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Re: [libvirt] [PATCH] Fix a misuse of virAsprintf in qemudDomainMemoryPeek



On 05/14/2010 04:08 AM, Ryota Ozaki wrote:
> The code specifies driver->cacheDir as the format string,
> but it usually doesn't contain '%s', so the subsequent
> argument, "/qemu.mem.XXXXXX", is always ignored.
> 
> The patch fixes the misuse.
> ---
>  src/qemu/qemu_driver.c |    2 +-
>  1 files changed, 1 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/src/qemu/qemu_driver.c b/src/qemu/qemu_driver.c
> index bb1079e..843f827 100644
> --- a/src/qemu/qemu_driver.c
> +++ b/src/qemu/qemu_driver.c
> @@ -9033,7 +9033,7 @@ qemudDomainMemoryPeek (virDomainPtr dom,
>          goto endjob;
>      }
>  
> -    if (virAsprintf(&tmp, driver->cacheDir,  "/qemu.mem.XXXXXX") < 0) {
> +    if (virAsprintf(&tmp, "%s/qemu.mem.XXXXXX", driver->cacheDir) < 0) {

ACK.  Even worse, if driver->cacheDir contains %n, we have an
exploitable security hole.

Why didn't gcc -Wformat catch this one?  Oh, because it doesn't warn on
non-literal formats.  So why didn't -Wformat-nonliteral catch it?  Oh,
because we don't turn it on, since we have other (provably safe)
non-literals that would trip it up.  Maybe it's time to play with the
appropriate '#pragma gcc' to temporarily disable -Wformat-nonliteral
around just the places audited to be safe, if we detect at configure
time that we have new-enough gcc?

Pushed.

-- 
Eric Blake   eblake redhat com    +1-801-349-2682
Libvirt virtualization library http://libvirt.org

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