[libvirt] [PATCH v2 0/8] Don't hold both monitor and agent jobs at the same time

[Eric Blake]

On 1/10/20 5:32 PM, Jonathon Jongsma wrote:
> We have to assume that the guest agent may be malicious, so we don't want to
> allow any agent queries to block any other libvirt API. By holding a monitor
> job and an agent job while we're querying the agent, any other threads will be
> blocked from using the monitor while the agent is unresponsive. Because libvirt
> waits forever for an agent response, this makes us vulnerable to a denial of
> service from a malicious (or simply buggy) guest agent.
> 
> Most of the patches in the first series were already reviewed and pushed, but a
> couple remain: the filesystem info functions. The problem with these functions
> is that the agent functions access the vm definition (owned by the domain). If
> a monitor job is not held while this is done, the vm definition could change
> while we are looking up the disk alias, leading to a potentional crash.

Did we ever hear back on a CVE assignment for the first series?  And do 
any of the patches in this series also fall under the CVE umbrella?

-- 
Eric Blake, Principal Software Engineer
Red Hat, Inc.           +1-919-301-3226
Virtualization:  qemu.org | libvirt.org