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Re: [Libguestfs] [PATCH v2v] Check that guest names don't contain illegal characters.



On 22/03/11 15:31, Richard W.M. Jones wrote:
From 09b3e6c59b9cacc0263170631a022bd873412390 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Richard W.M. Jones<rjones redhat com>
Date: Tue, 22 Mar 2011 15:28:29 +0000
Subject: [PATCH 2/3] Check that guest names don't contain illegal characters.

---
  v2v/virt-v2v.pl |   10 ++++++++++
  1 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-)

diff --git a/v2v/virt-v2v.pl b/v2v/virt-v2v.pl
index a499924..264fe21 100755
--- a/v2v/virt-v2v.pl
+++ b/v2v/virt-v2v.pl
@@ -434,6 +434,16 @@ else {
  # Decide the name of the guest target.
  $output_name = $source->get_name() unless defined $output_name;

+# The regexp matches any unicode alphanumeric, underscore, and a range
+# of safe ASCII characters.  Note that we include the $output_name
+# string directly in XML so it must not contain<  >  &.  Libvirt allows
+# any character at all.  Hypervisors running under libvirt (except
+# libvirt-managed ones like KVM) will probably be more strict than
+# this simple test.
+v2vdie __x('Domain {name} contains illegal characters.  Use the "-on" option to rename the guest.',
+           name =>  $output_name)
+    if $output_name !~ m{^[-#\$%()*+,./:;=?\ {}\[\]\^\w]+$}i;
+
  # Check that the guest doesn't already exist on the target
  v2vdie __x('Domain {name} already exists on the target.',
             name =>  $output_name)
-- 1.7.4.1

Is there any reason for this restriction other than the XML escaping issue? If not, I'd prefer to fix the escaping directly and leave this out.

Matt
--
Matthew Booth, RHCA, RHCSS
Red Hat Engineering, Virtualisation Team

GPG ID:  D33C3490
GPG FPR: 3733 612D 2D05 5458 8A8A 1600 3441 EA19 D33C 3490


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