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Re: [PATCH] enable /proc/$$/loginuid

There is a bigger problem with the current loginuid assumptions.  The
loginuid is stored on the audit_context.  The audit_context is only
created when auditing has been enabled using auditctl, and an auditable
action has occurred.

Either we need to change the behavior to always create an audit_context
(with state=AUDIT_DISABLED) so long as AUDIT_SYSCALL is enabled, or we
need to move loginuid directly into the task_struct.


Quoting Stephen Smalley (sds epoch ncsc mil):
> On Fri, 2005-01-14 at 14:06, Serge Hallyn wrote:
> > Changelog:
> >   1/14/2005: Added several checks for error values which were missing.
> >   1/07/2005: First version.
> > 
> > Is this ready for lkml?
> Why require CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL to read the loginuid?  Programs like
> newrole would like to have a more reliable user identity available than
> the normal uid; we were having them extract the SELinux user identity
> from the security context, but in Fedora, that is typically just user_u
> due to the lack of integration of user management with policy.
> -- 
> Stephen Smalley <sds epoch ncsc mil>
> National Security Agency
> --
> Linux-audit mailing list
> Linux-audit redhat com
> http://www.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/linux-audit

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