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[PATCH] Audit capabilities



Attached is a new patch to introduce CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL and
CAP_AUDIT_WRITE.  Thank you all for the clarifications on appropriate
caps.

Purpose: Audit message authentication is being done on the process
receiving the message, which may not be the process sending the message.
This patch sets the sk_buff eff_caps according to the sender
permissions, and authenticates audit message handling based on that.  It
also switches from using CAP_SYS_ADMIN to using AUDIT capabilities.

Changelog:
12-20-2005: Switch from CAP_[SYS,NET]_ADMIN to AUDIT capabilities.
12-27-2005: Use dummy_capget in dummy_netlink_send, and correctly mask
the skb's eff_cap according to selinux perms.
12-28-2005: Use avc_has_perm_noaudit in selinux_netlink_send to use
cached decisions.
01-06-2005: Switch to using CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL and CAP_AUDIT_WRITE.

thanks,
-serge
-- 
Serge Hallyn <serue us ibm com>
Index: linux-2.6.10/include/linux/capability.h
===================================================================
--- linux-2.6.10.orig/include/linux/capability.h	2004-12-24 15:34:27.000000000 -0600
+++ linux-2.6.10/include/linux/capability.h	2005-01-06 18:51:57.000000000 -0600
@@ -284,6 +284,10 @@ typedef __u32 kernel_cap_t;
 
 #define CAP_LEASE            28
 
+#define CAP_AUDIT_WRITE      29
+
+#define CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL    30
+
 #ifdef __KERNEL__
 /* 
  * Bounding set
Index: linux-2.6.10/include/linux/netlink.h
===================================================================
--- linux-2.6.10.orig/include/linux/netlink.h	2005-01-06 18:49:22.000000000 -0600
+++ linux-2.6.10/include/linux/netlink.h	2005-01-06 18:54:40.000000000 -0600
@@ -118,6 +118,7 @@ struct netlink_skb_parms
 
 extern int netlink_post(int unit, struct sk_buff *skb);
 extern struct sock *netlink_kernel_create(int unit, void (*input)(struct sock *sk, int len));
+extern int netlink_get_msgtype(struct sk_buff *skb);
 extern void netlink_ack(struct sk_buff *in_skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh, int err);
 extern int netlink_unicast(struct sock *ssk, struct sk_buff *skb, __u32 pid, int nonblock);
 extern int netlink_broadcast(struct sock *ssk, struct sk_buff *skb, __u32 pid,
Index: linux-2.6.10/kernel/audit.c
===================================================================
--- linux-2.6.10.orig/kernel/audit.c	2004-12-24 15:35:50.000000000 -0600
+++ linux-2.6.10/kernel/audit.c	2005-01-06 19:02:31.000000000 -0600
@@ -300,15 +300,60 @@ nlmsg_failure:			/* Used by NLMSG_PUT */
 		kfree_skb(skb);
 }
 
+/*
+ * This function causes two checks on the incoming audit control
+ * message.  1. netlink_get_msgtype() will perform a length check,
+ * and 2. we check for CAP_AUDIT perms on a message which might
+ * change audit params.
+ */
+int audit_netlink_ok(struct sk_buff *skb)
+{
+	int err = 0;
+	int msgtype;
+	
+	msgtype = netlink_get_msgtype(skb);
+
+	switch(msgtype) {
+		case 0:  /* not an audit msg */
+			break;
+
+		case AUDIT_GET:
+		case AUDIT_LIST:
+		case AUDIT_SET:
+		case AUDIT_LOGIN:
+		case AUDIT_ADD:
+		case AUDIT_DEL:
+			if (!cap_raised(NETLINK_CB (skb).eff_cap,
+						CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL))
+				err = -EPERM;
+			break;
+
+		case AUDIT_USER:
+			if (!cap_raised(NETLINK_CB (skb).eff_cap,
+						CAP_AUDIT_WRITE))
+				err = -EPERM;
+			break;
+
+		default:  /* permission denied: bad msg */
+			err = -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	return err;
+}
+
 static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh)
 {
 	u32			uid, pid, seq;
 	void			*data;
 	struct audit_status	*status_get, status_set;
 	struct audit_login	*login;
-	int			err = 0;
+	int			err;
 	struct audit_buffer	*ab;
 
+	err = audit_netlink_ok(skb);
+	if (err)
+		return err;
+
 	pid  = NETLINK_CREDS(skb)->pid;
 	uid  = NETLINK_CREDS(skb)->uid;
 	seq  = nlh->nlmsg_seq;
@@ -327,8 +372,8 @@ static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_b
 				 &status_set, sizeof(status_set));
 		break;
 	case AUDIT_SET:
-		if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
-			return -EPERM;
+		if (nlh->nlmsg_len < sizeof(struct audit_status))
+			return -EINVAL;
 		status_get   = (struct audit_status *)data;
 		if (status_get->mask & AUDIT_STATUS_ENABLED) {
 			err = audit_set_enabled(status_get->enabled);
@@ -364,8 +409,8 @@ static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_b
 		audit_log_end(ab);
 		break;
 	case AUDIT_LOGIN:
-		if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
-			return -EPERM;
+		if (nlh->nlmsg_len < sizeof(struct audit_login))
+			return -EINVAL;
 		login = (struct audit_login *)data;
 		ab = audit_log_start(NULL);
 		if (ab) {
@@ -384,9 +429,12 @@ static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_b
 					 login->loginuid);
 #endif
 		break;
-	case AUDIT_LIST:
 	case AUDIT_ADD:
 	case AUDIT_DEL:
+		if (nlh->nlmsg_len < sizeof(struct audit_rule))
+			return -EINVAL;
+		/* fallthrough */
+	case AUDIT_LIST:
 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL
 		err = audit_receive_filter(nlh->nlmsg_type, pid, uid, seq,
 					   data);
@@ -394,7 +442,7 @@ static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_b
 		err = -EOPNOTSUPP;
 #endif
 		break;
-	default:
+	default:  /* no longer needed... */
 		err = -EINVAL;
 		break;
 	}
Index: linux-2.6.10/kernel/auditsc.c
===================================================================
--- linux-2.6.10.orig/kernel/auditsc.c	2004-12-24 15:35:24.000000000 -0600
+++ linux-2.6.10/kernel/auditsc.c	2005-01-06 18:55:25.000000000 -0600
@@ -250,8 +250,6 @@ int audit_receive_filter(int type, int p
 		audit_send_reply(pid, seq, AUDIT_LIST, 1, 1, NULL, 0);
 		break;
 	case AUDIT_ADD:
-		if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
-			return -EPERM;
 		if (!(entry = kmalloc(sizeof(*entry), GFP_KERNEL)))
 			return -ENOMEM;
 		if (audit_copy_rule(&entry->rule, data)) {
Index: linux-2.6.10/net/netlink/af_netlink.c
===================================================================
--- linux-2.6.10.orig/net/netlink/af_netlink.c	2005-01-06 18:49:22.000000000 -0600
+++ linux-2.6.10/net/netlink/af_netlink.c	2005-01-06 18:56:27.000000000 -0600
@@ -518,6 +518,18 @@ static int netlink_connect(struct socket
 	return err;
 }
 
+int netlink_get_msgtype(struct sk_buff *skb)
+{
+	struct nlmsghdr *nlh = (struct nlmsghdr *)skb->data;
+
+	if (skb->len < NLMSG_SPACE(0))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (nlh->nlmsg_len < sizeof(*nlh) || skb->len < nlh->nlmsg_len)
+		return -EINVAL;
+	return nlh->nlmsg_type;
+}
+
 static int netlink_getname(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *addr, int *addr_len, int peer)
 {
 	struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
Index: linux-2.6.10/security/dummy.c
===================================================================
--- linux-2.6.10.orig/security/dummy.c	2005-01-06 18:49:22.000000000 -0600
+++ linux-2.6.10/security/dummy.c	2005-01-06 18:57:26.000000000 -0600
@@ -736,10 +736,11 @@ static int dummy_sem_semop (struct sem_a
 
 static int dummy_netlink_send (struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
 {
-	if (current->euid == 0)
-		cap_raise (NETLINK_CB (skb).eff_cap, CAP_NET_ADMIN);
-	else
-		NETLINK_CB (skb).eff_cap = 0;
+	kernel_cap_t dummy_cap, eff_cap;
+
+	dummy_capget(current, &eff_cap, &dummy_cap, &dummy_cap);
+	NETLINK_CB (skb).eff_cap = eff_cap;
+
 	return 0;
 }
 
Index: linux-2.6.10/security/selinux/hooks.c
===================================================================
--- linux-2.6.10.orig/security/selinux/hooks.c	2005-01-06 18:49:22.000000000 -0600
+++ linux-2.6.10/security/selinux/hooks.c	2005-01-06 18:58:31.000000000 -0600
@@ -3535,12 +3535,20 @@ static inline int selinux_nlmsg_perm(str
 
 static int selinux_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
 {
-	int err = 0;
+	struct task_security_struct *tsec;
+	struct av_decision avd;
+	int err;
 
-	if (capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN))
-		cap_raise (NETLINK_CB (skb).eff_cap, CAP_NET_ADMIN);
-	else
-		NETLINK_CB(skb).eff_cap = 0;
+	err = secondary_ops->netlink_send(sk, skb);
+	if (err)
+		return err;
+	
+	tsec = current->security;
+
+	avd.allowed = 0;
+	(void)avc_has_perm_noaudit(tsec->sid, tsec->sid,
+				SECCLASS_CAPABILITY, ~0, &avd);
+	cap_mask(NETLINK_CB(skb).eff_cap, avd.allowed);
 
 	if (policydb_loaded_version >= POLICYDB_VERSION_NLCLASS)
 		err = selinux_nlmsg_perm(sk, skb);

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