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Re: [libvirt] libguestfs integration: rich disk access for libvirt applications



On Wed, Sep 28, 2011 at 06:52:13PM +0100, Richard W.M. Jones wrote:
> On Wed, Sep 28, 2011 at 06:37:17PM +0100, Daniel P. Berrange wrote:
> > On Wed, Sep 28, 2011 at 11:14:57AM +0100, Stefan Hajnoczi wrote:
> > > On Tue, Sep 27, 2011 at 12:55 PM, Richard W.M. Jones <rjones redhat com> wrote:
> > > > To put this all into one place:
> > > >
> > > > (1) An ugly new libvirt API that runs febootstrap-supermin-helper to
> > > > create the appliance.
> > > [...]
> > > > I'm worried about item (1) in this list ...
> > > 
> > > This is the only instance where libvirt knows about libguestfs.  All
> > > other steps are libguest only or involve libguestfs knowing about
> > > libvirt.
> > > 
> > > Would it be possible introduce a "domain-builder" concept into
> > > libvirt?  When libguestfs is installed it drops a domain-builder
> > > configuration/script that libvirt can pick up.  Then you can say
> > > something like virDomainBuild(name="guestfs-appliance",
> > > builder="guestfs").
> > 
> > We do have a historical syntax from Xen paravirt which lets us call out
> > to a helper at boot time, namely the "<bootloader>" element. With Xen
> > this is typically something like pygrub, or pxegrub, which does some
> > work and writes out a kernel+initrd into temporary files, and prints
> > the file paths + any kernel args on stdout.
> > 
> > We could just wire up this concept in KVM too without any real trouble,
> > and then we could have guestfs-bootloader script todo the magic setup
> 
> I'm fine with this.
> 
> Are there security implications to allowing users to add <bootloader>
> clauses pointing at random scripts that get run on remote machines as
> different users?

Yes, but you have to consider a connection to libvirtd, to be equivalent
to a root shell at this time anyway. When we get RBAC in libvirt we'll
be able to control who can make such configurations, and/or whitelist
bootloaders in the SELinux policy so only trusted ones can be run

Daniel
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