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Re: acpid

Stephen Smalley wrote:

On Fri, 2005-09-23 at 16:09 -0400, Matthew Saltzman wrote:
Can nobody here help with this (and if not, where could I go for assistance)? selinux-policy-targeted-1.27.1-2.1 does not solve the problem.

From the audit messages you posted, I would have expected that:
- a new type would have been assigned to /usr/share/hwdata, and apmd_t
would have been allowed to read it.
I am making this change.

- tmp_domain(apmd_t) would have been added to enable it to create its
own temporary files under /tmp without disturbing anyone else's
temporary files.

Looking at the latest rawhide targeted policy (1.27.1-5), it looks like
the tmp_domain() has been added, it has been directly allowed to read
usr_t (which I would have preferred not doing) and it has been made
unconfined in targeted policy (which seems overkill).  So I would expect
your scripts to work just fine with that policy, even though I'd still
favor adding a new type for /usr/share/hwdata and not making apmd_t
completely unconfined.

The problem is there is no standard scripts for this yet. Trying to lock down acpid is a moving target at this time, until the distros settle on a standard way of doing this. So until then it is better to run unconfined. If in FC5 timeframe a standard develops in Fedora, I will make the policy work and remove the unconfined_domain.


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