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Re: [Linux-cluster] GFS 6.0 node without quorum tries to fence



> > Michael Conrad Tadpol Tilstra wrote:
> >yes, worst case everyone reboots.  BUT! the data on disc is safe.  There
> >is probbly a better way to go about this, but we've currently kept the
> >idea that an unexpected reboot is better than looking for backup tapes.

On Tue, Aug 03, 2004 at 10:04:53PM +0200, Konrads Smelkovs wrote:
> I don't think it is smart enough. This kind of assumes that the fencing 
> method is power. Suppose people are running only on san fencing.

Is a node/resource that has access to the cluster only through IP (say if it 
is a dedicated lock_gulmd server) really fenced if SAN fencing is used?
I would argue not.

After the a SAN fencing action has successfully returned, the lock_gulmd
resources still would have access to the rest of the cluster.  In this case,
you may as well have used /bin/true as your fencing agent.  SAN fencing for
the lock_gulmd cluster resource is the wrong tool for the job (unless you
are doing IP traffic through that SAN).

So, you're right, it's not smart enough.  What's worse is that it relies
upon the admins being smart enough to realize this before their cluster is
configured ;)  

This is probably a point worth adding to our FAQ if it's not already there.

-- 
Adam Manthei  <amanthei redhat com>


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