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Re: [patch] Syscall auditing - move "name=" field to the end



On Thu, 2005-03-17 at 02:25 +0000, David Woodhouse wrote:
> Consider: 
> 
> open("/bin/true\naudit(1111008484.824:89346): ...", O_RDONLY);
> 
> I don't think this patch is enough -- either we need to escape the text
> completely or just dump it as hex instead of a string. One option would
> be to dump it in quotes as a string if all chars in the string are in
> the range 0x20-0x7e, and as hex otherwise. That slightly complicates the
> parsing, but not by much, and still gives you plain text in the majority
> of cases while protecting against abuse.

I think that the same issue exists for audit_log_d_path and portions of
avc_audit.  Of course, hopefully portions of avc_audit, like the exe=
information, can be pushed into audit_log_exit and redundant information
(like pid=) can be removed from avc_audit and we can just mandate that
syscall auditing be enabled when SELinux is enabled.  Not clear if
avc_audit() should then be converted to just adding to a list on the
audit context for later processing by audit_log_exit like
audit_notify_watch or if it should continue immediate generation of a
partial audit message with the SELinux information.

-- 
Stephen Smalley <sds tycho nsa gov>
National Security Agency


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