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[libvirt] Bug#732394: Implementation deficiency in virInitctlSetRunLevel



On Wed, Dec 18, 2013 at 06:33:21PM +0400, Reco wrote:
>  Hello, list.
> 
> I was pointed here by maintainer of libvirt package in Debian, Guido
> G√ľnther. For the sake of completeness, the original bug report can be
> viewed at this link:
> 
> http://bugs.debian.org/cgi-bin/bugreport.cgi?bugs2394
> 
> To sum up the bug report, current implementation of
> virInitctlSetRunLevel function (src/util/virinitctl.c) lacks any sanity
> checks before writing to container's /dev/initctl. In the absence of
> such checks, libvirtd can be easily tricked to write runlevel check
> request to an arbitrary main hosts' file (including
> hosts' /run/initctl, as described in the bug report). All it takes is
> one symlink in place of containers' /dev/initctl.
> 
> I've checked current libvirtd's git, and it seems to me that the
> problem is still here.
> 
> Attached to this letter is a patch which tries to mitigate the issue by
> checking whenever container's /dev/initctl is a pipe actually.
> 
> Sincerely yours, Reco
> 
> PS I'm not subscribed to this list, in case of further questions please
> CC me.

> --- a/src/util/virinitctl.c 2013-12-18 11:13:10.078432196 +0400
> +++ b/src/util/virinitctl.c 2013-12-18 11:26:50.000000000 +0400
> @@ -24,7 +24,10 @@
>  #include <config.h>
> 
>  #include <sys/param.h>
> +#include <sys/types.h>
> +#include <sys/stat.h>
>  #include <fcntl.h>
> +#include <unistd.h>
> 
>  #include "internal.h"
>  #include "virinitctl.h"
> @@ -122,6 +125,7 @@
>      int fd >      char *path >      int ret > +    struct stat attrs;
> 
>      memset(&req, 0, sizeof(req));
> 
> @@ -139,7 +143,10 @@
>              return -1;
>      }
> 
> -    if ((fd > +    if (lstat(path, &attrs) > +        goto cleanup;
> +
> +    if ((attrs.st_mode & S_IFIFO) && (fd >          if (errno >              ret >              goto cleanup

Hmm, using lstat sets up a race condition though. I would suggest we
use O_NOFOLLOW with open() but that only works for the final component
of the path - so if /dev is a symlink in the guest it'll still cause
problems.

There are also a few other places where we use /proc/$PID/root/dev for
hotplug where we mknod. If the guest setup a bad /dev symlink it could
cause us problems. 

I think we may actually have to instead rely on forking a child which
does setns(/proc/$PID/ns/mnt) to make the changes safely in the container
namespace.

Regards,
Daniel
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