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Re: [libvirt] [PATCH v2 2/2] selinux: add security selinux function to label tapfd

On 10/17/2012 03:19 AM, Eric Blake wrote:
On 10/15/2012 03:03 AM, Guannan Ren wrote:
When using macvtap, a character device gets first created by
kernel with name /dev/tapN, its selinux context is:

Shortly, when udev gets notification when new file is created
in /dev, it will then jump in and relabel this file back to the
expected default context:

There is a time gap happened.
Sometimes, it will have migration failed, AVC error message:
type=AVC msg=audit(1349858424.233:42507): avc:  denied  { read write } for
pid=19926 comm="qemu-kvm" path="/dev/tap33" dev=devtmpfs ino=131524
tcontext=system_u:object_r:device_t:s0 tclass=chr_file

This patch will label the tapfd device before qemu process starts:
system_u:object_r:tun_tap_device_t:MCS(MCS from seclabel->label)
This patch is breaking things for me - with it applied, I'm now seeing
/dev/net/tun with a label of :MCS that matches the most recently started
guest, which prevents other tun clients (like openvpn) from creating
their own tapfd.  I haven't yet looked closely to see where in this
patch you are labeling the wrong file, but it needs to be fixed.

    Sorry, that is a really stupid mistake I made.
I should relabel tapfd of virtual network of type VIR_DOMAIN_NET_TYPE_DIRECT
    Patch has sent out.


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