

Network Security for Apps on OpenShift

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Agenda

OpenShift SDN Overview


Typical network security questions for OpenShift

- Restricting traffic across tiers
- Handling network zones and isolation
- Securing Egress
- Securing Ingress
- Securing communications between OpenShift Nodes
- Application Network Security
- Upcoming changes in App Network Security with Istio

OpenShift SDN Overview

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OpenShift uses CNI



* Flannel is minimally verified and is supported only and exactly as deployed in the OpenShift on OpenStack reference architecture

OpenShift Networking

Software Defined Networking (SDN) for pod-pod communication

- Configures overlay network using Open vSwitch (OVS)
- Three types of plugins
 - **ovs-subnet** : flat network every pod can talk to every other pod
 - ovs-multitenant: project level isolation for pod-pod communication.
 Unique VNID per project

You can join projects to get them the same VNID

'default' project (VNID 0) privileged to communicate with other pods

- **ovs-networkpolicy**: fine-grained isolation using network policy objects

OpenShift Installation Defaults

Cluster network CIDR: 10.128.0.0/14

Gives 32-14=18 bits or the ip address range of 10.128.0.0 - 10.131.255.255

Host subnet length: 9 bits (32-9=23)


Subnet for each node is /23. Gets 512 ip addresses per node.

Leaves 9 bits for nodes ((32-9)-14=9). Allows $2^9=512$ subnets that can be assigned to nodes

Subnets: 10.128.0.0/23, 10.128.2.0/23, ...10.131.254.0/23

Master Portal Net (services): 172.30.0.0/16

OpenShift SDN manages Node Registry




Master allocates a subnet to the node.

Node creation - Allocated subnet added to Node Registry

Node deletion - subnet removed from the Node Registry

On node creation, SDN registers the host with the SDN master

OpenShift SDN configures network devices on Node



br0 Pod containers attached to this ovs bridge device. Non subnet specific flow rules on br0


tun0 For external network access via NAT. Cluster subnet gateway address assigned. Configures netfilter and routing rules.

vxlan0 Access to other nodes. OVS VxLAN device

additional node added:


- Watch subnet updates from master
- Add OpenFlow rules on br0 to push traffic to the newly added subnet go to vxlan0

OpenShift SDN Pod Creation



- Assigns an available ip address from the node's cluster subnet to the pod
- Attaches host side of pod's veth interface pair to br0
- Adds OpenFlow rules to OVS DB to route traffic addressed to the new pod to correct OVS port
- For ovs-multitenant, adds OpenFlow rules
 - to attach pod's VNID to outgoing traffic
 - allow traffic to pod when VNID matches

Pod to Pod Traffic - Both pods on the same Node




* Peer vEthernet device for container A is named ethA and for container B is named ethB

Pod to Pod Traffic - Pods on two different Nodes

Flow of traffic

eth0(in A's netns) - vethA - br0 - vxlan0 - network - vxlan0 - br0- vethB - eth0(in B's netns)




* Peer vEthernet device for container A is named ethA and for container B is named ethB

Pod to External Systems outside OpenShift

Flow of traffic

eth0(in A's netns) - vethA - br0 - tun0 - (NAT) - eth0(physical device) - Internet



Typical Network Scenarios and OpenShift Solutions




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1. Restricting traffic across tiers



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Traffic Restrictions Across Application Tiers



In the world of OpenShift, how can we restrict traffic across Application Tiers?

Allowed connections

Disallowed connections

Network Policy Objects - Introduction

Enables Microsegmentation


Allows configuring individual policies at the Pod Level

Apply to ingress traffic for pods and services

Allows restricting traffic between the pods within a project/namespace


Allows traffic to specific pods from other projects/namespaces


Network Policy Objects




Example Policies

- Allow all traffic inside the project
- Allow traffic from green to gray
- Allow traffic to purple on 8080







Network Policy Objects to Rescue



Start with Default Deny




Add Network Policies To Allow Specific Incoming



2. Isolating zones

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Network Zones separated by Firewalls



External traffic allowed to touch DMZ

Holes punched in firewalls to allow specific traffic from

DMZ to Application Zone


and from

Application Zone to Data Zone

How do I setup OpenShift here?

Option 1: OpenShift cluster per Zone






Useful to demonstrate compliance with Security Standards and Regulations

Additional actions needed to protect Master APIs, and other URLs in DMZ that are not supposed to be exposed to Internet

Cost of maintenance is high

Option 2: OpenShift Cluster covering Multiple Zones



Application pods run on one OpenShift Cluster. Microsegmented with Network Security policies.

Infra Nodes in each zone run Ingress and Egress pods for specific zones


If required, physical isolation of pods to specific nodes is possible with node-selectors. But that defeats the purpose of a shared cluster. Microsegmentation with SDN is the way to go.

3. Securing Egress



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
Connecting via External Service




Application connecting to External System talks to an External Service whose Endpoint is set as Destination IP & Port Or a Fully qualified domain name (FQDN) of the external system and port

But, what if we have a firewall in front of the External System that allows only Specific IPs?

Connecting via Egress Router




Static IP for all traffic from a Project



Egress Firewall to Limit Access

Cluster admin can limit the external addresses accessed by some or all pods



Examples:

A pod can talk to hosts (outside OpenShift cluster) but cannot connect to public internet

A pod can talk to public internet, but cannot connect to hosts (outside OpenShift cluster)




A pod cannot reach specific subnets/hosts

4. Securing Ingress

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OpenShift Router as Ingress




Route Specific IP Whitelists

- Restrict access to a route to a select IP address(es)
- Annotate the route with the whitelisted/allowed IP addresses
- Connections from any other IPs are blocked

```
metadata:
 annotations:
 haproxy.router.openshift.io/ip_whitelist: 192.168.1.10 192.168.1.11
```

What about ingress traffic on ports that are not 80 or 443?

Using NodePort as Ingress to Service



Binds service to a unique port on every node in the cluster

Port randomly assigned or optionally picked from port range 30000-32767


All nodes act as ingress point at the port assigned

Every node in the cluster redirects traffic to service service endpoints even if a corresponding pod is not running on that node

Firewall rules should not prevent nodes listening on these ports

Every exposed service uses up a port on all the nodes in a cluster. Are there alternatives?

Assigning External IP to a Service with Ingress



Admin defines ExternalIP address range. Assigns these extra IPs to nodes.

OpenShift assigns both internal IP and external IP to a service. Or a specific External IP can be chosen.

Node to which ExternalIP is assigned acts as the ingress point to the service.


ExternalIP can be a VIP. You can set up ipfailover to reassign VIP to other nodes. Ipfailover runs as a privileged pod and handles VIP assignment.

5. Securing communications between OpenShift nodes



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Secured Communications between Hosts



Secures cluster communications with IPsec


- Encryption between all Master and Node hosts (L3)
- Uses OpenShift CA and existing certificates
- Simple setup via policy defn
 - Groups (e.g. subnets)
 - Individual hosts

6. Security at Application Level



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SSL at Ingress (with OpenShift Routes)



Layer 7 Application Security

Application specific monitoring East-West container traffic

Web Application Firewalls

Granular traffic control, Packet Inspections

Denial of Service, Ransomware, Viruses Detection and Mitigation

Runtime Security, Forensics, Incident capture, Audits, Alerts

Container runtime monitoring and

Partner Solutions




7. (Upcoming) Application network security with Istio



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Istio Concepts - Sidecar Proxy




SideCar Proxy

- Intercepts all network communication between microservices
- Encapsulates Service Infrastructure code
- Application code (business logic) unaware of Sidecar proxy
- Examples Linkerd, Envoy

Istio Concepts - Service Mesh

Network of Microservices




Service Mesh is a dedicated infrastructure layer to handle service-service communications

Typically implemented as an array of lightweight network proxies deployed alongside application code

Interconnected Proxies form a mesh network


Istio Service Mesh on OpenShift



Connect, Manage, and Secure Microservices, transparently

- Intelligent Routing
- Load Balancing
- Service Resilience
- Telemetry and Reporting
- Policy Enforcement
- Content based Filtering (Layer 7)
- mTLS between services
- East-West traffic control

Application Traffic Encryption with Istio Auth (Future)



Uses Service Account as Identity. SPIFFE Id format

spiffe://<domain>/ns/<namespace>/sa/<serviceaccount>

Mutual TLS between sidecars

Istio CA

- Generate cert pair and SPIFFE key for each SA
- Distribute key and cert pairs
- Rotate keys and certs periodically
- Revoke key and cert when need

Questions?





THANK YOU


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
Kubernetes/OpenShift Core Concepts Pods



Openshift/K8S runs containers in Pods. Pod is a wrapper


Each pod gets an IP address. Container adopts Pod's IP.

Containers in Pods



Some pods may have more than one container .. that's a special case though!! Usually these containers are dependent like a master and slave or side-car pattern And they have a very tight married relationship All the containers in a pod die along with a pod.


Pod Scaling




when you scale up your application, you are scaling up pods.

Each Pod has its own IP.


Nodes






Nodes are the application hosts that make up a Openshift/K&S cluster. They run docker and Openshift. Master controls where the pods are deployed on the nodes, and ensures cluster health.

High Availability



when you scale up, pods are distributed across nodes following scheduler policies defined by the administrator. So even if a node fails, the application is still available

Health Management




Not just that, if a pod dies for some reason, another pod will come in its place


Flexibility of architecture with Openshift/ K8S Services

Pods can be front-ended by a Service. Service is a proxy.. Every node knows about it. Service gets an IP

Service knows which pods to frontend based on the labels.



Built-in Service Discovery



Clients can talk to the service. Service redirects the requests to the pods.

Service also gets a DNS Name

Client can discover service... built in service discovery!!

Accessing your Application

