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Re: verify TGT in pam-kerberos



On Tue, 18 Sep 2001, SRIDHAR BANDI wrote:

> Thank you so much for the clarification but I have a small doubt in that ,

>   When rlogind (for example)  is the server who makes as [AS_REQ] to the KDC on
> behalf of the client (user) then the KDC to issues the [AS_REP] ( without any
> preauthentication if no preauth are present) that contains the ticket(TGT) and
> the encrypted data that can be decrypted by clients password, on receiving the
> [AS-REP] the server (rlogind) will try to decrypt the data that is obtained
> from the KDC , So the client is said to be authenticated if he knows the
> password which can decrypt the data in [AS-REP] . Now if the KDC is spoofed
> then the password of the clients also need to be known to the KDC so that the
> client's password can be used to decrypt the packet as its at the server
> (rlogind) end that the decryption  takes place. So I still have a doubt that,
> will the spoofing of KDC be caught by doing verify_krb_v5_tgt() .
> please help me out .

If the KDC is being spoofed, the danger is that it's being spoofed by the
person trying to log in to the system.  A simple password verification will
work (the server will be able to decrypt the ticket) because this only
requires cooperation between the user and the spoofing KDC.

Using that TGT to request a ticket from the KDC will /not/ work, because the
spoofed `TGT' is not a valid TGT in the realm; the attacker would need to
compromise the KDC to make this work (and then it's not spoofing anymore).  If
the server requests a ticket for a service principal that is in its
possession, only a KDC that knows that service principal can generate a proper
ticket that will be accepted by the verification routine.

If you verify the TGT, the only way you can be spoofed is if one or more
principals in your Kerberos realm have been compromised.  Dealing with
compromised principals is out of scope for pam_krb5.


> I could think of a problem that is addressed with this is that when both the
> user and the KDC are spoofed this will work , but even this will fail in the
> case when the keytab file is not present for the serveras it will ignore the
> case and allows the user in.

In the current revision of the code, it's considered an error if the PAM
module cannot find a keytab -- /unless/ you use the 'missing_keytab_ok'
option.

Regards,
Steve Langasek
postmodern programmer





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