[PATCH v5 4/6] seccomp: Operation for checking if an action is available

Tyler Hicks tyhicks at canonical.com
Fri Aug 4 22:56:04 UTC 2017


On 08/03/2017 11:54 AM, Kees Cook wrote:
> On Fri, Jul 28, 2017 at 1:55 PM, Tyler Hicks <tyhicks at canonical.com> wrote:
>> Userspace code that needs to check if the kernel supports a given action
>> may not be able to use the /proc/sys/kernel/seccomp/actions_avail
>> sysctl. The process may be running in a sandbox and, therefore,
>> sufficient filesystem access may not be available. This patch adds an
>> operation to the seccomp(2) syscall that allows userspace code to ask
>> the kernel if a given action is available.
>>
>> If the action is supported by the kernel, 0 is returned. If the action
>> is not supported by the kernel, -1 is returned with errno set to
>> -EOPNOTSUPP. If this check is attempted on a kernel that doesn't support
>> this new operation, -1 is returned with errno set to -EINVAL meaning
>> that userspace code will have the ability to differentiate between the
>> two error cases.
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks at canonical.com>
>> ---
>>
>> * Changes since v4:
>>   - This is new patch to allow applications to check if an action is supported
>>     without having to consult the actions_avail sysctl
>>
>>  include/uapi/linux/seccomp.h                  |  5 ++--
>>  kernel/seccomp.c                              | 26 +++++++++++++++++++
>>  tools/testing/selftests/seccomp/seccomp_bpf.c | 36 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++
>>  3 files changed, 65 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
>>
>> diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/seccomp.h b/include/uapi/linux/seccomp.h
>> index 82c823c..19a611d 100644
>> --- a/include/uapi/linux/seccomp.h
>> +++ b/include/uapi/linux/seccomp.h
>> @@ -11,8 +11,9 @@
>>  #define SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER    2 /* uses user-supplied filter. */
>>
>>  /* Valid operations for seccomp syscall. */
>> -#define SECCOMP_SET_MODE_STRICT        0
>> -#define SECCOMP_SET_MODE_FILTER        1
>> +#define SECCOMP_SET_MODE_STRICT                0
>> +#define SECCOMP_SET_MODE_FILTER                1
>> +#define SECCOMP_GET_ACTION_AVAIL       2
>>
>>  /* Valid flags for SECCOMP_SET_MODE_FILTER */
>>  #define SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_TSYNC      1
>> diff --git a/kernel/seccomp.c b/kernel/seccomp.c
>> index 1c4c496..03ad3ba 100644
>> --- a/kernel/seccomp.c
>> +++ b/kernel/seccomp.c
>> @@ -858,6 +858,27 @@ static inline long seccomp_set_mode_filter(unsigned int flags,
>>  }
>>  #endif
>>
>> +static long seccomp_get_action_avail(const char __user *uaction)
>> +{
>> +       u32 action;
>> +
>> +       if (copy_from_user(&action, uaction, sizeof(action)))
>> +               return -EFAULT;
>> +
>> +       switch (action) {
>> +       case SECCOMP_RET_KILL:
>> +       case SECCOMP_RET_TRAP:
>> +       case SECCOMP_RET_ERRNO:
>> +       case SECCOMP_RET_TRACE:
>> +       case SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW:
>> +               break;
>> +       default:
>> +               return -EOPNOTSUPP;
>> +       }
>> +
>> +       return 0;
>> +}
>> +
>>  /* Common entry point for both prctl and syscall. */
>>  static long do_seccomp(unsigned int op, unsigned int flags,
>>                        const char __user *uargs)
>> @@ -869,6 +890,11 @@ static long do_seccomp(unsigned int op, unsigned int flags,
>>                 return seccomp_set_mode_strict();
>>         case SECCOMP_SET_MODE_FILTER:
>>                 return seccomp_set_mode_filter(flags, uargs);
>> +       case SECCOMP_GET_ACTION_AVAIL:
>> +               if (flags != 0)
>> +                       return -EINVAL;
>> +
>> +               return seccomp_get_action_avail(uargs);
>>         default:
>>                 return -EINVAL;
>>         }
>> diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/seccomp/seccomp_bpf.c b/tools/testing/selftests/seccomp/seccomp_bpf.c
>> index eeb4f7a..8f0872b 100644
>> --- a/tools/testing/selftests/seccomp/seccomp_bpf.c
>> +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/seccomp/seccomp_bpf.c
>> @@ -1683,6 +1683,10 @@ TEST_F_SIGNAL(TRACE_syscall, kill_after_ptrace, SIGSYS)
>>  #define SECCOMP_SET_MODE_FILTER 1
>>  #endif
>>
>> +#ifndef SECCOMP_GET_ACTION_AVAIL
>> +#define SECCOMP_GET_ACTION_AVAIL 2
>> +#endif
>> +
>>  #ifndef SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_TSYNC
>>  #define SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_TSYNC 1
>>  #endif
>> @@ -2486,6 +2490,38 @@ TEST_SIGNAL(filter_flag_log, SIGSYS)
>>         EXPECT_EQ(0, syscall(__NR_getpid));
>>  }
>>
>> +TEST(get_action_avail)
>> +{
>> +       __u32 actions[] = { SECCOMP_RET_KILL,  SECCOMP_RET_TRAP,
>> +                           SECCOMP_RET_ERRNO, SECCOMP_RET_TRACE,
>> +                           SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW };
>> +       __u32 unknown_action = 0x10000000U;
>> +       int i;
>> +       long ret;
>> +
>> +       ret = seccomp(SECCOMP_GET_ACTION_AVAIL, 0, &actions[0]);
>> +       ASSERT_NE(ENOSYS, errno) {
>> +               TH_LOG("Kernel does not support seccomp syscall!");
>> +       }
>> +       ASSERT_NE(EINVAL, errno) {
>> +               TH_LOG("Kernel does not support SECCOMP_GET_ACTION_AVAIL operation!");
>> +       }
>> +       EXPECT_EQ(ret, 0);
>> +
>> +       for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(actions); i++) {
>> +               ret = seccomp(SECCOMP_GET_ACTION_AVAIL, 0, &actions[i]);
>> +               EXPECT_EQ(ret, 0) {
>> +                       TH_LOG("Expected action (0x%X) not available!",
>> +                              actions[i]);
>> +               }
>> +       }
>> +
>> +       /* Check that an unknown action is handled properly (EOPNOTSUPP) */
>> +       ret = seccomp(SECCOMP_GET_ACTION_AVAIL, 0, &unknown_action);
>> +       EXPECT_EQ(ret, -1);
>> +       EXPECT_EQ(errno, EOPNOTSUPP);
>> +}
>> +
>>  /*
>>   * TODO:
>>   * - add microbenchmarks
>> --
>> 2.7.4
>>
> 
> I like this a lot. I think it should follow the sysctl patch in the
> series, but otherwise looks great.

Good to hear! I like it a lot, as well. I'm pretty sure Andy suggested
it so I'll add a Suggested-by tag in the next revision.

Tyler

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