Fedora 36 and Red Hat Enterprise Linux 9 (RHEL 9) are out, and both ship with OpenSSL 3 that has tighter security defaults and a brand new "provider" architecture. While users were testing the beta and other development versions, issues in interoperability with servers and devices such as Wi-Fi access points showed up and caused some confusion between various uses of the rather overloaded word "legacy" that we would like to clear up.
LEGACY cryptographic policy
Fedora and RHEL provide system-wide configurations that apply to all cryptographic libraries in the crypto-policies package since RHEL 8. This provides more consistency for cryptography across all applications.
There are various policies that system administrators can enable using update-crypto-policies --set POLICYNAME from the crypto-policies-scripts package. One of those is the first encounter with the "legacy" keyword: the LEGACY cryptographic policy generates configuration files for GnuTLS, OpenSSL, NSS, BIND, libkrb5, OpenSSH, OpenJDK and libssh that maximize compatibility with older systems while still providing a minimum level of security over the lifetime of the operating system.
The lifetime of the operating system also explains why the LEGACY crypto-policy on Fedora has lower requirements than its RHEL 9 counterpart. Fedora 36’s lifetime is much shorter than that of RHEL 9, so the configuration shipped with RHEL must hold up longer (and thus be tighter). For example, the Fedora 36 LEGACY cryptographic policy includes support for TLS 1.0, while RHEL 9 requires TLS 1.2 at minimum.
Other notable preconfigured cryptographic policies are DEFAULT and FUTURE. Additionally, the crypto-policies system supports subpolicies that allow enabling or disabling specific features, for example using update-crypto-policies --set DEFAULT:SHA1 to use the default policy, but with support for signatures using the SHA-1 digest. See the crypto-policies(7) manpage, the Red Hat Customer Portal, and previous coverage of crypto-policies in this blog for more details, including information on how to define your own policies and subpolicies.
The OpenSSL legacy provider
Fedora 36 and RHEL 9 both ship OpenSSL 3 for the first time, and the OpenSSL developers introduced a concept called "providers" in this version. Providers contain implementations of cryptographic primitives grouped by specific properties. For example, the OpenSSL FIPS provider contains implementations that are undergoing validation according to NIST’s Cryptographic Module Validation Program.
This is where we meet the second instance of "legacy" we’re covering today: the OpenSSL legacy provider. The OpenSSL developers have decided to move a number of outdated algorithms into this provider which isn’t loaded by default and must be enabled explicitly — either through configuration or programmatically — if applications need to use any of these algorithms.
The choices made by the OpenSSL team on which algorithms are "legacy" are rather conservative: the RIPEMD-160 hash function, the RC4, RC5, and single DES encryption algorithms as well as the PBKDF1 key derivation function are the most prominent algorithms that are no longer available by default in OpenSSL.
Applications that still require those deprecated algorithms for special purposes usually load the legacy provider on demand where needed. As a consequence, system administrators should rarely, if ever, have to enable the OpenSSL legacy provider manually. In FIPS mode, these algorithms will be unavailable.
Unsafe legacy renegotiation in TLS
Our final stop on today’s journey across the land of word "legacy" brings us to Transport Layer Security or TLS, also often known by its predecessor’s name, SSL. Starting with OpenSSL 3, and thus Fedora 36 and RHEL 9, TLS connections expect the server to send the renegotiation_info extension, specified in 2010 in RFC5746 in response to CVE-2009-3555. Unfortunately, it seems some servers out there still do not yet support this extension, which causes connections to fail with a rather cryptic message that contains our keyword:
SSL_connect error:0A000152:SSL routines::unsafe legacy renegotiation disabled
In particular, older enterprise Wi-Fi hardware seems to have some catching up to do with the relevant standards. You can follow the discussion and witness the term confusion for Fedora 36 in bug 2072070, and for RHEL 9 in bug 2077973.
"Legacy" has many uses in cryptography, and this post can only cover a small subset. Nonetheless, we hope that our discussion of these three uses helps you distinguish these cases and draw the right conclusions. If you would like to learn more about the security capabilities within RHEL, the Red Hat Product Security Center is a great place to get started.
About the author
Clemens Lang has been part of the Red Hat Crypto Team since January 2022. Prior to his work at Red Hat, he took care of open source packaging, over-the-air updates and security of infotainment systems at BMW. Clemens has also contributed to the MacPorts project since Google Summer of Code 2011.