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Re: [libvirt] [PATCH v5 3/3] security_dac: Favour ACLs over chown()



On 28.03.2013 12:12, Daniel P. Berrange wrote:
> On Thu, Mar 28, 2013 at 11:38:04AM +0100, Michal Privoznik wrote:
>> On 28.03.2013 10:46, Daniel P. Berrange wrote:
>>> On Thu, Mar 21, 2013 at 05:50:49PM +0100, Michal Privoznik wrote:
>>>>  #define VIR_FROM_THIS VIR_FROM_SECURITY
>>>>  #define SECURITY_DAC_NAME "dac"
>>>> +#define SECURITY_DAC_XATTR_OLD_ACL "trusted.libvirt.dac.oldACL"
>>>> +#define SECURITY_DAC_XATTR_OLD_OWNER "trusted.libvirt.dac.oldOwner"
>>>> +#define SECURITY_DAC_XATTR_REFCOUNT "trusted.libvirt.dac.refCount"
>>>
>>> IMHO we don't need the 'trusted.' prefix on these.
>>>
>>> Daniel
>>>
>>
>> An XATTR has to have a prefix. We can choose from several prefixes.
>> attr(5) says:
>>
>>   Currently the security, system, trusted, and user extended attribute
>>   classes are defined as described below. Additional classes may be
>>   added in the future.
>>
>> security - should be used by kernel security modules, such as Security
>> Enhanced Linux. As long as libvirt doesn't provide kernel module, we
>> should not be polluting this prefix.
>>
>> system - used by the kernel to store system objects such as Access
>> Control Lists and Capabilities. Again, we are not kernel.
>>
>> trusted - visible and accessible only to processes that have the
>> CAP_SYS_ADMIN capability (the super user usually has this capability).
>> Attributes  in  this  class are used to implement mechanisms in user
>> space (i.e., outside the kernel) which keep information in extended
>> attributes to which ordinary processes should not have access.
>>
>> Note, that the three above can be touched only by root (or
>> CAP_SYS_ADMIN'ed process).
>>
>> user -  may be assigned to files and directories for storing arbitrary
>> additional information such as the mime type, character set or encoding
>> of a file.
>>
>> The user. can be manipulated by ordinary user.
>>
>> My rationale for not allowing ordinary user to play with our XATTRs is
>> to prevent them chowning to arbitrary user.
> 
> Ok, that makes more sense now. I wonder how portable this list of
> prefixes is though - does anyone know if *BSD use the same conventions ?
> 
> 
> Daniel
> 

Aah. On BSD they support just 'system' and 'user':

http://svnweb.freebsd.org/base/head/sys/sys/extattr.h?revision=184413&view=markup

Does it mean we should move from 'trusted' to 'system'? Or is
conditional prefix ('trusted' on linux, 'system' on BSD) sufficient?

Michal


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