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Re: [libvirt] AMD SEV's /dev/sev permissions and probing QEMU for capabilities
- From: "Singh, Brijesh" <brijesh singh amd com>
- To: Erik Skultety <eskultet redhat com>, "libvir-list redhat com" <libvir-list redhat com>
- Cc: "dinechin redhat com" <dinechin redhat com>, "mkletzan redhat com" <mkletzan redhat com>, "Singh, Brijesh" <brijesh singh amd com>, "qemu-devel nongnu org" <qemu-devel nongnu org>
- Subject: Re: [libvirt] AMD SEV's /dev/sev permissions and probing QEMU for capabilities
- Date: Fri, 18 Jan 2019 12:51:50 +0000
On 1/18/19 3:39 AM, Erik Skultety wrote:
> this is a summary of a private discussion I've had with guys CC'd on this email
> about finding a solution to  - basically, the default permissions on
> /dev/sev (below) make it impossible to query for SEV platform capabilities,
> since by default we run QEMU as qemu:qemu when probing for capabilities. It's
> worth noting is that this is only relevant to probing, since for a proper QEMU
> VM we create a mount namespace for the process and chown all the nodes (needs a
> SEV fix though).
> # ll /dev/sev
> crw-------. 1 root root
> I suggested either force running QEMU as root for probing (despite the obvious
> security implications) or using namespaces for probing too. Dan argued that
> this would have a significant perf impact and suggested we ask systemd to add a
> global udev rule.
> I proceeded with cloning  to systemd and creating an udev rule that I planned
> on submitting to systemd upstream - the initial idea was to mimic /dev/kvm and
> make it world accessible to which Brijesh from AMD expressed a concern that
> regular users might deplete the resources (limit on the number of guests
> allowed by the platform).
During private discussion I didn't realized that we are discussing a
probe issue hence things I have said earlier may not be applicable
during the probe. The /dev/sev is managed by the CCP (aka PSP) driver.
The /dev/sev is used for communicating with the SEV FW running inside
the PSP. The SEV FW offers platform and guest specific services. The
guest specific services are used during the guest launch, these services
are available through KVM driver only. Whereas the platform services can
be invoked at anytime. A typical platform specific services are:
- importing certificates
- exporting certificates
- querying the SEV FW version etc etc
In case of the probe we are not launch SEV guest hence we should not be
worried about depleting the SEV ASID resources.
IIRC, libvirt uses QEMP query-sev-capabilities to probe the SEV support.
QEMU executes the below sequence to complete the request:
1. Exports the platform certificates (this is when /dev/sev is accessed).
2. Read the host MSR to determine the C-bit and reduced phys-bit position
I don't see any reason why we can't give world a 'read' permission to
/dev/sev. Anyone should be able to export the certificates and query
status etc. I think the main issue is reading MSR -- which I believe is
putting a 'root' requirement. Am I missing something ?
> But since the limit is claimed to be around 4, Dan
FYI, the limit on EPYC is 15.
> discouraged me to continue with restricting the udev rule to only the 'kvm'
> group which Laszlo suggested earlier as the limit is so small that a malicious
> QEMU could easily deplete this during probing. This fact also ruled out any
> kind of ACL we could create dynamically. Instead, he suggested that we filter
> out the kvm-capable QEMU and put only that one in the namespace without a
> significant perf impact.
> - my take on this is that there could potentially be more than a single
> kvm-enabled QEMU and therefore we'd need to create more than just a
> single namespace.
> - I also argued that I can image that the same kind of DOS attack might be
> possible from within the namespace, even if we created the /dev/sev node
> only in SEV-enabled guests (which we currently don't). All of us have
> agreed that allowing /dev/sev in the namespace for only SEV-enabled
> guests is worth doing nonetheless.
> In the meantime, Christophe went through the kernel code to verify how the SEV
> resources are managed and what protection is currently in place to mitigate the
> chance of a process easily depleting the limit on SEV guests. He found that
> ASID, which determines the encryption key, is allocated from a single ASID
> bitmap and essentially guarded by a single 'sev->active' flag.
> So, in conclusion, we absolutely need input from Brijesh (AMD) whether there
> was something more than the low limit on number of guests behind the default
> permissions. Also, we'd like to get some details on how the limit is managed,
> helping to assess the approaches mentioned above.
As explained above, during the guest launch KVM drv directly call a
guest specific services from the /dev/sev so we wanted to ensure that
kvm user also has access to /dev/sev. If admin does not grant access to
/dev/sev then KVM drv should fail to execute the SEV commands.
> Thanks and please do share your ideas,
>  https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1665400
>  https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1561113
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