rpms/selinux-policy/devel policy-20080509.patch,1.12,1.13
Daniel J Walsh (dwalsh)
fedora-extras-commits at redhat.com
Thu Jun 12 18:27:44 UTC 2008
Author: dwalsh
Update of /cvs/extras/rpms/selinux-policy/devel
In directory cvs-int.fedora.redhat.com:/tmp/cvs-serv23666
Modified Files:
policy-20080509.patch
Log Message:
* Wed Jun 11 2008 Dan Walsh <dwalsh at redhat.com> 3.4.2-1
- Update to upstream
policy-20080509.patch:
Index: policy-20080509.patch
===================================================================
RCS file: /cvs/extras/rpms/selinux-policy/devel/policy-20080509.patch,v
retrieving revision 1.12
retrieving revision 1.13
diff -u -r1.12 -r1.13
--- policy-20080509.patch 12 Jun 2008 14:48:13 -0000 1.12
+++ policy-20080509.patch 12 Jun 2008 18:26:59 -0000 1.13
@@ -25914,7 +25914,7 @@
/var/lib/pam_devperm/:0 -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:xdm_var_lib_t,s0)
diff --exclude-from=exclude -N -u -r nsaserefpolicy/policy/modules/services/xserver.if serefpolicy-3.4.2/policy/modules/services/xserver.if
--- nsaserefpolicy/policy/modules/services/xserver.if 2008-05-19 10:26:38.000000000 -0400
-+++ serefpolicy-3.4.2/policy/modules/services/xserver.if 2008-06-12 10:36:55.251920000 -0400
++++ serefpolicy-3.4.2/policy/modules/services/xserver.if 2008-06-12 12:10:32.884486000 -0400
@@ -16,7 +16,8 @@
gen_require(`
type xkb_var_lib_t, xserver_exec_t, xserver_log_t;
@@ -26204,7 +26204,7 @@
# for when /tmp/.X11-unix is created by the system
allow $2 xdm_t:fd use;
-@@ -643,11 +623,81 @@
+@@ -643,13 +623,175 @@
xserver_read_xdm_tmp_files($2)
@@ -26246,7 +26246,7 @@
+ attribute x_domain;
+ type $1_xserver_t;
+# type $2_input_xevent_t;
- ')
++ ')
+
+# typeattribute $2_input_xevent_t $1_input_xevent_type;
+
@@ -26266,10 +26266,9 @@
+ # manage: xhost X11:ChangeHosts
+ # freeze: metacity X11:GrabKey
+ # force_cursor: metacity X11:GrabPointer
-+ allow $3 $1_xserver_t:x_device { manage freeze force_cursor };
++ allow $3 $1_xserver_t:x_device { read manage freeze force_cursor };
+ allow $3 $1_xserver_t:x_device { getfocus setfocus grab use getattr setattr bell };
+
-+
+ # gnome-settings-daemon XKEYBOARD:SetControls
+ allow $3 $1_xserver_t:x_server { manage grab };
+
@@ -26287,13 +26286,20 @@
+
+ # setattr: metacity X11:InstallColormap
+ allow $3 $1_xserver_t:x_screen { getattr saver_setattr saver_getattr setattr };
- ')
-
- #######################################
-@@ -662,6 +712,99 @@
- ## is the prefix for user_t).
- ## </summary>
- ## </param>
++')
++
++#######################################
++## <summary>
++## Interface to provide X object permissions on a given X server to
++## an X client domain. Provides the minimal set required by a basic
++## X client application.
++## </summary>
++## <param name="user">
++## <summary>
++## The prefix of the X server domain (e.g., user
++## is the prefix for user_t).
++## </summary>
++## </param>
+## <param name="domain">
+## <summary>
+## Client domain allowed access.
@@ -26333,7 +26339,7 @@
+ type manage_xevent_t, output_xext_t, property_xevent_t;
+ type shmem_xext_t, xselection_t;
+ attribute xevent_type, xextension_type;
-+ ')
+ ')
+ # can receive certain root window events
+ allow $2 self:x_cursor { destroy create use setattr };
+ allow $2 self:x_drawable { write getattr read destroy create add_child };
@@ -26341,7 +26347,7 @@
+ allow $2 self:x_resource { write read };
+
+ allow $2 input_xevent_t:x_synthetic_event receive;
-+ allow $2 client_xevent_t:x_synthetic_event receive;
++ allow $2 client_xevent_t:x_synthetic_event { send receive };
+ allow $2 focus_xevent_t:x_event receive;
+ allow $2 info_xproperty_t:x_property read;
+ allow $2 manage_xevent_t:x_event receive;
@@ -26372,25 +26378,13 @@
+
+# xserver_use($1,$1,$2)
+ xserver_use(xdm,$1,$2)
-+')
-+
+ ')
+
+
-+#######################################
-+## <summary>
-+## Interface to provide X object permissions on a given X server to
-+## an X client domain. Provides the minimal set required by a basic
-+## X client application.
-+## </summary>
-+## <param name="user">
-+## <summary>
-+## The prefix of the X server domain (e.g., user
-+## is the prefix for user_t).
-+## </summary>
-+## </param>
- ## <param name="prefix">
- ## <summary>
- ## The prefix of the X client domain (e.g., user
-@@ -676,7 +819,7 @@
+ #######################################
+ ## <summary>
+ ## Interface to provide X object permissions on a given X server to
+@@ -676,7 +818,7 @@
#
template(`xserver_common_x_domain_template',`
gen_require(`
@@ -26399,7 +26393,7 @@
type xproperty_t, info_xproperty_t, clipboard_xproperty_t;
type input_xevent_t, focus_xevent_t, property_xevent_t, manage_xevent_t;
type xevent_t, client_xevent_t;
-@@ -685,7 +828,6 @@
+@@ -685,7 +827,6 @@
attribute x_server_domain, x_domain;
attribute xproperty_type;
attribute xevent_type, xextension_type;
@@ -26407,7 +26401,7 @@
class x_drawable all_x_drawable_perms;
class x_screen all_x_screen_perms;
-@@ -709,20 +851,22 @@
+@@ -709,20 +850,22 @@
# Declarations
#
@@ -26433,7 +26427,7 @@
##############################
#
# Local Policy
-@@ -740,7 +884,7 @@
+@@ -740,7 +883,7 @@
allow $3 x_server_domain:x_server getattr;
# everyone can do override-redirect windows.
# this could be used to spoof labels
@@ -26442,7 +26436,7 @@
# everyone can receive management events on the root window
# allows to know when new windows appear, among other things
allow $3 manage_xevent_t:x_event receive;
-@@ -749,7 +893,7 @@
+@@ -749,7 +892,7 @@
# can read server-owned resources
allow $3 x_server_domain:x_resource read;
# can mess with own clients
@@ -26451,7 +26445,7 @@
# X Protocol Extensions
allow $3 std_xext_t:x_extension { query use };
-@@ -758,27 +902,17 @@
+@@ -758,27 +901,17 @@
# X Properties
# can read and write client properties
@@ -26484,20 +26478,20 @@
# X Input
# can receive own events
-@@ -805,6 +939,12 @@
+@@ -805,6 +938,12 @@
allow $3 manage_xevent_t:x_synthetic_event send;
allow $3 client_xevent_t:x_synthetic_event send;
+ allow $3 input_xevent_t:x_event receive;
+ allow $3 input_xevent_t:x_synthetic_event send;
+ allow $3 $2_client_xevent_t:x_synthetic_event send;
-+ allow $3 xproperty_t:x_property read;
++ allow $3 xproperty_t:x_property { read destroy };
+ allow $3 xselection_t:x_selection setattr;
+
# X Selections
# can use the clipboard
allow $3 clipboard_xselection_t:x_selection { getattr setattr read };
-@@ -813,13 +953,15 @@
+@@ -813,13 +952,15 @@
# Other X Objects
# can create and use cursors
@@ -26517,7 +26511,7 @@
tunable_policy(`! xserver_object_manager',`
# should be xserver_unconfined($3),
-@@ -879,17 +1021,17 @@
+@@ -879,17 +1020,17 @@
#
template(`xserver_user_x_domain_template',`
gen_require(`
@@ -26542,7 +26536,7 @@
# for when /tmp/.X11-unix is created by the system
allow $3 xdm_t:fd use;
-@@ -916,11 +1058,9 @@
+@@ -916,11 +1057,9 @@
# X object manager
xserver_common_x_domain_template($1,$2,$3)
@@ -26557,7 +26551,7 @@
')
########################################
-@@ -952,26 +1092,43 @@
+@@ -952,26 +1091,43 @@
#
template(`xserver_use_user_fonts',`
gen_require(`
@@ -26608,7 +26602,7 @@
## Transition to a user Xauthority domain.
## </summary>
## <desc>
-@@ -1005,6 +1162,73 @@
+@@ -1005,6 +1161,73 @@
########################################
## <summary>
@@ -26682,7 +26676,7 @@
## Transition to a user Xauthority domain.
## </summary>
## <desc>
-@@ -1030,10 +1254,10 @@
+@@ -1030,10 +1253,10 @@
#
template(`xserver_user_home_dir_filetrans_user_xauth',`
gen_require(`
@@ -26695,7 +26689,7 @@
')
########################################
-@@ -1219,6 +1443,25 @@
+@@ -1219,6 +1442,25 @@
########################################
## <summary>
@@ -26721,7 +26715,7 @@
## Read xdm-writable configuration files.
## </summary>
## <param name="domain">
-@@ -1273,6 +1516,7 @@
+@@ -1273,6 +1515,7 @@
files_search_tmp($1)
allow $1 xdm_tmp_t:dir list_dir_perms;
create_sock_files_pattern($1,xdm_tmp_t,xdm_tmp_t)
@@ -26729,7 +26723,7 @@
')
########################################
-@@ -1291,7 +1535,7 @@
+@@ -1291,7 +1534,7 @@
')
files_search_pids($1)
@@ -26738,7 +26732,7 @@
')
########################################
-@@ -1314,6 +1558,24 @@
+@@ -1314,6 +1557,24 @@
########################################
## <summary>
@@ -26763,7 +26757,7 @@
## Execute the X server in the XDM X server domain.
## </summary>
## <param name="domain">
-@@ -1324,15 +1586,47 @@
+@@ -1324,15 +1585,47 @@
#
interface(`xserver_domtrans_xdm_xserver',`
gen_require(`
@@ -26812,7 +26806,7 @@
## Make an X session script an entrypoint for the specified domain.
## </summary>
## <param name="domain">
-@@ -1482,7 +1776,7 @@
+@@ -1482,7 +1775,7 @@
type xdm_xserver_tmp_t;
')
@@ -26821,7 +26815,7 @@
')
########################################
-@@ -1674,6 +1968,65 @@
+@@ -1674,6 +1967,65 @@
########################################
## <summary>
@@ -26887,7 +26881,7 @@
## Interface to provide X object permissions on a given X server to
## an X client domain. Gives the domain complete control over the
## display.
-@@ -1686,8 +2039,87 @@
+@@ -1686,8 +2038,87 @@
#
interface(`xserver_unconfined',`
gen_require(`
@@ -30469,7 +30463,7 @@
+')
diff --exclude-from=exclude -N -u -r nsaserefpolicy/policy/modules/system/selinuxutil.fc serefpolicy-3.4.2/policy/modules/system/selinuxutil.fc
--- nsaserefpolicy/policy/modules/system/selinuxutil.fc 2008-05-19 10:26:42.000000000 -0400
-+++ serefpolicy-3.4.2/policy/modules/system/selinuxutil.fc 2008-06-12 10:36:55.473696000 -0400
++++ serefpolicy-3.4.2/policy/modules/system/selinuxutil.fc 2008-06-12 14:04:10.162698000 -0400
@@ -38,7 +38,7 @@
/usr/sbin/restorecond -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:restorecond_exec_t,s0)
/usr/sbin/run_init -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:run_init_exec_t,s0)
@@ -30479,6 +30473,15 @@
/usr/sbin/semanage -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:semanage_exec_t,s0)
/usr/sbin/semodule -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:semanage_exec_t,s0)
+@@ -46,3 +46,8 @@
+ # /var/run
+ #
+ /var/run/restorecond\.pid -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:restorecond_var_run_t,s0)
++
++#
++# /var/lib
++#
++/var/lib/selinux(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:selinux_var_lib_t,s0)
diff --exclude-from=exclude -N -u -r nsaserefpolicy/policy/modules/system/selinuxutil.if serefpolicy-3.4.2/policy/modules/system/selinuxutil.if
--- nsaserefpolicy/policy/modules/system/selinuxutil.if 2008-05-29 15:55:43.000000000 -0400
+++ serefpolicy-3.4.2/policy/modules/system/selinuxutil.if 2008-06-12 10:36:55.480688000 -0400
@@ -30986,8 +30989,18 @@
+')
diff --exclude-from=exclude -N -u -r nsaserefpolicy/policy/modules/system/selinuxutil.te serefpolicy-3.4.2/policy/modules/system/selinuxutil.te
--- nsaserefpolicy/policy/modules/system/selinuxutil.te 2008-05-29 15:55:43.000000000 -0400
-+++ serefpolicy-3.4.2/policy/modules/system/selinuxutil.te 2008-06-12 10:36:55.485685000 -0400
-@@ -75,7 +75,6 @@
++++ serefpolicy-3.4.2/policy/modules/system/selinuxutil.te 2008-06-12 14:05:15.662484000 -0400
+@@ -23,6 +23,9 @@
+ type selinux_config_t;
+ files_type(selinux_config_t)
+
++type selinux_var_lib_t;
++files_type(selinux_var_lib_t)
++
+ type checkpolicy_t, can_write_binary_policy;
+ type checkpolicy_exec_t;
+ application_domain(checkpolicy_t, checkpolicy_exec_t)
+@@ -75,7 +78,6 @@
type restorecond_exec_t;
init_daemon_domain(restorecond_t,restorecond_exec_t)
domain_obj_id_change_exemption(restorecond_t)
@@ -30995,7 +31008,7 @@
type restorecond_var_run_t;
files_pid_file(restorecond_var_run_t)
-@@ -92,6 +91,10 @@
+@@ -92,6 +94,10 @@
domain_interactive_fd(semanage_t)
role system_r types semanage_t;
@@ -31006,7 +31019,7 @@
type semanage_store_t;
files_type(semanage_store_t)
-@@ -109,6 +112,11 @@
+@@ -109,6 +115,11 @@
init_system_domain(setfiles_t,setfiles_exec_t)
domain_obj_id_change_exemption(setfiles_t)
@@ -31018,7 +31031,7 @@
########################################
#
# Checkpolicy local policy
-@@ -168,6 +176,7 @@
+@@ -168,6 +179,7 @@
files_read_etc_runtime_files(load_policy_t)
fs_getattr_xattr_fs(load_policy_t)
@@ -31026,7 +31039,7 @@
mls_file_read_all_levels(load_policy_t)
-@@ -195,15 +204,6 @@
+@@ -195,15 +207,6 @@
')
')
@@ -31042,7 +31055,7 @@
########################################
#
# Newrole local policy
-@@ -221,7 +221,7 @@
+@@ -221,7 +224,7 @@
allow newrole_t self:msg { send receive };
allow newrole_t self:unix_dgram_socket sendto;
allow newrole_t self:unix_stream_socket { create_stream_socket_perms connectto };
@@ -31051,7 +31064,7 @@
read_files_pattern(newrole_t,default_context_t,default_context_t)
read_lnk_files_pattern(newrole_t,default_context_t,default_context_t)
-@@ -277,6 +277,7 @@
+@@ -277,6 +280,7 @@
libs_use_ld_so(newrole_t)
libs_use_shared_libs(newrole_t)
@@ -31059,7 +31072,7 @@
logging_send_syslog_msg(newrole_t)
miscfiles_read_localization(newrole_t)
-@@ -347,6 +348,8 @@
+@@ -347,6 +351,8 @@
seutil_libselinux_linked(restorecond_t)
@@ -31068,7 +31081,7 @@
ifdef(`distro_ubuntu',`
optional_policy(`
unconfined_domain(restorecond_t)
-@@ -365,7 +368,7 @@
+@@ -365,7 +371,7 @@
allow run_init_t self:process setexec;
allow run_init_t self:capability setuid;
allow run_init_t self:fifo_file rw_file_perms;
@@ -31077,7 +31090,7 @@
# often the administrator runs such programs from a directory that is owned
# by a different user or has restrictive SE permissions, do not want to audit
-@@ -396,7 +399,6 @@
+@@ -396,7 +402,6 @@
auth_use_nsswitch(run_init_t)
auth_domtrans_chk_passwd(run_init_t)
@@ -31085,7 +31098,7 @@
auth_dontaudit_read_shadow(run_init_t)
init_spec_domtrans_script(run_init_t)
-@@ -435,64 +437,17 @@
+@@ -435,64 +440,22 @@
# semodule local policy
#
@@ -31104,9 +31117,13 @@
-kernel_read_kernel_sysctls(semanage_t)
-
-corecmd_exec_bin(semanage_t)
--
++seutil_semanage_policy(semanage_t)
++allow semanage_t self:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms;
+
-dev_read_urand(semanage_t)
--
++manage_dirs_pattern(semanage_t, selinux_var_lib_t, selinux_var_lib_t)
++manage_files_pattern(semanage_t, selinux_var_lib_t, selinux_var_lib_t)
+
-domain_use_interactive_fds(semanage_t)
-
-files_read_etc_files(semanage_t)
@@ -31121,7 +31138,6 @@
-selinux_get_enforce_mode(semanage_t)
-selinux_getattr_fs(semanage_t)
-# for setsebool:
-+seutil_semanage_policy(semanage_t)
selinux_set_boolean(semanage_t)
+can_exec(semanage_t, semanage_exec_t)
@@ -31155,7 +31171,7 @@
# netfilter_contexts:
seutil_manage_default_contexts(semanage_t)
-@@ -501,12 +456,21 @@
+@@ -501,12 +464,21 @@
files_read_var_lib_symlinks(semanage_t)
')
@@ -31177,7 +31193,7 @@
# cjp: need a more general way to handle this:
ifdef(`enable_mls',`
# read secadm tmp files
-@@ -514,121 +478,40 @@
+@@ -514,121 +486,40 @@
# Handle pp files created in homedir and /tmp
sysadm_read_home_content_files(semanage_t)
sysadm_read_tmp_files(semanage_t)
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