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Re: New development

On Thursday 25 August 2005 13:55, Steve Grubb wrote:
> If you have ideas about nice things to add, lets start the discussion

I think its time to kick off the next round of development for the audit 
system. I would like to propose a list of items to be worked on. This is list 
does not include LSPP/RBAC...that topic is big enough for a message all its 
own. I will send an email covering LSPP/RBAC separately in a couple days. 
This list is by no means complete. It is a starting point for discussion. If 
anyone else has ideas, please speak up.

1) Syscall auditing enhancements. Collect all args to execve. This would be 
implemented as an aux record like the  socket_addr type. As all items come 
from userspace, they should all the treated as untrusted data. This might 
also need to be expanded for ioctl syscall as well. Does anyone know of any 
function that we need special handling to get its parameters? Also, would 
collecting EIP that the syscall was made from be useful to anyone? This might 
be useful to people doing IDS systems so they can spot an anomalous 
EIP/syscall pair to know something has gone wrong.

2) Higher Performance. We need to work on ways to lessen the load when the 
audit system is both disabled and enabled. I put some ideas on the mail list 
last week. There are more things that can be done. Perhaps a hard look at the 
organization of the context should be done. Are the structure members really 
in the best locations for cache effects? Can we get rid of TIF_SYSCALL_AUDIT 
flag and then successfully re-attach later? Maybe this can be done by walking 
the process tree or hooking a specific function all programs execute to 
re-enable. Another way to help performance is to push the decision to audit 
out to where the hook function is located. Chris has shown that it can be 
done using inline hook functions. Also, we should look at whether syscall 
entry filter as implemented is optimal. Right now all syscalls are marked 
like possible unless there is a rule explicitly saying to not audit the 
syscall. I think this area needs review.

3) Ability to track child processes. There is a need to be able to audit the 
actions of a child process. For example, maybe we add a rule to audit a 
specific pid like apache's. We may need to collect all syscall data for any 
child it spawns. This can be done by matching on session id, process group, 
and/or another mechanism. I leave this as an "and" since all 3 things may 
need to be implemented. Process group and session ID are not fool proof, but 
work for any non-malicious program. If we want to consider tracking possibly 
untrusted apps - we need to implement another mechanism.

4) More operators for filters. Right now, we only have == and !=. It would be 
nice to write rules that could use >, >=, <, <=, and a range. For example, 
you may want to write a rule that is filtered on uid >= 500 so that you don't 
collect data for daemons. Does anyone have ideas on rules that are awkward to 
express given the current techniques?

5) Ability to filter on message type. Because we are going to support LSPP and 
CAPP, we need to filter this information in the kernel. All messages start 
with a log_start. That function could call the filter to see if the message 
should be allowed. If so proceed as done today. Otherwise leave a NULL 
buffer. All calls to helper functions like log_format & log_end functions 
would check for NULL and return as if they succeeded. The other way I see 
this working is have the log_end function do the filtering, but that means 
that all the helper functions did the full work of building the message 
before it is discarded. The filter on message type would be one rule where we 
would want to have a range operator. For example, we may want to block all 
USER, LSPP, or SE Linux AVC messages.

6) Normalization of SE Linux AVC messages. Right now, SE Linux code has if 
statements that swing in and out different fields in its messages. This 
information needs normalizing as a step towards getting to binary message 
format. This may need to be done as AUX records or changing from a generics 
AVC message to several  message types.

7) Consolidation of information in events. There is duplicate information in 
various records emitted. We need to try to reduce that information and 
consolidate. I think this involves reviewing the messages to make sure they 
follow a standard pattern. A message printing function could be created so 
that format specifiers are not all over the kernel, but in 1 place. This is a 
necessary step for creating a binary format.

8) Binary format. We need to create a format where the data is handed to the 
audit daemon in a binary format. This would avoid all the snprintf that is 
currently done. If there is no audit daemon, then the kernel would use the 
common messaging framework mention in #7 above to create the text message.

As for implementing these ideas...I think we need to start with the current 
2.6.9-11 kernel. When U2 kernel is public, port the audit system to that and 
continue. At some point, we need to switch to the rawhide kernel. The LSPP 
work for example does not belong in the 2.6.9 series kernel.

What I would like to see get into the 2.6.9 series is #1 & #2. #3, #4, & #5 
might be possible to get into the 2.6.9 series if we come up with a good way 
to make sure old kernels don't panic or do something bad. #6, #7, & #8 would 
definitely be for rawhide.

Let's discuss these points. Do they make sense? Are there more ideas that 
should be added? Do the ones slated for 2.6.9 make sense? Does anyone in 
particular want to take on the responsibility of any of these items? I think 
we need 1-5 either done or pretty close to done this month. The LSPP work
would dovetail into #6-#8 nicely.


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