Thu Dec 18 23:34:39 UTC 2008

Author: cebbert

Update of /cvs/pkgs/rpms/kernel/F-8
In directory cvs1.fedora.phx.redhat.com:/tmp/cvs-serv398

Modified Files:
	kernel.spec 
Added Files:
	linux-2.6-applicom-fix-an-unchecked-user-ioctl-range-and-an-error-return.patch 
	linux-2.6-atm-cve-2008-5079-duplicate-listen-on-socket-corrupts-the-vcc-table.patch 
	linux-2.6-enforce-a-minimum-sg_io-timeout.patch 
	linux-2.6-fix-inotify-watch-removal-umount-races.patch 
	linux-2.6-hfs-fix-namelength-memory-corruption.patch 
	linux-2.6-hfsplus-check-read_mapping_page-return-value.patch 
	linux-2.6-hfsplus-fix-buffer-overflow-with-a-corrupted-image.patch 
	linux-2.6-net-fix-soft-lockups-oom-issues-w-unix-garbage-collector.patch 
	linux-2.6-v4l-dvb-avoid-writing-outside-shadow.bytes-array.patch 
Log Message:
Fixes from 2.6.27-stable:
                 linux-2.6-applicom-fix-an-unchecked-user-ioctl-range-and-an-error-return.patch
  CVE-2008-5079: linux-2.6-atm-cve-2008-5079-duplicate-listen-on-socket-corrupts-the-vcc-table.patch
                 linux-2.6-enforce-a-minimum-sg_io-timeout.patch
  CVE-2008-5182: linux-2.6-fix-inotify-watch-removal-umount-races.patch
  CVE-2008-5300: linux-2.6-net-fix-soft-lockups-oom-issues-w-unix-garbage-collector.patch
                 linux-2.6-v4l-dvb-avoid-writing-outside-shadow.bytes-array.patch
  CVE-2008-4933: linux-2.6-hfs-fix-namelength-memory-corruption.patch
                 linux-2.6-hfsplus-check-read_mapping_page-return-value.patch
  CVE-2008-5025: linux-2.6-hfsplus-fix-buffer-overflow-with-a-corrupted-image.patch

linux-2.6-applicom-fix-an-unchecked-user-ioctl-range-and-an-error-return.patch:

--- NEW FILE linux-2.6-applicom-fix-an-unchecked-user-ioctl-range-and-an-error-return.patch ---
>From a7be18d436f0c7007794965e5af29fa1ffff1e05 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Alan Cox <alan at redhat.com>
Date: Mon, 13 Oct 2008 10:45:17 +0100
Subject: applicom: Fix an unchecked user ioctl range and an error return

From: Alan Cox <alan at redhat.com>

commit a7be18d436f0c7007794965e5af29fa1ffff1e05 upstream.

Closes bug #11408 by checking the card index range for command 0
Fixes the ioctl to return ENOTTY which is correct for unknown ioctls

Signed-off-by: Alan Cox <alan at redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds at linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh at suse.de>

---
 drivers/char/applicom.c |    6 ++----
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

--- a/drivers/char/applicom.c
+++ b/drivers/char/applicom.c
@@ -712,8 +712,7 @@ static int ac_ioctl(struct inode *inode,
 	
 	IndexCard = adgl->num_card-1;
 	 
-	if(cmd != 0 && cmd != 6 &&
-	   ((IndexCard >= MAX_BOARD) || !apbs[IndexCard].RamIO)) {
+	if(cmd != 6 && ((IndexCard >= MAX_BOARD) || !apbs[IndexCard].RamIO)) {
 		static int warncount = 10;
 		if (warncount) {
 			printk( KERN_WARNING "APPLICOM driver IOCTL, bad board number %d\n",(int)IndexCard+1);
@@ -832,8 +831,7 @@ static int ac_ioctl(struct inode *inode,
 		}
 		break;
 	default:
-		printk(KERN_INFO "APPLICOM driver ioctl, unknown function code %d\n",cmd) ;
-		ret = -EINVAL;
+		ret = -ENOTTY;
 		break;
 	}
 	Dummy = readb(apbs[IndexCard].RamIO + VERS);

linux-2.6-atm-cve-2008-5079-duplicate-listen-on-socket-corrupts-the-vcc-table.patch:

--- NEW FILE linux-2.6-atm-cve-2008-5079-duplicate-listen-on-socket-corrupts-the-vcc-table.patch ---
>From 17b24b3c97498935a2ef9777370b1151dfed3f6f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Chas Williams <chas at cmf.nrl.navy.mil>
Date: Thu, 4 Dec 2008 14:58:13 -0800
Subject: ATM: CVE-2008-5079: duplicate listen() on socket corrupts the vcc table

From: Chas Williams <chas at cmf.nrl.navy.mil>

commit 17b24b3c97498935a2ef9777370b1151dfed3f6f upstream.

As reported by Hugo Dias that it is possible to cause a local denial
of service attack by calling the svc_listen function twice on the same
socket and reading /proc/net/atm/*vc

Signed-off-by: Chas Williams <chas at cmf.nrl.navy.mil>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem at davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh at suse.de>

---
 net/atm/svc.c |    6 +++++-
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/net/atm/svc.c
+++ b/net/atm/svc.c
@@ -293,7 +293,10 @@ static int svc_listen(struct socket *soc
 		error = -EINVAL;
 		goto out;
 	}
-	vcc_insert_socket(sk);
+	if (test_bit(ATM_VF_LISTEN, &vcc->flags)) {
+		error = -EADDRINUSE;
+		goto out;
+        }
 	set_bit(ATM_VF_WAITING, &vcc->flags);
 	prepare_to_wait(sk->sk_sleep, &wait, TASK_UNINTERRUPTIBLE);
 	sigd_enq(vcc,as_listen,NULL,NULL,&vcc->local);
@@ -307,6 +310,7 @@ static int svc_listen(struct socket *soc
 		goto out;
 	}
 	set_bit(ATM_VF_LISTEN,&vcc->flags);
+	vcc_insert_socket(sk);
 	sk->sk_max_ack_backlog = backlog > 0 ? backlog : ATM_BACKLOG_DEFAULT;
 	error = -sk->sk_err;
 out:

linux-2.6-enforce-a-minimum-sg_io-timeout.patch:

--- NEW FILE linux-2.6-enforce-a-minimum-sg_io-timeout.patch ---
>From f2f1fa78a155524b849edf359e42a3001ea652c0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Linus Torvalds <torvalds at linux-foundation.org>
Date: Fri, 5 Dec 2008 14:49:18 -0800
Subject: Enforce a minimum SG_IO timeout

From: Linus Torvalds <torvalds at linux-foundation.org>

commit f2f1fa78a155524b849edf359e42a3001ea652c0 upstream.

There's no point in having too short SG_IO timeouts, since if the
command does end up timing out, we'll end up through the reset sequence
that is several seconds long in order to abort the command that timed
out.

As a result, shorter timeouts than a few seconds simply do not make
sense, as the recovery would be longer than the timeout itself.

Add a BLK_MIN_SG_TIMEOUT to match the existign BLK_DEFAULT_SG_TIMEOUT.

Suggested-by: Alan Cox <alan at lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk>
Acked-by: Tejun Heo <tj at kernel.org>
Acked-by: Jens Axboe <jens.axboe at oracle.com>
Cc: Jeff Garzik <jeff at garzik.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds at linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh at suse.de>

---
 block/bsg.c            |    2 ++
 block/scsi_ioctl.c     |    2 ++
 include/linux/blkdev.h |    1 +
 3 files changed, 5 insertions(+)

--- a/block/bsg.c
+++ b/block/bsg.c
@@ -202,6 +202,8 @@ static int blk_fill_sgv4_hdr_rq(struct r
 		rq->timeout = q->sg_timeout;
 	if (!rq->timeout)
 		rq->timeout = BLK_DEFAULT_SG_TIMEOUT;
+	if (rq->timeout < BLK_MIN_SG_TIMEOUT)
+		rq->timeout = BLK_MIN_SG_TIMEOUT;
 
 	return 0;
 }
--- a/block/scsi_ioctl.c
+++ b/block/scsi_ioctl.c
@@ -208,6 +208,8 @@ static int blk_fill_sghdr_rq(struct requ
 		rq->timeout = q->sg_timeout;
 	if (!rq->timeout)
 		rq->timeout = BLK_DEFAULT_SG_TIMEOUT;
+	if (rq->timeout < BLK_MIN_SG_TIMEOUT)
+		rq->timeout = BLK_MIN_SG_TIMEOUT;
 
 	return 0;
 }
--- a/include/linux/blkdev.h
+++ b/include/linux/blkdev.h
@@ -623,6 +623,7 @@ extern unsigned long blk_max_low_pfn, bl
  * default timeout for SG_IO if none specified
  */
 #define BLK_DEFAULT_SG_TIMEOUT	(60 * HZ)
+#define BLK_MIN_SG_TIMEOUT	(7 * HZ)
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_BOUNCE
 extern int init_emergency_isa_pool(void);

linux-2.6-fix-inotify-watch-removal-umount-races.patch:

--- NEW FILE linux-2.6-fix-inotify-watch-removal-umount-races.patch ---
>From 8f7b0ba1c853919b85b54774775f567f30006107 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Al Viro <viro at ZenIV.linux.org.uk>
Date: Sat, 15 Nov 2008 01:15:43 +0000
Subject: Fix inotify watch removal/umount races

From: Al Viro <viro at ZenIV.linux.org.uk>

commit 8f7b0ba1c853919b85b54774775f567f30006107 upstream.

Inotify watch removals suck violently.

To kick the watch out we need (in this order) inode->inotify_mutex and
ih->mutex.  That's fine if we have a hold on inode; however, for all
other cases we need to make damn sure we don't race with umount.  We can
*NOT* just grab a reference to a watch - inotify_unmount_inodes() will
happily sail past it and we'll end with reference to inode potentially
outliving its superblock.

Ideally we just want to grab an active reference to superblock if we
can; that will make sure we won't go into inotify_umount_inodes() until
we are done.  Cleanup is just deactivate_super().

However, that leaves a messy case - what if we *are* racing with
umount() and active references to superblock can't be acquired anymore?
We can bump ->s_count, grab ->s_umount, which will almost certainly wait
until the superblock is shut down and the watch in question is pining
for fjords.  That's fine, but there is a problem - we might have hit the
window between ->s_active getting to 0 / ->s_count - below S_BIAS (i.e.
the moment when superblock is past the point of no return and is heading
for shutdown) and the moment when deactivate_super() acquires
->s_umount.

We could just do drop_super() yield() and retry, but that's rather
antisocial and this stuff is luser-triggerable.  OTOH, having grabbed
->s_umount and having found that we'd got there first (i.e.  that
->s_root is non-NULL) we know that we won't race with
inotify_umount_inodes().

So we could grab a reference to watch and do the rest as above, just
with drop_super() instead of deactivate_super(), right? Wrong.  We had
to drop ih->mutex before we could grab ->s_umount.  So the watch
could've been gone already.

That still can be dealt with - we need to save watch->wd, do idr_find()
and compare its result with our pointer.  If they match, we either have
the damn thing still alive or we'd lost not one but two races at once,
the watch had been killed and a new one got created with the same ->wd
at the same address.  That couldn't have happened in inotify_destroy(),
but inotify_rm_wd() could run into that.  Still, "new one got created"
is not a problem - we have every right to kill it or leave it alone,
whatever's more convenient.

So we can use idr_find(...) == watch && watch->inode->i_sb == sb as
"grab it and kill it" check.  If it's been our original watch, we are
fine, if it's a newcomer - nevermind, just pretend that we'd won the
race and kill the fscker anyway; we are safe since we know that its
superblock won't be going away.

And yes, this is far beyond mere "not very pretty"; so's the entire
concept of inotify to start with.

Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro at zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Acked-by: Greg KH <greg at kroah.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds at linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh at suse.de>

---
 fs/inotify.c            |  150 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
 include/linux/inotify.h |   11 +++
 kernel/audit_tree.c     |   91 +++++++++++++++++------------
 kernel/auditfilter.c    |   14 ++--
 4 files changed, 218 insertions(+), 48 deletions(-)

--- a/fs/inotify.c
+++ b/fs/inotify.c
@@ -106,6 +106,20 @@ void get_inotify_watch(struct inotify_wa
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(get_inotify_watch);
 
+int pin_inotify_watch(struct inotify_watch *watch)
+{
+	struct super_block *sb = watch->inode->i_sb;
+	spin_lock(&sb_lock);
+	if (sb->s_count >= S_BIAS) {
+		atomic_inc(&sb->s_active);
+		spin_unlock(&sb_lock);
+		atomic_inc(&watch->count);
+		return 1;
+	}
+	spin_unlock(&sb_lock);
+	return 0;
+}
+
 /**
  * put_inotify_watch - decrements the ref count on a given watch.  cleans up
  * watch references if the count reaches zero.  inotify_watch is freed by
@@ -124,6 +138,13 @@ void put_inotify_watch(struct inotify_wa
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(put_inotify_watch);
 
+void unpin_inotify_watch(struct inotify_watch *watch)
+{
+	struct super_block *sb = watch->inode->i_sb;
+	put_inotify_watch(watch);
+	deactivate_super(sb);
+}
+
 /*
  * inotify_handle_get_wd - returns the next WD for use by the given handle
  *
@@ -479,6 +500,112 @@ void inotify_init_watch(struct inotify_w
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(inotify_init_watch);
 
+/*
+ * Watch removals suck violently.  To kick the watch out we need (in this
+ * order) inode->inotify_mutex and ih->mutex.  That's fine if we have
+ * a hold on inode; however, for all other cases we need to make damn sure
+ * we don't race with umount.  We can *NOT* just grab a reference to a
+ * watch - inotify_unmount_inodes() will happily sail past it and we'll end
+ * with reference to inode potentially outliving its superblock.  Ideally
+ * we just want to grab an active reference to superblock if we can; that
+ * will make sure we won't go into inotify_umount_inodes() until we are
+ * done.  Cleanup is just deactivate_super().  However, that leaves a messy
+ * case - what if we *are* racing with umount() and active references to
+ * superblock can't be acquired anymore?  We can bump ->s_count, grab
+ * ->s_umount, which will almost certainly wait until the superblock is shut
+ * down and the watch in question is pining for fjords.  That's fine, but
+ * there is a problem - we might have hit the window between ->s_active
+ * getting to 0 / ->s_count - below S_BIAS (i.e. the moment when superblock
+ * is past the point of no return and is heading for shutdown) and the
+ * moment when deactivate_super() acquires ->s_umount.  We could just do
+ * drop_super() yield() and retry, but that's rather antisocial and this
+ * stuff is luser-triggerable.  OTOH, having grabbed ->s_umount and having
+ * found that we'd got there first (i.e. that ->s_root is non-NULL) we know
+ * that we won't race with inotify_umount_inodes().  So we could grab a
+ * reference to watch and do the rest as above, just with drop_super() instead
+ * of deactivate_super(), right?  Wrong.  We had to drop ih->mutex before we
+ * could grab ->s_umount.  So the watch could've been gone already.
+ *
+ * That still can be dealt with - we need to save watch->wd, do idr_find()
+ * and compare its result with our pointer.  If they match, we either have
+ * the damn thing still alive or we'd lost not one but two races at once,
+ * the watch had been killed and a new one got created with the same ->wd
+ * at the same address.  That couldn't have happened in inotify_destroy(),
+ * but inotify_rm_wd() could run into that.  Still, "new one got created"
+ * is not a problem - we have every right to kill it or leave it alone,
+ * whatever's more convenient.
+ *
+ * So we can use idr_find(...) == watch && watch->inode->i_sb == sb as
+ * "grab it and kill it" check.  If it's been our original watch, we are
+ * fine, if it's a newcomer - nevermind, just pretend that we'd won the
+ * race and kill the fscker anyway; we are safe since we know that its
+ * superblock won't be going away.
+ *
+ * And yes, this is far beyond mere "not very pretty"; so's the entire
+ * concept of inotify to start with.
+ */
+
+/**
+ * pin_to_kill - pin the watch down for removal
+ * @ih: inotify handle
+ * @watch: watch to kill
+ *
+ * Called with ih->mutex held, drops it.  Possible return values:
+ * 0 - nothing to do, it has died
+ * 1 - remove it, drop the reference and deactivate_super()
+ * 2 - remove it, drop the reference and drop_super(); we tried hard to avoid
+ * that variant, since it involved a lot of PITA, but that's the best that
+ * could've been done.
+ */
+static int pin_to_kill(struct inotify_handle *ih, struct inotify_watch *watch)
+{
+	struct super_block *sb = watch->inode->i_sb;
+	s32 wd = watch->wd;
+
+	spin_lock(&sb_lock);
+	if (sb->s_count >= S_BIAS) {
+		atomic_inc(&sb->s_active);
+		spin_unlock(&sb_lock);
+		get_inotify_watch(watch);
+		mutex_unlock(&ih->mutex);
+		return 1;	/* the best outcome */
+	}
+	sb->s_count++;
+	spin_unlock(&sb_lock);
+	mutex_unlock(&ih->mutex); /* can't grab ->s_umount under it */
+	down_read(&sb->s_umount);
+	if (likely(!sb->s_root)) {
+		/* fs is already shut down; the watch is dead */
+		drop_super(sb);
+		return 0;
+	}
+	/* raced with the final deactivate_super() */
+	mutex_lock(&ih->mutex);
+	if (idr_find(&ih->idr, wd) != watch || watch->inode->i_sb != sb) {
+		/* the watch is dead */
+		mutex_unlock(&ih->mutex);
+		drop_super(sb);
+		return 0;
+	}
+	/* still alive or freed and reused with the same sb and wd; kill */
+	get_inotify_watch(watch);
+	mutex_unlock(&ih->mutex);
+	return 2;
+}
+
+static void unpin_and_kill(struct inotify_watch *watch, int how)
+{
+	struct super_block *sb = watch->inode->i_sb;
+	put_inotify_watch(watch);
+	switch (how) {
+	case 1:
+		deactivate_super(sb);
+		break;
+	case 2:
+		drop_super(sb);
+	}
+}
+
 /**
  * inotify_destroy - clean up and destroy an inotify instance
  * @ih: inotify handle
@@ -490,11 +617,15 @@ void inotify_destroy(struct inotify_hand
 	 * pretty.  We cannot do a simple iteration over the list, because we
 	 * do not know the inode until we iterate to the watch.  But we need to
 	 * hold inode->inotify_mutex before ih->mutex.  The following works.
+	 *
+	 * AV: it had to become even uglier to start working ;-/
 	 */
 	while (1) {
 		struct inotify_watch *watch;
 		struct list_head *watches;
+		struct super_block *sb;
 		struct inode *inode;
+		int how;
 
 		mutex_lock(&ih->mutex);
 		watches = &ih->watches;
@@ -503,8 +634,10 @@ void inotify_destroy(struct inotify_hand
 			break;
 		}
 		watch = list_first_entry(watches, struct inotify_watch, h_list);
-		get_inotify_watch(watch);
-		mutex_unlock(&ih->mutex);
+		sb = watch->inode->i_sb;
+		how = pin_to_kill(ih, watch);
+		if (!how)
+			continue;
 
 		inode = watch->inode;
 		mutex_lock(&inode->inotify_mutex);
@@ -518,7 +651,7 @@ void inotify_destroy(struct inotify_hand
 
 		mutex_unlock(&ih->mutex);
 		mutex_unlock(&inode->inotify_mutex);
-		put_inotify_watch(watch);
+		unpin_and_kill(watch, how);
 	}
 
 	/* free this handle: the put matching the get in inotify_init() */
@@ -719,7 +852,9 @@ void inotify_evict_watch(struct inotify_
 int inotify_rm_wd(struct inotify_handle *ih, u32 wd)
 {
 	struct inotify_watch *watch;
+	struct super_block *sb;
 	struct inode *inode;
+	int how;
 
 	mutex_lock(&ih->mutex);
 	watch = idr_find(&ih->idr, wd);
@@ -727,9 +862,12 @@ int inotify_rm_wd(struct inotify_handle 
 		mutex_unlock(&ih->mutex);
 		return -EINVAL;
 	}
-	get_inotify_watch(watch);
+	sb = watch->inode->i_sb;
+	how = pin_to_kill(ih, watch);
+	if (!how)
+		return 0;
+
 	inode = watch->inode;
-	mutex_unlock(&ih->mutex);
 
 	mutex_lock(&inode->inotify_mutex);
 	mutex_lock(&ih->mutex);
@@ -740,7 +878,7 @@ int inotify_rm_wd(struct inotify_handle 
 
 	mutex_unlock(&ih->mutex);
 	mutex_unlock(&inode->inotify_mutex);
-	put_inotify_watch(watch);
+	unpin_and_kill(watch, how);
 
 	return 0;
 }
--- a/include/linux/inotify.h
+++ b/include/linux/inotify.h
@@ -134,6 +134,8 @@ extern void inotify_remove_watch_locked(
 					struct inotify_watch *);
 extern void get_inotify_watch(struct inotify_watch *);
 extern void put_inotify_watch(struct inotify_watch *);
+extern int pin_inotify_watch(struct inotify_watch *);
+extern void unpin_inotify_watch(struct inotify_watch *);
 
 #else
 
@@ -228,6 +230,15 @@ static inline void put_inotify_watch(str
 {
 }
 
+extern inline int pin_inotify_watch(struct inotify_watch *watch)
+{
+	return 0;
+}
+
+extern inline void unpin_inotify_watch(struct inotify_watch *watch)
+{
+}
+
 #endif	/* CONFIG_INOTIFY */
 
 #endif	/* __KERNEL __ */
--- a/kernel/auditfilter.c
+++ b/kernel/auditfilter.c
@@ -1094,8 +1094,8 @@ static void audit_inotify_unregister(str
 	list_for_each_entry_safe(p, n, in_list, ilist) {
 		list_del(&p->ilist);
 		inotify_rm_watch(audit_ih, &p->wdata);
-		/* the put matching the get in audit_do_del_rule() */
-		put_inotify_watch(&p->wdata);
+		/* the unpin matching the pin in audit_do_del_rule() */
+		unpin_inotify_watch(&p->wdata);
 	}
 }
 
@@ -1389,9 +1389,13 @@ static inline int audit_del_rule(struct 
 				/* Put parent on the inotify un-registration
 				 * list.  Grab a reference before releasing
 				 * audit_filter_mutex, to be released in
-				 * audit_inotify_unregister(). */
-				list_add(&parent->ilist, &inotify_list);
-				get_inotify_watch(&parent->wdata);
+				 * audit_inotify_unregister().
+				 * If filesystem is going away, just leave
+				 * the sucker alone, eviction will take
+				 * care of it.
+				 */
+				if (pin_inotify_watch(&parent->wdata))
+					list_add(&parent->ilist, &inotify_list);
 			}
 		}
 	}
--- a/kernel/audit_tree.c
+++ b/kernel/audit_tree.c
@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@ struct audit_chunk {
 	struct list_head trees;		/* with root here */
 	int dead;
 	int count;
+	atomic_long_t refs;
 	struct rcu_head head;
 	struct node {
 		struct list_head list;
@@ -56,7 +57,8 @@ static LIST_HEAD(prune_list);
  * tree is refcounted; one reference for "some rules on rules_list refer to
  * it", one for each chunk with pointer to it.
  *
- * chunk is refcounted by embedded inotify_watch.
+ * chunk is refcounted by embedded inotify_watch + .refs (non-zero refcount
+ * of watch contributes 1 to .refs).
  *
  * node.index allows to get from node.list to containing chunk.
  * MSB of that sucker is stolen to mark taggings that we might have to
@@ -121,6 +123,7 @@ static struct audit_chunk *alloc_chunk(i
 	INIT_LIST_HEAD(&chunk->hash);
 	INIT_LIST_HEAD(&chunk->trees);
 	chunk->count = count;
+	atomic_long_set(&chunk->refs, 1);
 	for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
 		INIT_LIST_HEAD(&chunk->owners[i].list);
 		chunk->owners[i].index = i;
@@ -129,9 +132,8 @@ static struct audit_chunk *alloc_chunk(i
 	return chunk;
 }
 
-static void __free_chunk(struct rcu_head *rcu)
+static void free_chunk(struct audit_chunk *chunk)
 {
-	struct audit_chunk *chunk = container_of(rcu, struct audit_chunk, head);
 	int i;
 
 	for (i = 0; i < chunk->count; i++) {
@@ -141,14 +143,16 @@ static void __free_chunk(struct rcu_head
 	kfree(chunk);
 }
 
-static inline void free_chunk(struct audit_chunk *chunk)
+void audit_put_chunk(struct audit_chunk *chunk)
 {
-	call_rcu(&chunk->head, __free_chunk);
+	if (atomic_long_dec_and_test(&chunk->refs))
+		free_chunk(chunk);
 }
 
-void audit_put_chunk(struct audit_chunk *chunk)
+static void __put_chunk(struct rcu_head *rcu)
 {
-	put_inotify_watch(&chunk->watch);
+	struct audit_chunk *chunk = container_of(rcu, struct audit_chunk, head);
+	audit_put_chunk(chunk);
 }
 
 enum {HASH_SIZE = 128};
@@ -176,7 +180,7 @@ struct audit_chunk *audit_tree_lookup(co
 
 	list_for_each_entry_rcu(p, list, hash) {
 		if (p->watch.inode == inode) {
-			get_inotify_watch(&p->watch);
+			atomic_long_inc(&p->refs);
 			return p;
 		}
 	}
@@ -194,17 +198,49 @@ int audit_tree_match(struct audit_chunk 
 
 /* tagging and untagging inodes with trees */
 
-static void untag_chunk(struct audit_chunk *chunk, struct node *p)
+static struct audit_chunk *find_chunk(struct node *p)
+{
+	int index = p->index & ~(1U<<31);
+	p -= index;
+	return container_of(p, struct audit_chunk, owners[0]);
+}
+
+static void untag_chunk(struct node *p)
 {
+	struct audit_chunk *chunk = find_chunk(p);
 	struct audit_chunk *new;
 	struct audit_tree *owner;
 	int size = chunk->count - 1;
 	int i, j;
 
+	if (!pin_inotify_watch(&chunk->watch)) {
+		/*
+		 * Filesystem is shutting down; all watches are getting
+		 * evicted, just take it off the node list for this
+		 * tree and let the eviction logics take care of the
+		 * rest.
+		 */
+		owner = p->owner;
+		if (owner->root == chunk) {
+			list_del_init(&owner->same_root);
+			owner->root = NULL;
+		}
+		list_del_init(&p->list);
+		p->owner = NULL;
+		put_tree(owner);
+		return;
+	}
+
+	spin_unlock(&hash_lock);
+
+	/*
+	 * pin_inotify_watch() succeeded, so the watch won't go away
+	 * from under us.
+	 */
 	mutex_lock(&chunk->watch.inode->inotify_mutex);
 	if (chunk->dead) {
 		mutex_unlock(&chunk->watch.inode->inotify_mutex);
-		return;
+		goto out;
 	}
 
 	owner = p->owner;
@@ -221,7 +257,7 @@ static void untag_chunk(struct audit_chu
 		inotify_evict_watch(&chunk->watch);
 		mutex_unlock(&chunk->watch.inode->inotify_mutex);
 		put_inotify_watch(&chunk->watch);
-		return;
+		goto out;
 	}
 
 	new = alloc_chunk(size);
@@ -263,7 +299,7 @@ static void untag_chunk(struct audit_chu
 	inotify_evict_watch(&chunk->watch);
 	mutex_unlock(&chunk->watch.inode->inotify_mutex);
 	put_inotify_watch(&chunk->watch);
-	return;
+	goto out;
 
 Fallback:
 	// do the best we can
@@ -277,6 +313,9 @@ Fallback:
 	put_tree(owner);
 	spin_unlock(&hash_lock);
 	mutex_unlock(&chunk->watch.inode->inotify_mutex);
+out:
+	unpin_inotify_watch(&chunk->watch);
+	spin_lock(&hash_lock);
 }
 
 static int create_chunk(struct inode *inode, struct audit_tree *tree)
@@ -387,13 +426,6 @@ static int tag_chunk(struct inode *inode
 	return 0;
 }
 
-static struct audit_chunk *find_chunk(struct node *p)
-{
-	int index = p->index & ~(1U<<31);
-	p -= index;
-	return container_of(p, struct audit_chunk, owners[0]);
-}
-
 static void kill_rules(struct audit_tree *tree)
 {
 	struct audit_krule *rule, *next;
@@ -431,17 +463,10 @@ static void prune_one(struct audit_tree 
 	spin_lock(&hash_lock);
 	while (!list_empty(&victim->chunks)) {
 		struct node *p;
-		struct audit_chunk *chunk;
 
 		p = list_entry(victim->chunks.next, struct node, list);
-		chunk = find_chunk(p);
-		get_inotify_watch(&chunk->watch);
-		spin_unlock(&hash_lock);
-
-		untag_chunk(chunk, p);
 
-		put_inotify_watch(&chunk->watch);
-		spin_lock(&hash_lock);
+		untag_chunk(p);
 	}
 	spin_unlock(&hash_lock);
 	put_tree(victim);
@@ -469,7 +494,6 @@ static void trim_marked(struct audit_tre
 
 	while (!list_empty(&tree->chunks)) {
 		struct node *node;
-		struct audit_chunk *chunk;
 
 		node = list_entry(tree->chunks.next, struct node, list);
 
@@ -477,14 +501,7 @@ static void trim_marked(struct audit_tre
 		if (!(node->index & (1U<<31)))
 			break;
 
-		chunk = find_chunk(node);
-		get_inotify_watch(&chunk->watch);
-		spin_unlock(&hash_lock);
-
-		untag_chunk(chunk, node);
-
-		put_inotify_watch(&chunk->watch);
-		spin_lock(&hash_lock);
+		untag_chunk(node);
 	}
 	if (!tree->root && !tree->goner) {
 		tree->goner = 1;
@@ -878,7 +895,7 @@ static void handle_event(struct inotify_
 static void destroy_watch(struct inotify_watch *watch)
 {
 	struct audit_chunk *chunk = container_of(watch, struct audit_chunk, watch);
-	free_chunk(chunk);
+	call_rcu(&chunk->head, __put_chunk);
 }
 
 static const struct inotify_operations rtree_inotify_ops = {

linux-2.6-hfs-fix-namelength-memory-corruption.patch:

--- NEW FILE linux-2.6-hfs-fix-namelength-memory-corruption.patch ---
>From d38b7aa7fc3371b52d036748028db50b585ade2e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Eric Sesterhenn <snakebyte at gmx.de>
Date: Wed, 15 Oct 2008 22:04:11 -0700
Subject: hfs: fix namelength memory corruption (CVE-2008-5025)

From: Eric Sesterhenn <snakebyte at gmx.de>

commit d38b7aa7fc3371b52d036748028db50b585ade2e upstream

Fix a stack corruption caused by a corrupted hfs filesystem.  If the
catalog name length is corrupted the memcpy overwrites the catalog btree
structure.  Since the field is limited to HFS_NAMELEN bytes in the
structure and the file format, we throw an error if it is too long.

Cc: Roman Zippel <zippel at linux-m68k.org>
Signed-off-by: Eric Sesterhenn <snakebyte at gmx.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm at linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds at linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh at suse.de>

---
 fs/hfs/catalog.c |    4 ++++
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)

--- a/fs/hfs/catalog.c
+++ b/fs/hfs/catalog.c
@@ -190,6 +190,10 @@ int hfs_cat_find_brec(struct super_block
 
 	fd->search_key->cat.ParID = rec.thread.ParID;
 	len = fd->search_key->cat.CName.len = rec.thread.CName.len;
+	if (len > HFS_NAMELEN) {
+		printk(KERN_ERR "hfs: bad catalog namelength\n");
+		return -EIO;
+	}
 	memcpy(fd->search_key->cat.CName.name, rec.thread.CName.name, len);
 	return hfs_brec_find(fd);
 }

linux-2.6-hfsplus-check-read_mapping_page-return-value.patch:

--- NEW FILE linux-2.6-hfsplus-check-read_mapping_page-return-value.patch ---
>From 649f1ee6c705aab644035a7998d7b574193a598a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Eric Sesterhenn <snakebyte at gmx.de>
Date: Wed, 15 Oct 2008 22:04:10 -0700
Subject: hfsplus: check read_mapping_page() return value

From: Eric Sesterhenn <snakebyte at gmx.de>

While testing more corrupted images with hfsplus, i came across
one which triggered the following bug:

[15840.675016] BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at fffffffb
[15840.675016] IP: [<c0116a4f>] kmap+0x15/0x56
[15840.675016] *pde = 00008067 *pte = 00000000
[15840.675016] Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT DEBUG_PAGEALLOC
[15840.675016] Modules linked in:
[15840.675016]
[15840.675016] Pid: 11575, comm: ln Not tainted (2.6.27-rc4-00123-gd3ee1b4-dirty #29)
[15840.675016] EIP: 0060:[<c0116a4f>] EFLAGS: 00010202 CPU: 0
[15840.675016] EIP is at kmap+0x15/0x56
[15840.675016] EAX: 00000246 EBX: fffffffb ECX: 00000000 EDX: cab919c0
[15840.675016] ESI: 000007dd EDI: cab0bcf4 EBP: cab0bc98 ESP: cab0bc94
[15840.675016]  DS: 007b ES: 007b FS: 0000 GS: 0033 SS: 0068
[15840.675016] Process ln (pid: 11575, ti=cab0b000 task=cab919c0 task.ti=cab0b000)
[15840.675016] Stack: 00000000 cab0bcdc c0231cfb 00000000 cab0bce0 00000800 ca9290c0 fffffffb
[15840.675016]        cab145d0 cab919c0 cab15998 22222222 22222222 22222222 00000001 cab15960
[15840.675016]        000007dd cab0bcf4 cab0bd04 c022cb3a cab0bcf4 cab15a6c ca9290c0 00000000
[15840.675016] Call Trace:
[15840.675016]  [<c0231cfb>] ? hfsplus_block_allocate+0x6f/0x2d3
[15840.675016]  [<c022cb3a>] ? hfsplus_file_extend+0xc4/0x1db
[15840.675016]  [<c022ce41>] ? hfsplus_get_block+0x8c/0x19d
[15840.675016]  [<c06adde4>] ? sub_preempt_count+0x9d/0xab
[15840.675016]  [<c019ece6>] ? __block_prepare_write+0x147/0x311
[15840.675016]  [<c0161934>] ? __grab_cache_page+0x52/0x73
[15840.675016]  [<c019ef4f>] ? block_write_begin+0x79/0xd5
[15840.675016]  [<c022cdb5>] ? hfsplus_get_block+0x0/0x19d
[15840.675016]  [<c019f22a>] ? cont_write_begin+0x27f/0x2af
[15840.675016]  [<c022cdb5>] ? hfsplus_get_block+0x0/0x19d
[15840.675016]  [<c0139ebe>] ? tick_program_event+0x28/0x4c
[15840.675016]  [<c013bd35>] ? trace_hardirqs_off+0xb/0xd
[15840.675016]  [<c022b723>] ? hfsplus_write_begin+0x2d/0x32
[15840.675016]  [<c022cdb5>] ? hfsplus_get_block+0x0/0x19d
[15840.675016]  [<c0161988>] ? pagecache_write_begin+0x33/0x107
[15840.675016]  [<c01879e5>] ? __page_symlink+0x3c/0xae
[15840.675016]  [<c019ad34>] ? __mark_inode_dirty+0x12f/0x137
[15840.675016]  [<c0187a70>] ? page_symlink+0x19/0x1e
[15840.675016]  [<c022e6eb>] ? hfsplus_symlink+0x41/0xa6
[15840.675016]  [<c01886a9>] ? vfs_symlink+0x99/0x101
[15840.675016]  [<c018a2f6>] ? sys_symlinkat+0x6b/0xad
[15840.675016]  [<c018a348>] ? sys_symlink+0x10/0x12
[15840.675016]  [<c01038bd>] ? sysenter_do_call+0x12/0x31
[15840.675016]  =======================
[15840.675016] Code: 00 00 75 10 83 3d 88 2f ec c0 02 75 07 89 d0 e8 12 56 05 00 5d c3 55 ba 06 00 00 00 89 e5 53 89 c3 b8 3d eb 7e c0 e8 16 74 00 00 <8b> 03 c1 e8 1e 69 c0 d8 02 00 00 05 b8 69 8e c0 2b 80 c4 02 00
[15840.675016] EIP: [<c0116a4f>] kmap+0x15/0x56 SS:ESP 0068:cab0bc94
[15840.675016] ---[ end trace 4fea40dad6b70e5f ]---

This happens because the return value of read_mapping_page() is passed on
to kmap unchecked.  The bug is triggered after the first
read_mapping_page() in hfsplus_block_allocate(), this patch fixes all
three usages in this functions but leaves the ones further down in the
file unchanged.

Signed-off-by: Eric Sesterhenn <snakebyte at gmx.de>
Cc: Roman Zippel <zippel at linux-m68k.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm at linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds at linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh at suse.de>

---
 fs/hfsplus/bitmap.c |   12 ++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+)

--- a/fs/hfsplus/bitmap.c
+++ b/fs/hfsplus/bitmap.c
@@ -32,6 +32,10 @@ int hfsplus_block_allocate(struct super_
 	mutex_lock(&HFSPLUS_SB(sb).alloc_file->i_mutex);
 	mapping = HFSPLUS_SB(sb).alloc_file->i_mapping;
 	page = read_mapping_page(mapping, offset / PAGE_CACHE_BITS, NULL);
+	if (IS_ERR(page)) {
+		start = size;
+		goto out;
+	}
 	pptr = kmap(page);
 	curr = pptr + (offset & (PAGE_CACHE_BITS - 1)) / 32;
 	i = offset % 32;
@@ -73,6 +77,10 @@ int hfsplus_block_allocate(struct super_
 			break;
 		page = read_mapping_page(mapping, offset / PAGE_CACHE_BITS,
 					 NULL);
+		if (IS_ERR(page)) {
+			start = size;
+			goto out;
+		}
 		curr = pptr = kmap(page);
 		if ((size ^ offset) / PAGE_CACHE_BITS)
 			end = pptr + PAGE_CACHE_BITS / 32;
@@ -120,6 +128,10 @@ found:
 		offset += PAGE_CACHE_BITS;
 		page = read_mapping_page(mapping, offset / PAGE_CACHE_BITS,
 					 NULL);
+		if (IS_ERR(page)) {
+			start = size;
+			goto out;
+		}
 		pptr = kmap(page);
 		curr = pptr;
 		end = pptr + PAGE_CACHE_BITS / 32;

linux-2.6-hfsplus-fix-buffer-overflow-with-a-corrupted-image.patch:

--- NEW FILE linux-2.6-hfsplus-fix-buffer-overflow-with-a-corrupted-image.patch ---
>From efc7ffcb4237f8cb9938909041c4ed38f6e1bf40 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Eric Sesterhenn <snakebyte at gmx.de>
Date: Wed, 15 Oct 2008 22:04:08 -0700
Subject: hfsplus: fix Buffer overflow with a corrupted image

From: Eric Sesterhenn <snakebyte at gmx.de>

commit efc7ffcb4237f8cb9938909041c4ed38f6e1bf40 upstream

When an hfsplus image gets corrupted it might happen that the catalog
namelength field gets b0rked.  If we mount such an image the memcpy() in
hfsplus_cat_build_key_uni() writes more than the 255 that fit in the name
field.  Depending on the size of the overwritten data, we either only get
memory corruption or also trigger an oops like this:

[  221.628020] BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at c82b0000
[  221.629066] IP: [<c022d4b1>] hfsplus_find_cat+0x10d/0x151
[  221.629066] *pde = 0ea29163 *pte = 082b0160
[  221.629066] Oops: 0002 [#1] PREEMPT DEBUG_PAGEALLOC
[  221.629066] Modules linked in:
[  221.629066]
[  221.629066] Pid: 4845, comm: mount Not tainted (2.6.27-rc4-00123-gd3ee1b4-dirty #28)
[  221.629066] EIP: 0060:[<c022d4b1>] EFLAGS: 00010206 CPU: 0
[  221.629066] EIP is at hfsplus_find_cat+0x10d/0x151
[  221.629066] EAX: 00000029 EBX: 00016210 ECX: 000042c2 EDX: 00000002
[  221.629066] ESI: c82d70ca EDI: c82b0000 EBP: c82d1bcc ESP: c82d199c
[  221.629066]  DS: 007b ES: 007b FS: 0000 GS: 0033 SS: 0068
[  221.629066] Process mount (pid: 4845, ti=c82d1000 task=c8224060 task.ti=c82d1000)
[  221.629066] Stack: c080b3c4 c82aa8f8 c82d19c2 00016210 c080b3be c82d1bd4 c82aa8f0 00000300
[  221.629066]        01000000 750008b1 74006e00 74006900 65006c00 c82d6400 c013bd35 c8224060
[  221.629066]        00000036 00000046 c82d19f0 00000082 c8224548 c8224060 00000036 c0d653cc
[  221.629066] Call Trace:
[  221.629066]  [<c013bd35>] ? trace_hardirqs_off+0xb/0xd
[  221.629066]  [<c013bca3>] ? trace_hardirqs_off_caller+0x14/0x9b
[  221.629066]  [<c013bd35>] ? trace_hardirqs_off+0xb/0xd
[  221.629066]  [<c013bca3>] ? trace_hardirqs_off_caller+0x14/0x9b
[  221.629066]  [<c013bd35>] ? trace_hardirqs_off+0xb/0xd
[  221.629066]  [<c0107aa3>] ? native_sched_clock+0x82/0x96
[  221.629066]  [<c01302d2>] ? __kernel_text_address+0x1b/0x27
[  221.629066]  [<c010487a>] ? dump_trace+0xca/0xd6
[  221.629066]  [<c0109e32>] ? save_stack_address+0x0/0x2c
[  221.629066]  [<c0109eaf>] ? save_stack_trace+0x1c/0x3a
[  221.629066]  [<c013b571>] ? save_trace+0x37/0x8d
[  221.629066]  [<c013b62e>] ? add_lock_to_list+0x67/0x8d
[  221.629066]  [<c013ea1c>] ? validate_chain+0x8a4/0x9f4
[  221.629066]  [<c013553d>] ? down+0xc/0x2f
[  221.629066]  [<c013f1f6>] ? __lock_acquire+0x68a/0x6e0
[  221.629066]  [<c013bd35>] ? trace_hardirqs_off+0xb/0xd
[  221.629066]  [<c013bca3>] ? trace_hardirqs_off_caller+0x14/0x9b
[  221.629066]  [<c013bd35>] ? trace_hardirqs_off+0xb/0xd
[  221.629066]  [<c0107aa3>] ? native_sched_clock+0x82/0x96
[  221.629066]  [<c013da5d>] ? mark_held_locks+0x43/0x5a
[  221.629066]  [<c013dc3a>] ? trace_hardirqs_on+0xb/0xd
[  221.629066]  [<c013dbf4>] ? trace_hardirqs_on_caller+0xf4/0x12f
[  221.629066]  [<c06abec8>] ? _spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x42/0x58
[  221.629066]  [<c013555c>] ? down+0x2b/0x2f
[  221.629066]  [<c022aa68>] ? hfsplus_iget+0xa0/0x154
[  221.629066]  [<c022b0b9>] ? hfsplus_fill_super+0x280/0x447
[  221.629066]  [<c0107aa3>] ? native_sched_clock+0x82/0x96
[  221.629066]  [<c013bca3>] ? trace_hardirqs_off_caller+0x14/0x9b
[  221.629066]  [<c013bca3>] ? trace_hardirqs_off_caller+0x14/0x9b
[  221.629066]  [<c013f1f6>] ? __lock_acquire+0x68a/0x6e0
[  221.629066]  [<c041c9e4>] ? string+0x2b/0x74
[  221.629066]  [<c041cd16>] ? vsnprintf+0x2e9/0x512
[  221.629066]  [<c010487a>] ? dump_trace+0xca/0xd6
[  221.629066]  [<c0109eaf>] ? save_stack_trace+0x1c/0x3a
[  221.629066]  [<c0109eaf>] ? save_stack_trace+0x1c/0x3a
[  221.629066]  [<c013b571>] ? save_trace+0x37/0x8d
[  221.629066]  [<c013b62e>] ? add_lock_to_list+0x67/0x8d
[  221.629066]  [<c013ea1c>] ? validate_chain+0x8a4/0x9f4
[  221.629066]  [<c01354d3>] ? up+0xc/0x2f
[  221.629066]  [<c013f1f6>] ? __lock_acquire+0x68a/0x6e0
[  221.629066]  [<c013bd35>] ? trace_hardirqs_off+0xb/0xd
[  221.629066]  [<c013bca3>] ? trace_hardirqs_off_caller+0x14/0x9b
[  221.629066]  [<c013bd35>] ? trace_hardirqs_off+0xb/0xd
[  221.629066]  [<c0107aa3>] ? native_sched_clock+0x82/0x96
[  221.629066]  [<c041cfb7>] ? snprintf+0x1b/0x1d
[  221.629066]  [<c01ba466>] ? disk_name+0x25/0x67
[  221.629066]  [<c0183960>] ? get_sb_bdev+0xcd/0x10b
[  221.629066]  [<c016ad92>] ? kstrdup+0x2a/0x4c
[  221.629066]  [<c022a7b3>] ? hfsplus_get_sb+0x13/0x15
[  221.629066]  [<c022ae39>] ? hfsplus_fill_super+0x0/0x447
[  221.629066]  [<c0183583>] ? vfs_kern_mount+0x3b/0x76
[  221.629066]  [<c0183602>] ? do_kern_mount+0x32/0xba
[  221.629066]  [<c01960d4>] ? do_new_mount+0x46/0x74
[  221.629066]  [<c0196277>] ? do_mount+0x175/0x193
[  221.629066]  [<c013dbf4>] ? trace_hardirqs_on_caller+0xf4/0x12f
[  221.629066]  [<c01663b2>] ? __get_free_pages+0x1e/0x24
[  221.629066]  [<c06ac07b>] ? lock_kernel+0x19/0x8c
[  221.629066]  [<c01962e6>] ? sys_mount+0x51/0x9b
[  221.629066]  [<c01962f9>] ? sys_mount+0x64/0x9b
[  221.629066]  [<c01038bd>] ? sysenter_do_call+0x12/0x31
[  221.629066]  =======================
[  221.629066] Code: 89 c2 c1 e2 08 c1 e8 08 09 c2 8b 85 e8 fd ff ff 66 89 50 06 89 c7 53 83 c7 08 56 57 68 c4 b3 80 c0 e8 8c 5c ef ff 89 d9 c1 e9 02 <f3> a5 89 d9 83 e1 03 74 02 f3 a4 83 c3 06 8b 95 e8 fd ff ff 0f
[  221.629066] EIP: [<c022d4b1>] hfsplus_find_cat+0x10d/0x151 SS:ESP 0068:c82d199c
[  221.629066] ---[ end trace e417a1d67f0d0066 ]---

Since hfsplus_cat_build_key_uni() returns void and only has one callsite,
the check is performed at the callsite.

Signed-off-by: Eric Sesterhenn <snakebyte at gmx.de>
Reviewed-by: Pekka Enberg <penberg at cs.helsinki.fi>
Cc: Roman Zippel <zippel at linux-m68k.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm at linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds at linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh at suse.de>

---
 fs/hfsplus/catalog.c |    5 +++++
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)

--- a/fs/hfsplus/catalog.c
+++ b/fs/hfsplus/catalog.c
@@ -168,6 +168,11 @@ int hfsplus_find_cat(struct super_block 
 		return -EIO;
 	}
 
+	if (be16_to_cpu(tmp.thread.nodeName.length) > 255) {
+		printk(KERN_ERR "hfs: catalog name length corrupted\n");
+		return -EIO;
+	}
+
 	hfsplus_cat_build_key_uni(fd->search_key, be32_to_cpu(tmp.thread.parentID),
 				 &tmp.thread.nodeName);
 	return hfs_brec_find(fd);

linux-2.6-net-fix-soft-lockups-oom-issues-w-unix-garbage-collector.patch:

--- NEW FILE linux-2.6-net-fix-soft-lockups-oom-issues-w-unix-garbage-collector.patch ---
>From 5f23b734963ec7eaa3ebcd9050da0c9b7d143dd3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: dann frazier <dannf at hp.com>
Date: Wed, 26 Nov 2008 15:32:27 -0800
Subject: net: Fix soft lockups/OOM issues w/ unix garbage collector (CVE-2008-5300)

From: dann frazier <dannf at hp.com>

commit 5f23b734963ec7eaa3ebcd9050da0c9b7d143dd3 upstream.

This is an implementation of David Miller's suggested fix in:
  https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=470201

It has been updated to use wait_event() instead of
wait_event_interruptible().

Paraphrasing the description from the above report, it makes sendmsg()
block while UNIX garbage collection is in progress. This avoids a
situation where child processes continue to queue new FDs over a
AF_UNIX socket to a parent which is in the exit path and running
garbage collection on these FDs. This contention can result in soft
lockups and oom-killing of unrelated processes.

Signed-off-by: dann frazier <dannf at hp.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem at davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh at suse.de>

---
 include/net/af_unix.h |    1 +
 net/unix/af_unix.c    |    2 ++
 net/unix/garbage.c    |   13 ++++++++++---
 3 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

--- a/include/net/af_unix.h
+++ b/include/net/af_unix.h
@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@
 extern void unix_inflight(struct file *fp);
 extern void unix_notinflight(struct file *fp);
 extern void unix_gc(void);
+extern void wait_for_unix_gc(void);
 
 #define UNIX_HASH_SIZE	256
 
--- a/net/unix/af_unix.c
+++ b/net/unix/af_unix.c
@@ -1341,6 +1341,7 @@ static int unix_dgram_sendmsg(struct kio
 
 	if (NULL == siocb->scm)
 		siocb->scm = &tmp_scm;
+	wait_for_unix_gc();
 	err = scm_send(sock, msg, siocb->scm);
 	if (err < 0)
 		return err;
@@ -1491,6 +1492,7 @@ static int unix_stream_sendmsg(struct ki
 
 	if (NULL == siocb->scm)
 		siocb->scm = &tmp_scm;
+	wait_for_unix_gc();
 	err = scm_send(sock, msg, siocb->scm);
 	if (err < 0)
 		return err;
--- a/net/unix/garbage.c
+++ b/net/unix/garbage.c
@@ -80,6 +80,7 @@
 #include <linux/file.h>
 #include <linux/proc_fs.h>
 #include <linux/mutex.h>
+#include <linux/wait.h>
 
 #include <net/sock.h>
 #include <net/af_unix.h>
@@ -91,6 +92,7 @@
 static LIST_HEAD(gc_inflight_list);
 static LIST_HEAD(gc_candidates);
 static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(unix_gc_lock);
+static DECLARE_WAIT_QUEUE_HEAD(unix_gc_wait);
 
 unsigned int unix_tot_inflight;
 
@@ -266,12 +268,16 @@ static void inc_inflight_move_tail(struc
 		list_move_tail(&u->link, &gc_candidates);
 }
 
-/* The external entry point: unix_gc() */
+static bool gc_in_progress = false;
 
-void unix_gc(void)
+void wait_for_unix_gc(void)
 {
-	static bool gc_in_progress = false;
+	wait_event(unix_gc_wait, gc_in_progress == false);
+}
 
+/* The external entry point: unix_gc() */
+void unix_gc(void)
+{
 	struct unix_sock *u;
 	struct unix_sock *next;
 	struct sk_buff_head hitlist;
@@ -376,6 +382,7 @@ void unix_gc(void)
 	/* All candidates should have been detached by now. */
 	BUG_ON(!list_empty(&gc_candidates));
 	gc_in_progress = false;
+	wake_up(&unix_gc_wait);
 
  out:
 	spin_unlock(&unix_gc_lock);

linux-2.6-v4l-dvb-avoid-writing-outside-shadow.bytes-array.patch:

--- NEW FILE linux-2.6-v4l-dvb-avoid-writing-outside-shadow.bytes-array.patch ---
>From 494264379d186bf806613d27aafb7d88d42f4212 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab at redhat.com>
Date: Thu, 13 Nov 2008 17:03:28 -0300
Subject: V4L/DVB (9621): Avoid writing outside shadow.bytes[] array

From: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab at redhat.com>

commit 494264379d186bf806613d27aafb7d88d42f4212 upstream.

There were no check about the limits of shadow.bytes array. This offers
a risk of writing values outside the limits, overriding other data
areas.

Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab at redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh at suse.de>

---
 drivers/media/video/tvaudio.c |   30 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++---
 1 file changed, 27 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

--- a/drivers/media/video/tvaudio.c
+++ b/drivers/media/video/tvaudio.c
@@ -152,7 +152,7 @@ static int chip_write(struct CHIPSTATE *
 {
 	unsigned char buffer[2];
 
-	if (-1 == subaddr) {
+	if (subaddr < 0) {
 		v4l_dbg(1, debug, chip->c, "%s: chip_write: 0x%x\n",
 			chip->c->name, val);
 		chip->shadow.bytes[1] = val;
@@ -163,6 +163,13 @@ static int chip_write(struct CHIPSTATE *
 			return -1;
 		}
 	} else {
+		if (subaddr + 1 >= ARRAY_SIZE(chip->shadow.bytes)) {
+			v4l_info(chip->c,
+				"Tried to access a non-existent register: %d\n",
+				subaddr);
+			return -EINVAL;
+		}
+
 		v4l_dbg(1, debug, chip->c, "%s: chip_write: reg%d=0x%x\n",
 			chip->c->name, subaddr, val);
 		chip->shadow.bytes[subaddr+1] = val;
@@ -177,12 +184,20 @@ static int chip_write(struct CHIPSTATE *
 	return 0;
 }
 
-static int chip_write_masked(struct CHIPSTATE *chip, int subaddr, int val, int mask)
+static int chip_write_masked(struct CHIPSTATE *chip,
+			     int subaddr, int val, int mask)
 {
 	if (mask != 0) {
-		if (-1 == subaddr) {
+		if (subaddr < 0) {
 			val = (chip->shadow.bytes[1] & ~mask) | (val & mask);
 		} else {
+			if (subaddr + 1 >= ARRAY_SIZE(chip->shadow.bytes)) {
+				v4l_info(chip->c,
+					"Tried to access a non-existent register: %d\n",
+					subaddr);
+				return -EINVAL;
+			}
+
 			val = (chip->shadow.bytes[subaddr+1] & ~mask) | (val & mask);
 		}
 	}
@@ -228,6 +243,15 @@ static int chip_cmd(struct CHIPSTATE *ch
 	if (0 == cmd->count)
 		return 0;
 
+	if (cmd->count + cmd->bytes[0] - 1 >= ARRAY_SIZE(chip->shadow.bytes)) {
+		v4l_info(chip->c,
+			 "Tried to access a non-existent register range: %d to %d\n",
+			 cmd->bytes[0] + 1, cmd->bytes[0] + cmd->count - 1);
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	/* FIXME: it seems that the shadow bytes are wrong bellow !*/
+
 	/* update our shadow register set; print bytes if (debug > 0) */
 	v4l_dbg(1, debug, chip->c, "%s: chip_cmd(%s): reg=%d, data:",
 		chip->c->name, name,cmd->bytes[0]);


Index: kernel.spec
===================================================================
RCS file: /cvs/pkgs/rpms/kernel/F-8/kernel.spec,v
retrieving revision 1.566
retrieving revision 1.567
diff -u -r1.566 -r1.567
--- kernel.spec	11 Nov 2008 01:39:58 -0000	1.566
+++ kernel.spec	18 Dec 2008 23:34:39 -0000	1.567
@@ -576,6 +576,17 @@
 # patches queued for the next -stable release
 #Patch11: linux-2.6-stable-queue.patch
 
+# Security patches from 2.6.27-stable
+Patch11: linux-2.6-applicom-fix-an-unchecked-user-ioctl-range-and-an-error-return.patch
+Patch12: linux-2.6-atm-cve-2008-5079-duplicate-listen-on-socket-corrupts-the-vcc-table.patch
+Patch13: linux-2.6-enforce-a-minimum-sg_io-timeout.patch
+Patch14: linux-2.6-fix-inotify-watch-removal-umount-races.patch
+Patch15: linux-2.6-net-fix-soft-lockups-oom-issues-w-unix-garbage-collector.patch
+Patch16: linux-2.6-v4l-dvb-avoid-writing-outside-shadow.bytes-array.patch
+Patch17: linux-2.6-hfs-fix-namelength-memory-corruption.patch
+Patch18: linux-2.6-hfsplus-check-read_mapping_page-return-value.patch
+Patch19: linux-2.6-hfsplus-fix-buffer-overflow-with-a-corrupted-image.patch
+
 Patch20: linux-2.6-ptrace-cleanup.patch
 Patch21: linux-2.6-tracehook.patch
 Patch22: linux-2.6-utrace.patch
@@ -1008,6 +1019,17 @@
 ApplyPatch linux-2.6-upstream-reverts.patch -R
 #ApplyPatch linux-2.6-stable-queue.patch
 
+# Security fixes from 2.6.27-stable
+ApplyPatch linux-2.6-applicom-fix-an-unchecked-user-ioctl-range-and-an-error-return.patch
+ApplyPatch linux-2.6-atm-cve-2008-5079-duplicate-listen-on-socket-corrupts-the-vcc-table.patch
+ApplyPatch linux-2.6-enforce-a-minimum-sg_io-timeout.patch
+ApplyPatch linux-2.6-fix-inotify-watch-removal-umount-races.patch
+ApplyPatch linux-2.6-net-fix-soft-lockups-oom-issues-w-unix-garbage-collector.patch
+ApplyPatch linux-2.6-v4l-dvb-avoid-writing-outside-shadow.bytes-array.patch
+ApplyPatch linux-2.6-hfs-fix-namelength-memory-corruption.patch
+ApplyPatch linux-2.6-hfsplus-check-read_mapping_page-return-value.patch
+ApplyPatch linux-2.6-hfsplus-fix-buffer-overflow-with-a-corrupted-image.patch
+
 # Roland's utrace ptrace replacement.
 ApplyPatch linux-2.6-ptrace-cleanup.patch
 ApplyPatch linux-2.6-tracehook.patch
@@ -1869,6 +1891,18 @@
 
 
 %changelog
+* Thu Dec 18 2008 Chuck Ebbert <cebbert at redhat.com> 2.6.26.8-57
+- Fixes from 2.6.27-stable:
+                 linux-2.6-applicom-fix-an-unchecked-user-ioctl-range-and-an-error-return.patch
+  CVE-2008-5079: linux-2.6-atm-cve-2008-5079-duplicate-listen-on-socket-corrupts-the-vcc-table.patch
+                 linux-2.6-enforce-a-minimum-sg_io-timeout.patch
+  CVE-2008-5182: linux-2.6-fix-inotify-watch-removal-umount-races.patch
+  CVE-2008-5300: linux-2.6-net-fix-soft-lockups-oom-issues-w-unix-garbage-collector.patch
+                 linux-2.6-v4l-dvb-avoid-writing-outside-shadow.bytes-array.patch
+  CVE-2008-4933: linux-2.6-hfs-fix-namelength-memory-corruption.patch
+                 linux-2.6-hfsplus-check-read_mapping_page-return-value.patch
+  CVE-2008-5025: linux-2.6-hfsplus-fix-buffer-overflow-with-a-corrupted-image.patch
+
 * Mon Nov 10 2008 Chuck Ebbert <cebbert at redhat.com> 2.6.26.8-56
 - Linux 2.6.26.8
   Dropped patches:


