[PATCH 1/2] auditsc: audit_krule mask accesses need bounds checking

[Greg KH]

On Mon, Jun 09, 2014 at 03:55:20PM -0700, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
> On Mon, Jun 9, 2014 at 3:46 PM, Greg KH <gregkh at linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
> > On Mon, Jun 09, 2014 at 03:35:02PM -0700, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
> >> On Mon, Jun 9, 2014 at 3:30 PM, Greg KH <gregkh at linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
> >> > On Wed, May 28, 2014 at 11:09:58PM -0400, Eric Paris wrote:
> >> >> From: Andy Lutomirski <luto at amacapital.net>
> >> >>
> >> >> Fixes an easy DoS and possible information disclosure.
> >> >>
> >> >> This does nothing about the broken state of x32 auditing.
> >> >>
> >> >> eparis: If the admin has enabled auditd and has specifically loaded audit
> >> >> rules.  This bug has been around since before git.  Wow...
> >> >>
> >> >> Cc: stable at vger.kernel.org
> >> >> Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto at amacapital.net>
> >> >> Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis at redhat.com>
> >> >> ---
> >> >>  kernel/auditsc.c | 27 ++++++++++++++++++---------
> >> >>  1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
> >> >
> >> > Did this patch get dropped somewhere?  Isn't it a valid bugfix, or did I
> >> > miss a later conversation about this?
> >>
> >> Hmm.  It seems that it didn't make it into Linus' tree.  Crap.
> >>
> >> IMO we need some kind of real tracking system for issues reported to
> >> security at .
> >
> > That seems to be my mbox at times :)
> >
> > But yes, having something "real" might be good if the load gets higher,
> > right now it's so low that my "sweep pending security patches" task
> > usually catches anything pending, which is rare.
> >
> 
> There are currently at least two issues that I reported that are stuck
> in limbo: this one and the (not-yet-public) vfs thing.

That was next on my list to poke people about...

> And there's the CVE-2014-0181 regression fix that almost got
> forgotten, but that isn't really a security issue.

What is that, where was that reported?

thanks,

greg k-h