Setting loginuid for a process starting at boot

Maupertuis Philippe philippe.maupertuis at worldline.com
Tue Jan 14 15:55:30 UTC 2014


Thank you so much for your very valuable answers.
After playing around, I found that the assignment of loginuid  produces a login type message (I could have guess)

Where can I find the description and the trigger of all messages types if such a documentation exists ?

Philippe

-----Message d'origine-----
De : Steve Grubb [mailto:sgrubb at redhat.com]
Envoyé : mardi 14 janvier 2014 15:34
À : Maupertuis Philippe
Cc : linux-audit at redhat.com
Objet : Re: Setting loginuid for a process starting at boot


On Tuesday, January 14, 2014 02:13:45 PM Maupertuis Philippe wrote:
> Auditctl -e wont probably go unnoticed while an inconspicuous echo
> probably would.

Both are auditable events as required by common criteria. Changes to auditing must produce an event as well as the assignment of loginuids. This is automatic and not caused by a rule.

> Is there a rule to track this action without overloading the system?

Changes to audit state are auditable events. You can test this yourself with auditctl and ausearch.


> Alternatively, is a post mortem analysis viable ?

yes.


> I was thinking of finding process in the audit.log whose loginuid differs
> from parent's loginuid. Is there a way to extract information and reformat
> the result (to keep process pid ppid loginuid for example) ?

You can write a utility using the auparse library to do anything you want it
to do.

https://fedorahosted.org/audit/browser/trunk/tools/aulastlog/aulastlog.c

The aulastlog program is probably a decent starting point to create something
like this. Instead of keeping uid, you'd be keeping pids and some attributes
of them. My guess is that you'll have long running processes that are not in
the logs and you'll have some unknowns.

-Steve


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