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Re: SELinux Policy/Flask Classes from scratch



On 1/26/07, Stephen Smalley <sds tycho nsa gov> wrote:
I'd suggest leveraging the reference policy instead as a baseline, then
customize it as desired.
http://oss.tresys.com/projects/refpolicy

I took a look at the reference policy and I am not sure how it can help me.  I am not  trying to use SELinux to constrain programs and daemons to sandboxes, instead I would like to use it to create restricted system administrator accounts.  Although in the future, I may want to end up hardening apache, etc, however at this point, that is not my focus.  My approach would be similar to the targeted policy, in which there is an "unconfined" base domain in which most things roam.  I understand that in theory the reference policy would be a good approach due to its modular approach, however I do not know where to start to get myself my base unconfined layer I want.  I am open to suggestions.
 
At present, removing kernel classes would lead to permission denials or
breakage.  See the thread starting with:
http://marc.theaimsgroup.com/
?l=selinux&m=116499002502432&w=2
Note however this isn't just a matter of granularity of protection, but
rather completeness of protection; if you were to disable SELinux
enforcement for a given object class, then you are removing all control
on those objects, enabling them to serve as a way of bypassing policy.
Changing the granularity of protection would just mean folding multiple
classes together, e.g. handle all of the file-related classes as one,
which you can achieve in policy by use of macros rather than needing to
change the kernel.

This makes absolute sense, thank you.  I will use macros to create the granularity I desire.


I appreciate your help,
Rebecca

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