

# Practical, Secure Computing through Fully Homomorphic Encryption

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# A Fear and a Vision



*"Your previous provider refused to share your electronic medical records, but not to worry  
—I was able to obtain all of your information online."*

# Encryption?

A method to “hide” information.

Use cases:

**Symmetric Encryption** – Hide information so it can be used later only by you.

- Ex: protecting your legal files.


**Public-Key Encryption** – Hide information except for an intended recipient.

- Ex: send financial transaction requests to ONLY your broker.

**Homomorphic Encryption** – Hide information so you can out-source processing.

- Cloud computing with encrypted data!!
- Ex: spam filtering e-mail without reading e-mail.

# Fully Homomorphic Encryption



# Out-Sourced Computation??

- Until very recently, once data is encrypted, there was basically no way to manipulate it.
  - Minor exceptions, of course.
- **Fully Homomorphic Encryption (FHE)**
  - Give data to cloud provider you don't need to trust.
  - Provider can perform arbitrary computations for you.
- **Examples:**
  - Send video to a contractor for facial recognition analysis, but don't need contractor to "see" the video.
  - Securely store and query a large, sensitive DB "in the cloud."
  - Outsourced spam filtering of encrypted e-mail.

# FHE Is Now Possible


- Discovery of a possible scheme in 2009
  - Craig Gentry from Stanford/IBM
  - Most important CS breakthrough of 21<sup>st</sup> century.
  - Very different computation model.
- There have been additional theoretical improvements since then.
- Practical computation challenges...
  - Slow-down
  - Ciphertext expansion
  - Different compute model

# Lattice-based encryption

- FHE schemes are lattice-based encryption schemes.
- Lattice schemes form a “new” family of encryption.
  - Built on lattice mathematics.
    - Lattices are integer vectors.
  - They are resistant to quantum computing attacks.

# Lattice Encryption Intuition?


- Encryption, Decryption, etc... are primarily composed of linear transforms over large integer vectors.



Plaintext space



Linear transforms  
and add noise



Ciphertext space

- Plaintext are integer vectors, modulus small  $p$ .
- Ciphertext are integer vectors modulus very large  $q$ .


# Security?

- Key length is a heuristic for security provided.
  - It is effective for RSA, AES, etc...
- “Real” security is “work factor”
  - Amount of computational effort required to “crack” a key, ciphertext, etc...

# Post-Quantum

- Quantum attacks:
  - Shor showed quantum algorithms for factoring.
  - Grover showed a quadratic speedup relative to search algorithms.
- Modern lattice encryption security proofs built on hardness of Shortest Vector Problem (SVP).
  - Best known quantum result is that we can provably find a shortest vector in time  $2^{(C^*n+o(n))}$ .
  - Resistance to quantum attacks is still a conjecture.
    - Similar to conjecture that factoring is hard for classical computers.

# Computing on Encrypted Data




- Message-Plaintext encodings determined by translation of program into EvalAdd, EvalMult operations.
- Coding is an open research topic and drastically impacts effective runtime.

- Plaintext-Ciphertext encryption/decryption defined by FHE scheme.

- Operations on ciphertexts

# Secure Programs with FHE

- Very different computation model.
- Base operations on ciphertext:



- Much of our innovations come from developing novel algorithms and data structures that are efficient for homomorphic computing model
- Conditional “if” statements on encrypted data not permitted.

# Looking Forward

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- Software
  - Smaller, Faster, Better!
- Hardware
  - Fit everything on board.
- Applications/Demos
  - Secure string searching (aka simple spam filtering) over encrypted ciphertext.
- Transition & Broader Adoption

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Questions?

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