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Re: [libvirt] [PATCH v5 3/3] security_dac: Favour ACLs over chown()



On Thu, Mar 28, 2013 at 12:47:25PM +0100, Michal Privoznik wrote:
> On 28.03.2013 12:12, Daniel P. Berrange wrote:
> > On Thu, Mar 28, 2013 at 11:38:04AM +0100, Michal Privoznik wrote:
> >> On 28.03.2013 10:46, Daniel P. Berrange wrote:
> >>> On Thu, Mar 21, 2013 at 05:50:49PM +0100, Michal Privoznik wrote:
> >>>>  #define VIR_FROM_THIS VIR_FROM_SECURITY
> >>>>  #define SECURITY_DAC_NAME "dac"
> >>>> +#define SECURITY_DAC_XATTR_OLD_ACL "trusted.libvirt.dac.oldACL"
> >>>> +#define SECURITY_DAC_XATTR_OLD_OWNER "trusted.libvirt.dac.oldOwner"
> >>>> +#define SECURITY_DAC_XATTR_REFCOUNT "trusted.libvirt.dac.refCount"
> >>>
> >>> IMHO we don't need the 'trusted.' prefix on these.
> >>>
> >>> Daniel
> >>>
> >>
> >> An XATTR has to have a prefix. We can choose from several prefixes.
> >> attr(5) says:
> >>
> >>   Currently the security, system, trusted, and user extended attribute
> >>   classes are defined as described below. Additional classes may be
> >>   added in the future.
> >>
> >> security - should be used by kernel security modules, such as Security
> >> Enhanced Linux. As long as libvirt doesn't provide kernel module, we
> >> should not be polluting this prefix.
> >>
> >> system - used by the kernel to store system objects such as Access
> >> Control Lists and Capabilities. Again, we are not kernel.
> >>
> >> trusted - visible and accessible only to processes that have the
> >> CAP_SYS_ADMIN capability (the super user usually has this capability).
> >> Attributes  in  this  class are used to implement mechanisms in user
> >> space (i.e., outside the kernel) which keep information in extended
> >> attributes to which ordinary processes should not have access.
> >>
> >> Note, that the three above can be touched only by root (or
> >> CAP_SYS_ADMIN'ed process).
> >>
> >> user -  may be assigned to files and directories for storing arbitrary
> >> additional information such as the mime type, character set or encoding
> >> of a file.
> >>
> >> The user. can be manipulated by ordinary user.
> >>
> >> My rationale for not allowing ordinary user to play with our XATTRs is
> >> to prevent them chowning to arbitrary user.
> > 
> > Ok, that makes more sense now. I wonder how portable this list of
> > prefixes is though - does anyone know if *BSD use the same conventions ?
> > 
> > 
> > Daniel
> > 
> 
> Aah. On BSD they support just 'system' and 'user':
> 
> http://svnweb.freebsd.org/base/head/sys/sys/extattr.h?revision=184413&view=markup
> 
> Does it mean we should move from 'trusted' to 'system'? Or is
> conditional prefix ('trusted' on linux, 'system' on BSD) sufficient?

You're not able to use 'system.' from userspace.

  # setfattr -n user.eek -v bar foo
  # setfattr -n system.eek -v bar foo
  setfattr: foo: Operation not supported

So 'user.' is the only option here for BSD. If we consider the (admittedly
unlikely) possibility of an NFS server access by 2 libvirt clients one
running Linux and one running BSD, we want compatibility. So this says
to me that we should use  'user.' as the prefer everywhere.

Regards,
Daniel
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