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Re: [libvirt] [PATCH v2] Add some notes about security considerations when using LXC



On 09/11/2013 04:56 AM, Daniel P. Berrange wrote:
> From: "Daniel P. Berrange" <berrange redhat com>
> 
> Describe some of the issues to be aware of when configuring LXC
> guests with security isolation as a goal.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange redhat com>
> ---
>  docs/drvlxc.html.in | 103 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
>  1 file changed, 103 insertions(+)
> 

> +
> +<p>
> +Sharing the host filesystem tree, also allows applications to access
> +UNIX domains sockets associated with the host OS, which are in the
> +filesystem namespaces. It should be noted that a number of init
> +systems including at least <code>systemd</code> and <code>upstart</code>
> +have UNIX domain socket which are used to control their operation.
> +Thus, if the directory/filesystem holding their UNIX domain socket is
> +exposed to the container, it will be possible for a user in the container
> +to invoke operations on the init service in the same way it could if
> +outside the container. This also applies to other applications in the
> +host which use UNIX domain sockets in the filesystem, such as DBus,
> +Libvirtd, and many more. If this is not desired, then applications
> +should either specify the UID/GID mapping in the configuration to
> +enable user namespaces & thus block access to the UNIX domain socket

s/&/and/

ACK.

-- 
Eric Blake   eblake redhat com    +1-919-301-3266
Libvirt virtualization library http://libvirt.org

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