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Re: auditing syscalls made 'by' an inode?



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On 06/08/2012 09:51 AM, Steve Grubb wrote:
> On Friday, June 08, 2012 09:35:01 AM Steve Grubb wrote:
>> On Thursday, June 07, 2012 06:31:47 PM Peter Moody wrote:
>>> Is there anyway to audit syscalls made by a particular, not yet 
>>> running, application?
>> 
>> No...its one of the things I've been interested in for a long time.
>> About as close as you get is using the selinux process context. But if
>> its bin_t...there's a couple thousand processes with the same label.
>> 
>>> For example, if I'm interested in seeing all exec's by google-chrome,
>>> can I do something like the following?
>>> 
>>> auditctl -a exit,always -F arch=b64 -S execve -F success=1 -F 
>>> inode=inode-of-chrome
>>> 
>>> experimenting seems to indicate that will only tell me when 
>>> inode-of-chrome is exec'd, basically a watch rule.
>>> 
>>> The sort of inverse of this rule that got me thinking about this 
>>> initially was auditing a syscall and seeing if it was/wasn't called by 
>>> a particular program. For example, audting all bind() calls which 
>>> *aren't* made by chrome (a silly rule to be sure, but just thrown out 
>>> as a hypothetical)
>>> 
>>> If it's not possible to do this now, is there interest in adding this 
>>> feature?
>> 
>> Yes. I'd be interested in seeing this available. But if you do implement 
>> it, its more natural to express the rule by process name. But the kernel 
>> does not do string comparisons. So, what you would likely need to do is 
>> lookup the path to get the inode, then when it executes a new kind of
>> pid rule gets created probably off the list like watches do. There are
>> some apps like apache which fork multiple copies and that adds a wrinkle 
>> because you would want to audit all of them. And then there are 
>> threads...
> 
> The other thing that was discussed a lot maybe 5 years ago (and I don't
> think it was ever created) was the ability to audit syscalls of a processes
> children and their children...on and on.  I think Al Viro mentioned he had
> some ideas about how to do this. But if you add audit by process name, its
> only natural to optionally track all child processes, too.
> 
> Where you might want this is like setting a rule on apache for any EPERM or
> any access to /home. Same could go for bind.
> 
> -Steve
> 
> -- Linux-audit mailing list Linux-audit redhat com 
> https://www.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/linux-audit
> 
On thing you could do would be to write a simple SELinux domain, like
auditproc_t and have unconfined_t transition to it using runcon.

type auditproc_t;
domain_type(auditproc_t);
unconfined_domain(auditproc_t)
gen_require(`
        type unconfined_t;
	type unconfined_r;
')

allow unconfined_t auditproc_t:process transition;
role unconfined_r types auditproc_t;



Setup audit rules to watch SELinux context auditproc_t.


Then use runcon -t auditproc_t chrome

Above is totally untested.

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