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Re: [libvirt] [PATCH 5/5] qemu: launch bridge helper from libvirtd



On Fri, Apr 19, 2013 at 09:47:05AM -0400, Corey Bryant wrote:
> 
> [snip]
> >
> >I still don't like using qemu-bridge-helper, but this is better than the
> >alternative of having qemu call it (although, due to the way that
> >process capabilities works, we are unable to prevent a rogue qemu
> >started by unprivileged libvirtd from calling it :-(
> 
> Maybe we can introduce a tighter seccomp sandbox environment that
> doesn't allow the QEMU process to call exec(), open(), socket() (and
> anything else?) on top of the syscalls that are already not included
> in the -sandbox whitelist.  This would require fd's to be passed
> from libvirt.  Eduardo's going to work on adding functionality in
> this area in case you have any suggestions.

I'd certainly like to see us have a profile that prevents execve() in
the near future. Already today there's no reason why a QEMU managed by
libvirt should need to exec anything. Eventually we'll get to the place
where we can consider blocking open/socket too, but I fear that's still
quite a way off in the distance.

Daniel
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