIL_NOADDR;
+}
+
+
+
+/*************************************************
+*       Verify Client SMTP Authorization         *
+*************************************************/
+
+/* Called from acl_verify() below. This routine calls dns_lookup_special()
+to find the CSA SRV record corresponding to the domain argument, or
+$sender_helo_name if no argument is provided. It then checks that the
+client is authorized, and that its IP address corresponds to the SRV
+target's address by calling acl_verify_csa_address() above. The address
+should have been returned in the DNS response's ADDITIONAL section, but if
+not we perform another DNS lookup to get it.
+
+Arguments:
+  domain    pointer to optional parameter following verify = csa
+
+Returns:    CSA_UNKNOWN    no valid CSA record found
+            CSA_OK         successfully authorized
+            CSA_FAIL_*     client is definitely not authorized
+            CSA_DEFER_*    there was a DNS problem
+*/
+
+static int
+acl_verify_csa(uschar *domain)
+{
+tree_node *t;
+uschar *found, *p;
+int priority, weight, port;
+dns_answer dnsa;
+dns_scan dnss;
+dns_record *rr;
+int rc, type;
+uschar target[256];
+
+/* Work out the domain we are using for the CSA lookup. The default is the
+client's HELO domain. If the client has not said HELO, use its IP address
+instead. If it's a local client (exim -bs), CSA isn't applicable. */
+
+while (isspace(*domain) && *domain != '\0') ++domain;
+if (*domain == '\0') domain = sender_helo_name;
+if (domain == NULL) domain = sender_host_address;
+if (sender_host_address == NULL) return CSA_UNKNOWN;
+
+/* If we have an address literal, strip off the framing ready for turning it
+into a domain. The framing consists of matched square brackets possibly
+containing a keyword and a colon before the actual IP address. */
+
+if (domain[0] == '[')
+  {
+  uschar *start = Ustrchr(domain, ':');
+  if (start == NULL) start = domain;
+  domain = string_copyn(start + 1, Ustrlen(start) - 2);
+  }
+
+/* Turn domains that look like bare IP addresses into domains in the reverse
+DNS. This code also deals with address literals and $sender_host_address. It's
+not quite kosher to treat bare domains such as EHLO 192.0.2.57 the same as
+address literals, but it's probably the most friendly thing to do. This is an
+extension to CSA, so we allow it to be turned off for proper conformance. */
+
+if (string_is_ip_address(domain, NULL))
+  {
+  if (!dns_csa_use_reverse) return CSA_UNKNOWN;
+  dns_build_reverse(domain, target);
+  domain = target;
+  }
+
+/* Find out if we've already done the CSA check for this domain. If we have,
+return the same result again. Otherwise build a new cached result structure
+for this domain. The name is filled in now, and the value is filled in when
+we return from this function. */
+
+t = tree_search(csa_cache, domain);
+if (t != NULL) return t->data.val;
+
+t = store_get_perm(sizeof(tree_node) + Ustrlen(domain));
+Ustrcpy(t->name, domain);
+(void)tree_insertnode(&csa_cache, t);
+
+/* Now we are ready to do the actual DNS lookup(s). */
+
+found = domain;
+switch (dns_special_lookup(&dnsa, domain, T_CSA, &found))
+  {
+  /* If something bad happened (most commonly DNS_AGAIN), defer. */
+
+  default:
+  return t->data.val = CSA_DEFER_SRV;
+
+  /* If we found nothing, the client's authorization is unknown. */
+
+  case DNS_NOMATCH:
+  case DNS_NODATA:
+  return t->data.val = CSA_UNKNOWN;
+
+  /* We got something! Go on to look at the reply in more detail. */
+
+  case DNS_SUCCEED:
+  break;
+  }
+
+/* Scan the reply for well-formed CSA SRV records. */
+
+for (rr = dns_next_rr(&dnsa, &dnss, RESET_ANSWERS);
+     rr != NULL;
+     rr = dns_next_rr(&dnsa, &dnss, RESET_NEXT))
+  {
+  if (rr->type != T_SRV) continue;
+
+  /* Extract the numerical SRV fields (p is incremented) */
+
+  p = rr->data;
+  GETSHORT(priority, p);
+  GETSHORT(weight, p);
+  GETSHORT(port, p);
+
+  DEBUG(D_acl)
+    debug_printf("CSA priority=%d weight=%d port=%d\n", priority, weight, port);
+
+  /* Check the CSA version number */
+
+  if (priority != 1) continue;
+
+  /* If the domain does not have a CSA SRV record of its own (i.e. the domain
+  found by dns_special_lookup() is a parent of the one we asked for), we check
+  the subdomain assertions in the port field. At the moment there's only one
+  assertion: legitimate SMTP clients are all explicitly authorized with CSA
+  SRV records of their own. */
+
+  if (found != domain)
+    {
+    if (port & 1)
+      return t->data.val = CSA_FAIL_EXPLICIT;
+    else
+      return t->data.val = CSA_UNKNOWN;
+    }
+
+  /* This CSA SRV record refers directly to our domain, so we check the value
+  in the weight field to work out the domain's authorization. 0 and 1 are
+  unauthorized; 3 means the client is authorized but we can't check the IP
+  address in order to authenticate it, so we treat it as unknown; values
+  greater than 3 are undefined. */
+
+  if (weight < 2) return t->data.val = CSA_FAIL_DOMAIN;
+
+  if (weight > 2) continue;
+
+  /* Weight == 2, which means the domain is authorized. We must check that the
+  client's IP address is listed as one of the SRV target addresses. Save the
+  target hostname then break to scan the additional data for its addresses. */
+
+  (void)dn_expand(dnsa.answer, dnsa.answer + dnsa.answerlen, p,
+    (DN_EXPAND_ARG4_TYPE)target, sizeof(target));
+
+  DEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("CSA target is %s\n", target);
+
+  break;
+  }
+
+/* If we didn't break the loop then no appropriate records were found. */
+
+if (rr == NULL) return t->data.val = CSA_UNKNOWN;
+
+/* Do not check addresses if the target is ".", in accordance with RFC 2782.
+A target of "." indicates there are no valid addresses, so the client cannot
+be authorized. (This is an odd configuration because weight=2 target=. is
+equivalent to weight=1, but we check for it in order to keep load off the
+root name servers.) Note that dn_expand() turns "." into "". */
+
+if (Ustrcmp(target, "") == 0) return t->data.val = CSA_FAIL_NOADDR;
+
+/* Scan the additional section of the CSA SRV reply for addresses belonging
+to the target. If the name server didn't return any additional data (e.g.
+because it does not fully support SRV records), we need to do another lookup
+to obtain the target addresses; otherwise we have a definitive result. */
+
+rc = acl_verify_csa_address(&dnsa, &dnss, RESET_ADDITIONAL, target);
+if (rc != CSA_FAIL_NOADDR) return t->data.val = rc;
+
+/* The DNS lookup type corresponds to the IP version used by the client. */
+
+#if HAVE_IPV6
+if (Ustrchr(sender_host_address, ':') != NULL)
+  type = T_AAAA;
+else
+#endif /* HAVE_IPV6 */
+  type = T_A;
+
+
+#if HAVE_IPV6 && defined(SUPPORT_A6)
+DNS_LOOKUP_AGAIN:
+#endif
+
+switch (dns_lookup(&dnsa, target, type, NULL))
+  {
+  /* If something bad happened (most commonly DNS_AGAIN), defer. */
+
+  default:
+  return t->data.val = CSA_DEFER_ADDR;
+
+  /* If the query succeeded, scan the addresses and return the result. */
+
+  case DNS_SUCCEED:
+  rc = acl_verify_csa_address(&dnsa, &dnss, RESET_ANSWERS, target);
+  if (rc != CSA_FAIL_NOADDR) return t->data.val = rc;
+  /* else fall through */
+
+  /* If the target has no IP addresses, the client cannot have an authorized
+  IP address. However, if the target site uses A6 records (not AAAA records)
+  we have to do yet another lookup in order to check them. */
+
+  case DNS_NOMATCH:
+  case DNS_NODATA:
+
+  #if HAVE_IPV6 && defined(SUPPORT_A6)
+  if (type == T_AAAA) { type = T_A6; goto DNS_LOOKUP_AGAIN; }
+  #endif
+
+  return t->data.val = CSA_FAIL_NOADDR;
+  }
+}
+
+
+
+/*************************************************
 *     Handle verification (address & other)      *
 *************************************************/
 
@@ -1017,6 +1353,19 @@
   {
   if (slash != NULL) goto NO_OPTIONS;
   return helo_verified? OK : FAIL;
+  }
+
+/* Do Client SMTP Authorization checks in a separate function, and turn the
+result code into user-friendly strings. */
+
+if (strcmpic(ss, US"csa") == 0)
+  {
+  rc = acl_verify_csa(list);
+  *log_msgptr = *user_msgptr = string_sprintf("client SMTP authorization %s",
+                                              csa_reason_string[rc]);
+  csa_status = csa_status_string[rc];
+  DEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("CSA result %s\n", csa_status);
+  return csa_return_code[rc];
   }
 
 /* Check that all relevant header lines have the correct syntax. If there is
--- src/dns.c	17 Feb 2005 11:58:26 -0000	1.5
+++ src/dns.c	10 May 2005 10:19:11 -0000	1.6
@@ -153,9 +153,9 @@
 *************************************************/
 
 /* Call this with reset == RESET_ANSWERS to scan the answer block, reset ==
-RESET_ADDITIONAL to scan the additional records, and reset == RESET_NEXT to
-get the next record. The result is in static storage which must be copied if
-it is to be preserved.
+RESET_AUTHORITY to scan the authority records, reset == RESET_ADDITIONAL to
+scan the additional records, and reset == RESET_NEXT to get the next record.
+The result is in static storage which must be copied if it is to be preserved.
 
 Arguments:
   dnsa      pointer to dns answer block
@@ -192,12 +192,14 @@
 
   dnss->rrcount = ntohs(h->ancount);
 
-  /* Skip over answers and NS records if wanting to look at the additional
+  /* Skip over answers if we want to look at the authority section. Also skip
+  the NS records (i.e. authority section) if wanting to look at the additional
   records. */
 
-  if (reset == RESET_ADDITIONAL)
+  if (reset == RESET_ADDITIONAL) dnss->rrcount += ntohs(h->nscount);
+
+  if (reset == RESET_AUTHORITY || reset == RESET_ADDITIONAL)
     {
-    dnss->rrcount += ntohs(h->nscount);
     while (dnss->rrcount-- > 0)
       {
       namelen = dn_expand(dnsa->answer, dnsa->answer + dnsa->answerlen,
@@ -207,11 +209,11 @@
       GETSHORT(dnss->srr.size, dnss->aptr); /* size of data portion */
       dnss->aptr += dnss->srr.size;         /* skip over it */
       }
-    dnss->rrcount = ntohs(h->arcount);
+    dnss->rrcount = (reset == RESET_AUTHORITY)
+      ? ntohs(h->nscount) : ntohs(h->arcount);
     }
   }
 
-
 /* The variable dnss->aptr is now pointing at the next RR, and dnss->rrcount
 contains the number of RR records left. */
 
@@ -666,6 +668,153 @@
     if (rc != DNS_NOMATCH && rc != DNS_NODATA) return rc;
     while (*d != 0 && *d != '.') d++;
     if (*d++ == 0) break;
+    }
+  return DNS_NOMATCH;
+  }
+
+/* Try to look up the Client SMTP Authorization SRV record for the name. If
+there isn't one, search from the top downwards for a CSA record in a parent
+domain, which might be making assertions about subdomains. If we find a record
+we set fully_qualified_name to whichever lookup succeeded, so that the caller
+can tell whether to look at the explicit authorization field or the subdomain
+assertion field. */
+
+if (type == T_CSA)
+  {
+  uschar *srvname, *namesuff, *tld, *p;
+  int priority, weight, port;
+  int limit, rc, i;
+  BOOL ipv6;
+  dns_record *rr;
+  dns_scan dnss;
+
+  DEBUG(D_dns) debug_printf("CSA lookup of %s\n", name);
+
+  srvname = string_sprintf("_client._smtp.%s", name);
+  rc = dns_lookup(dnsa, srvname, T_SRV, NULL);
+  if (rc == DNS_SUCCEED || rc == DNS_AGAIN)
+    {
+    if (rc == DNS_SUCCEED) *fully_qualified_name = name;
+    return rc;
+    }
+
+  /* Search for CSA subdomain assertion SRV records from the top downwards,
+  starting with the 2nd level domain. This order maximizes cache-friendliness.
+  We skip the top level domains to avoid loading their nameservers and because
+  we know they'll never have CSA SRV records. */
+
+  namesuff = Ustrrchr(name, '.');
+  if (namesuff == NULL) return DNS_NOMATCH;
+  tld = namesuff + 1;
+  ipv6 = FALSE;
+  limit = dns_csa_search_limit;
+
+  /* Use more appropriate search parameters if we are in the reverse DNS. */
+
+  if (strcmpic(namesuff, US".arpa") == 0)
+    {
+    if (namesuff - 8 > name && strcmpic(namesuff - 8, US".in-addr.arpa") == 0)
+      {
+      namesuff -= 8;
+      tld = namesuff + 1;
+      limit = 3;
+      }
+    else if (namesuff - 4 > name && strcmpic(namesuff - 4, US".ip6.arpa") == 0)
+      {
+      namesuff -= 4;
+      tld = namesuff + 1;
+      ipv6 = TRUE;
+      limit = 3;
+      }
+    }
+
+  DEBUG(D_dns) debug_printf("CSA TLD %s\n", tld);
+
+  /* Do not perform the search if the top level or 2nd level domains do not
+  exist. This is quite common, and when it occurs all the search queries would
+  go to the root or TLD name servers, which is not friendly. So we check the
+  AUTHORITY section; if it contains the root's SOA record or the TLD's SOA then
+  the TLD or the 2LD (respectively) doesn't exist and we can skip the search.
+  If the TLD and the 2LD exist but the explicit CSA record lookup failed, then
+  the AUTHORITY SOA will be the 2LD's or a subdomain thereof. */
+
+  if (rc == DNS_NOMATCH)
+    {
+    /* This is really gross. The successful return value from res_search() is
+    the packet length, which is stored in dnsa->answerlen. If we get a
+    negative DNS reply then res_search() returns -1, which causes the bounds
+    checks for name decompression to fail when it is treated as a packet
+    length, which in turn causes the authority search to fail. The correct
+    packet length has been lost inside libresolv, so we have to guess a
+    replacement value. (The only way to fix this properly would be to
+    re-implement res_search() and res_query() so that they don't muddle their
+    success and packet length return values.) For added safety we only reset
+    the packet length if the packet header looks plausible. */
+
+    HEADER *h = (HEADER *)dnsa->answer;
+    if (h->qr == 1 && h->opcode == QUERY && h->tc == 0
+        && (h->rcode == NOERROR || h->rcode == NXDOMAIN)
+        && ntohs(h->qdcount) == 1 && ntohs(h->ancount) == 0
+        && ntohs(h->nscount) >= 1)
+      dnsa->answerlen = MAXPACKET;
+
+    for (rr = dns_next_rr(dnsa, &dnss, RESET_AUTHORITY);
+         rr != NULL;
+         rr = dns_next_rr(dnsa, &dnss, RESET_NEXT))
+      if (rr->type != T_SOA) continue;
+      else if (strcmpic(rr->name, US"") == 0 ||
+               strcmpic(rr->name, tld) == 0) return DNS_NOMATCH;
+      else break;
+    }
+
+  for (i = 0; i < limit; i++)
+    {
+    if (ipv6)
+      {
+      /* Scan through the IPv6 reverse DNS in chunks of 16 bits worth of IP
+      address, i.e. 4 hex chars and 4 dots, i.e. 8 chars. */
+      namesuff -= 8;
+      if (namesuff <= name) return DNS_NOMATCH;
+      }
+    else
+      /* Find the start of the preceding domain name label. */
+      do
+        if (--namesuff <= name) return DNS_NOMATCH;
+      while (*namesuff != '.');
+
+    DEBUG(D_dns) debug_printf("CSA parent search at %s\n", namesuff + 1);
+
+    srvname = string_sprintf("_client._smtp.%s", namesuff + 1);
+    rc = dns_lookup(dnsa, srvname, T_SRV, NULL);
+    if (rc == DNS_AGAIN) return rc;
+    if (rc != DNS_SUCCEED) continue;
+
+    /* Check that the SRV record we have found is worth returning. We don't
+    just return the first one we find, because some lower level SRV record
+    might make stricter assertions than its parent domain. */
+
+    for (rr = dns_next_rr(dnsa, &dnss, RESET_ANSWERS);
+         rr != NULL;
+         rr = dns_next_rr(dnsa, &dnss, RESET_NEXT))
+      {
+      if (rr->type != T_SRV) continue;
+
+      /* Extract the numerical SRV fields (p is incremented) */
+      p = rr->data;
+      GETSHORT(priority, p);
+      GETSHORT(weight, p);
+      GETSHORT(port, p);
+
+      /* Check the CSA version number */
+      if (priority != 1) continue;
+
+      /* If it's making an interesting assertion, return this response. */
+      if (port & 1)
+        {
+        *fully_qualified_name = namesuff + 1;
+        return DNS_SUCCEED;
+        }
+      }
     }
   return DNS_NOMATCH;
   }
--- src/exim.h	27 Apr 2005 10:00:18 -0000	1.11
+++ src/exim.h	10 May 2005 10:19:11 -0000	1.12
@@ -280,12 +280,19 @@
 #define T_SRV 33
 #endif
 
-/* We use the private type T_ZNS for retrieving the nameservers for the
-enclosing zone of a domain, and the private type T_MXH for retrieving
-the MX hostnames only (without their priorities). */
+/* We define a few private types for special DNS lookups:
+
+ . T_ZNS gets the nameservers of the enclosing zone of a domain
+
+ . T_MXH gets the MX hostnames only (without their priorities)
+
+ . T_CSA gets the domain's Client SMTP Authorization SRV record
+
+*/
 
 #define T_ZNS (-1)
 #define T_MXH (-2)
+#define T_CSA (-3)
 
 /* The resolv.h header defines __P(x) on some Solaris 2.5.1 systems (without
 checking that it is already defined, in fact). This conflicts with other
--- src/expand.c	28 Apr 2005 13:29:27 -0000	1.20
+++ src/expand.c	10 May 2005 10:19:11 -0000	1.21
@@ -333,6 +333,7 @@
   { "caller_uid",          vtype_uid,         &real_uid },
   { "compile_date",        vtype_stringptr,   &version_date },
   { "compile_number",      vtype_stringptr,   &version_cnumber },
+  { "csa_status",          vtype_stringptr,   &csa_status },
 #ifdef WITH_OLD_DEMIME
   { "demime_errorlevel",   vtype_int,         &demime_errorlevel },
   { "demime_reason",       vtype_stringptr,   &demime_reason },
--- src/globals.c	3 May 2005 14:20:01 -0000	1.23
+++ src/globals.c	10 May 2005 10:19:11 -0000	1.24
@@ -385,6 +385,8 @@
 int     continue_sequence      = 1;
 uschar *continue_transport     = NULL;
 
+uschar *csa_status             = NULL;
+
 BOOL    daemon_listen          = FALSE;
 uschar *daemon_smtp_port       = US"smtp";
 BOOL    debug_daemon           = FALSE;
@@ -473,6 +475,8 @@
 #endif
 
 uschar *dns_again_means_nonexist = NULL;
+int     dns_csa_search_limit   = 5;
+BOOL    dns_csa_use_reverse    = TRUE;
 uschar *dns_ipv4_lookup        = NULL;
 int     dns_retrans            = 0;
 int     dns_retry              = 0;
--- src/globals.h	3 May 2005 14:20:01 -0000	1.15
+++ src/globals.h	10 May 2005 10:19:11 -0000	1.16
@@ -214,6 +214,8 @@
 extern int     continue_sequence;      /* Sequence num for continued delivery */
 extern uschar *continue_transport;     /* Transport for continued delivery */
 
+extern uschar *csa_status;             /* Client SMTP Authorization result */
+
 extern BOOL    daemon_listen;          /* True if listening required */
 extern uschar *daemon_smtp_port;       /* Can be a list of ports */
 extern BOOL    debug_daemon;           /* Debug the daemon process only */
@@ -271,6 +273,8 @@
 #endif
 
 extern uschar *dns_again_means_nonexist; /* Domains that are badly set up */
+extern int     dns_csa_search_limit;   /* How deep to search for CSA SRV records */
+extern BOOL    dns_csa_use_reverse;    /* Check CSA in reverse DNS? (non-standard) */
 extern uschar *dns_ipv4_lookup;        /* For these domains, don't look for AAAA (or A6) */
 extern int     dns_retrans;            /* Retransmission time setting */
 extern int     dns_retry;              /* Number of retries */
--- src/macros.h	7 Apr 2005 10:54:54 -0000	1.12
+++ src/macros.h	10 May 2005 10:19:11 -0000	1.13
@@ -178,7 +178,7 @@
 
 /* Options for dns_next_rr */
 
-enum { RESET_NEXT, RESET_ANSWERS, RESET_ADDITIONAL };
+enum { RESET_NEXT, RESET_ANSWERS, RESET_AUTHORITY, RESET_ADDITIONAL };
 
 /* Argument values for the time-of-day function */
 
--- src/readconf.c	5 Apr 2005 13:58:35 -0000	1.7
+++ src/readconf.c	10 May 2005 10:19:11 -0000	1.8
@@ -193,6 +193,8 @@
   { "delivery_date_remove",     opt_bool,        &delivery_date_remove },
   { "dns_again_means_nonexist", opt_stringptr,   &dns_again_means_nonexist },
   { "dns_check_names_pattern",  opt_stringptr,   &check_dns_names_pattern },
+  { "dns_csa_search_limit",     opt_int,         &dns_csa_search_limit },
+  { "dns_csa_use_reverse",      opt_bool,        &dns_csa_use_reverse },
   { "dns_ipv4_lookup",          opt_stringptr,   &dns_ipv4_lookup },
   { "dns_retrans",              opt_time,        &dns_retrans },
   { "dns_retry",                opt_int,         &dns_retry },
--- src/lookups/dnsdb.c	17 Feb 2005 11:58:27 -0000	1.10
+++ src/lookups/dnsdb.c	10 May 2005 10:19:11 -0000	1.11
@@ -31,6 +31,7 @@
   #endif
 #endif
   "cname",
+  "csa",
   "mx",
   "mxh",
   "ns",
@@ -49,6 +50,7 @@
   #endif
 #endif
   T_CNAME,
+  T_CSA,     /* Private type for "Client SMTP Authorization". */
   T_MX,
   T_MXH,     /* Private type for "MX hostnames" */
   T_NS,
@@ -112,7 +114,7 @@
 int type = T_TXT;
 int failrc = FAIL;
 uschar *outsep = US"\n";
-uschar *equals, *domain;
+uschar *equals, *domain, *found;
 uschar buffer[256];
 
 /* Because we're the working in the search pool, we try to reclaim as much
@@ -228,15 +230,18 @@
         != NULL)
   {
   uschar rbuffer[256];
-  int searchtype = (type == T_ZNS)? T_NS :          /* record type we want */
-                   (type == T_MXH)? T_MX : type;
+  int searchtype = (type == T_CSA)? T_SRV :         /* record type we want */
+                   (type == T_MXH)? T_MX :
+                   (type == T_ZNS)? T_NS : type;
+
+  /* If the type is PTR or CSA, we have to construct the relevant magic lookup
+  key if the original is an IP address (some experimental protocols are using
+  PTR records for different purposes where the key string is a host name, and
+  Exim's extended CSA can be keyed by domains or IP addresses). This code for
+  doing the reversal is now in a separate function. */
 
-  /* If the type is PTR, we have to construct the relevant magic lookup key if
-  the original is an IP address (some experimental protocols are using PTR
-  records for different purposes where the key string is a host name). This
-  code for doing the reversal is now in a separate function. */
-
-  if (type == T_PTR && string_is_ip_address(domain, NULL) > 0)
+  if ((type == T_PTR || type == T_CSA) &&
+      string_is_ip_address(domain, NULL) > 0)
     {
     dns_build_reverse(domain, rbuffer);
     domain = rbuffer;
@@ -244,15 +249,16 @@
 
   DEBUG(D_lookup) debug_printf("dnsdb key: %s\n", domain);
 
-  /* Do the lookup and sort out the result. There are two special types that
-  are handled specially: T_ZNS and T_MXH. The former is handled in a special
-  lookup function so that the facility could be used from other parts of the
-  Exim code. The latter affects only what happens later on in this function,
-  but for tidiness it is handled in a similar way. If the lookup fails,
-  continue with the next domain. In the case of DEFER, adjust the final
-  "nothing found" result, but carry on to the next domain. */
+  /* Do the lookup and sort out the result. There are three special types that
+  are handled specially: T_CSA, T_ZNS and T_MXH. The former two are handled in
+  a special lookup function so that the facility could be used from other
+  parts of the Exim code. The latter affects only what happens later on in
+  this function, but for tidiness it is handled in a similar way. If the
+  lookup fails, continue with the next domain. In the case of DEFER, adjust
+  the final "nothing found" result, but carry on to the next domain. */
 
-  rc = dns_special_lookup(&dnsa, domain, type, NULL);
+  found = domain;
+  rc = dns_special_lookup(&dnsa, domain, type, &found);
 
   if (rc == DNS_NOMATCH || rc == DNS_NODATA) continue;
   if (rc != DNS_SUCCEED)
@@ -300,32 +311,63 @@
       yield = string_cat(yield, &size, &ptr, (uschar *)(rr->data+1),
         (rr->data)[0]);
       }
-    else   /* T_CNAME, T_MX, T_MXH, T_NS, T_SRV, T_PTR */
+    else   /* T_CNAME, T_CSA, T_MX, T_MXH, T_NS, T_PTR, T_SRV */
       {
-      int num;
+      int priority, weight, port;
       uschar s[264];
       uschar *p = (uschar *)(rr->data);
 
       if (type == T_MXH)
         {
         /* mxh ignores the priority number and includes only the hostnames */
-        GETSHORT(num, p);            /* pointer is advanced */
+        GETSHORT(priority, p);
         }
       else if (type == T_MX)
         {
-        GETSHORT(num, p);            /* pointer is advanced */
-        sprintf(CS s, "%d ", num);
+        GETSHORT(priority, p);
+        sprintf(CS s, "%d ", priority);
         yield = string_cat(yield, &size, &ptr, s, Ustrlen(s));
         }
       else if (type == T_SRV)
         {
-        int weight, port;
-        GETSHORT(num, p);            /* pointer is advanced */
+        GETSHORT(priority, p);
         GETSHORT(weight, p);
         GETSHORT(port, p);
-        sprintf(CS s, "%d %d %d ", num, weight, port);
+        sprintf(CS s, "%d %d %d ", priority, weight, port);
         yield = string_cat(yield, &size, &ptr, s, Ustrlen(s));
         }
+      else if (type == T_CSA)
+        {
+        /* See acl_verify_csa() for more comments about CSA. */
+
+        GETSHORT(priority, p);
+        GETSHORT(weight, p);
+        GETSHORT(port, p);
+
+        if (priority != 1) continue;      /* CSA version must be 1 */
+
+        /* If the CSA record we found is not the one we asked for, analyse
+        the subdomain assertions in the port field, else analyse the direct
+        authorization status in the weight field. */
+
+        if (found != domain)
+          {
+          if (port & 1) *s = 'X';         /* explicit authorization required */
+          else *s = '?';                  /* no subdomain assertions here */
+          }
+        else
+          {
+          if (weight < 2) *s = 'N';       /* not authorized */
+          else if (weight == 2) *s = 'Y'; /* authorized */
+          else if (weight == 3) *s = '?'; /* unauthorizable */
+          else continue;                  /* invalid */
+          }
+
+        s[1] = ' ';
+        yield = string_cat(yield, &size, &ptr, s, 2);
+        }
+
+      /* GETSHORT() has advanced the pointer to the target domain. */
 
       rc = dn_expand(dnsa.answer, dnsa.answer + dnsa.answerlen, p,
         (DN_EXPAND_ARG4_TYPE)(s), sizeof(s));
--- src/configure.default	29 Mar 2005 09:49:49 -0000	1.2
+++ src/configure.default	10 May 2005 14:48:07 -0000	1.3
@@ -322,6 +322,17 @@
   # warn    message       = X-Warning: $sender_host_address is in a black list at $dnslist_domain
   #         log_message   = found in $dnslist_domain
   #         dnslists      = black.list.example
+  #############################################################################
+
+  #############################################################################
+  # This check is commented out because it is recognized that not every
+  # sysadmin will want to do it. If you enable it, the check performs
+  # Client SMTP Authorization (csa) checks on the sending host. These checks
+  # do DNS lookups for SRV records. The CSA proposal is currently (May 2005)
+  # an Internet draft. You can, of course, add additional conditions to this
+  # ACL statement to restrict the CSA checks to certain hosts only.
+  #
+  # require verify = csa
   #############################################################################
 
   # Accept if the address is in a local domain, but only if the recipient can


Index: .cvsignore
===================================================================
RCS file: /cvs/extras/rpms/exim/devel/.cvsignore,v
retrieving revision 1.3
retrieving revision 1.4
diff -u -r1.3 -r1.4
--- .cvsignore	4 May 2005 16:30:44 -0000	1.3
+++ .cvsignore	16 Jun 2005 11:17:05 -0000	1.4
@@ -1,2 +1,2 @@
-sa-exim-4.2.tar.gz
 exim-4.51.tar.bz2
+sa-exim-4.2.tar.gz


Index: exim.spec
===================================================================
RCS file: /cvs/extras/rpms/exim/devel/exim.spec,v
retrieving revision 1.2
retrieving revision 1.3
diff -u -r1.2 -r1.3
--- exim.spec	4 May 2005 16:30:44 -0000	1.2
+++ exim.spec	16 Jun 2005 11:17:05 -0000	1.3
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 Summary: The exim mail transfer agent
 Name: exim
 Version: 4.51
-Release: 1
+Release: 2
 License: GPL
 Url: http://www.exim.org/
 Group: System Environment/Daemons
@@ -25,7 +25,7 @@
 Patch12: exim-4.33-cyrus.patch
 Patch13: exim-4.43-pamconfig.patch
 Patch14: exim-4.50-spamdconf.patch
-Patch15: exim-4.51-csa.2c.patch
+Patch15: http://www.cus.cam.ac.uk/~fanf2/hermes/doc/antiforgery/exim-csa.patch
 
 Requires: /etc/aliases
 BuildRequires: db4-devel openssl-devel openldap-devel XFree86-devel pam-devel
@@ -78,7 +78,7 @@
 %patch12 -p1 -b .cyrus
 %patch13 -p1 -b .pam
 %patch14 -p1 -b .spamd
-%patch15 -p0 -b .csa.2c
+%patch15 -p0 -b .csa
 
 %build
 %ifnarch s390 s390x
@@ -287,6 +287,9 @@
 %doc sa-exim*/{ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS,INSTALL,LICENSE,TODO}
 
 %changelog
+* Wed May  4 2005 David Woodhouse <dwmw2 redhat com> 4.51-2
+- Update CSA patch
+
 * Wed May  4 2005 David Woodhouse <dwmw2 redhat com> 4.51-1
 - Update to Exim 4.51
 - Include Tony's CSA support patch


Index: sources
===================================================================
RCS file: /cvs/extras/rpms/exim/devel/sources,v
retrieving revision 1.3
retrieving revision 1.4
diff -u -r1.3 -r1.4
--- sources	4 May 2005 16:30:44 -0000	1.3
+++ sources	16 Jun 2005 11:17:05 -0000	1.4
@@ -1,2 +1,2 @@
-ad76f73c6b3d01caa88078e3e622745a  sa-exim-4.2.tar.gz
 36c0c005e012d13beb7edfd8d124c049  exim-4.51.tar.bz2
+ad76f73c6b3d01caa88078e3e622745a  sa-exim-4.2.tar.gz


--- exim-4.51-csa.2c.patch DELETED ---


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