Security testing: need for a security policy, and a security-critical package process

[Bruno Wolff III]

On Mon, Nov 30, 2009 at 16:39:05 -0500,
  Gene Czarcinski <gene at czarc.net> wrote:
> 
> As I see it, the problem is that without a grub password, then an un-
> privileged user can edit the command line to disable selinux or bootup in 
> single user mode.
> 
> On the other hand, there is also "good enough" versus perfect.  In a perfect 
> world, a user would (by default) be required to enter that password.  In a 
> "good enough" world, have the option to set the password.

If the threat model includes actively malicious people at the console, I'd
rather see encrypted file systems than a grub password. (And that doesn't
help if you don't realize that a malicious person may have had access
and that you shouldn't trust the system any more.)