[PATCH] TaskTracker : Simplified thread information tracker.

Sat Sep 27 13:14:40 UTC 2014

On Sat, 27 Sep 2014 10:02:44 +0900
Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel at I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> wrote:

> May I continue proposing this functionality?

>From the audit perspective, sure. I think we were expecting a revised
patch after the comments. Other groups may have different thoughts,
though.

-Steve

> I want to identify where
> bash is executed from in the RHEL servers in order to assess
> possibility of damage caused by CVE-2014-6271.
> 
> Tetsuo Handa wrote:
> > Thank you for your comment, Steve.
> > 
> > Steve Grubb wrote:
> > > On Monday, June 23, 2014 09:14:35 PM Tetsuo Handa wrote:
> > >> Any comments on this proposal?
> > >
> > > subj= is the wrong way to record this. The subj field name is for
> > > process labels. When field names get re-used for different
> > > purposes, it causes lots of problems in being able to assign
> > > meaning and correctly use it in analysis. I would suggest using
> > > phist= for process history or something like that. Please don't
> > > re-use subj for this.
> > 
> > This was just a sample implementation. If this proposal is
> > acceptable as a patch to auditing subsystem, I'm happy to update
> > not to re-use subj= field and not to occupy LSM. An updated version
> > is attached.
> > 
> > > Also, the comm file is under control of the user. What if they
> > > create a program "sshd=>crond"? Would that throw off the
> > > analysis? How do you ensure user supplied names do not contain
> > > symbols that you are using to denote parentage?
> > 
> > OK. I added '=' in comm name to the list of need-to-escape bytes.
> > 
> > By the way, audit_string_contains_control() treats *p == '"' || *p
> > < 0x21 || *p > 0x7e as need-to-escape bytes. Thus, 0x20 from
> > audit_log_untrustedstring() is a need-to-escape byte. However, I
> > can see that 0x20 from userspace programs is emitted without
> > escaping.
> > 
> >   type=USER_START msg=audit(1403741835.270:16): user pid=1870 uid=0
> > auid=0 ses=1 msg='op=login id=0 exe="/usr/sbin/sshd"
> > hostname=192.168.0.1 addr=192.168.0.1 terminal=/dev/pts/0
> > res=success'
> > 
> > Where can I find which bytes in $value need to be escaped when
> > emitting a record like name='$value' ? Is 0x20 in $value permitted?
> > 
> > > Also, would you consider adding this information as a auxiliary
> > > record rather than as part of a syscall record? The advantage is
> > > it can be filtered or searched for. We recently did this for
> > > PROCTITLE information. Perhaps this fits better as a PROCHIST
> > > auxiliary record?
> > 
> > I changed to use auxiliary record and noticed a difference.
> > The previous version emitted the history for type=USER_LOGIN case
> > 
> >   type=USER_LOGIN msg=audit(1400879947.084:24): pid=4308 uid=0
> > auid=0 ses=2
> > subj="swapper/0(2014/05/23-21:17:30)=>init(2014/05/23-21:17:33)=>
> > switch_root(2014/05/23-21:17:34)=>init(2014/05/23-21:17:34)=>
> > sh(2014/05/23-21:17:56)=>mingetty(2014/05/23-21:17:56)=>
> > login(2014/05/23-21:19:05)" msg='op=login id=0 exe="/bin/login"
> > hostname=? addr=? terminal=tty1 res=success'
> > 
> > but current version does not emit it for type=USER_LOGIN case.
> > Does auxiliary record work with only type=SYSCALL case (and
> > therefore I should use CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL rather than CONFIG_AUDIT
> > in the patch below) ?
> > 
> > Regards.
> > ----------
> > >From d015533ce544feb8922fcbf023017c82bd79a9ac Mon Sep 17 00:00:00
> > >2001
> > From: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel at I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
> > Date: Thu, 26 Jun 2014 09:39:14 +0900
> > Subject: [PATCH] audit: Emit history of thread's comm name.
> > 
> > When an unexpected system event (e.g. reboot) occurs, the
> > administrator may want to identify which application triggered the
> > event. System call auditing could be used for recording such event.
> > However, the audit log may not be able to provide sufficient
> > information for identifying the application because the audit log
> > does not reflect how the program was executed.
> > 
> > This patch adds ability to trace how the program was executed and
> > emit it as an auxiliary record in the form of comm name and time
> > stamp pairs as of execve().
> > 
> >   type=UNKNOWN[1329] msg=audit(1403741314.019:22): history='
> >   swapper/0(2014/06/26-09:06:04)=>init(2014/06/26-09:06:10)=>
> >   switch_root(2014/06/26-09:06:13)=>init(2014/06/26-09:06:13)=>
> >   sh(2014/06/26-00:06:27)=>rc(2014/06/26-00:06:27)=>
> >   S55sshd(2014/06/26-00:06:35)=>sshd(2014/06/26-00:06:35)=>
> >   sshd(2014/06/26-00:06:40)=>bash(2014/06/26-00:06:43)=>
> >   tail(2014/06/26-00:08:34)'
> > 
> > Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel at I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
> > ---
> >  fs/exec.c                  |    1 +
> >  include/linux/audit.h      |   23 +++++++++++-
> >  include/linux/init_task.h  |    9 ++++
> >  include/linux/sched.h      |    5 ++
> >  include/uapi/linux/audit.h |    1 +
> >  kernel/audit.c             |   90
> > ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> > kernel/auditsc.c           |   19 +++++++++ 7 files changed, 147
> > insertions(+), 1 deletions(-)
> >