The scale of AI-powered vulnerability discovery has no precedent. Within its 1st month of operation, Project Glasswing—Anthropic's consortium of defensive security partners using the Mythos model—surfaced 6,202 high- or critical-severity vulnerability findings across more than 1,000 open source projects. Independent verification conducted over a subset of these findings confirmed a 90.6% true positive rate.2
Those numbers alone would be significant. What makes them urgent is the remediation reality. Of approximately 23,000 discovered vulnerabilities, only about 75 were patched and documented in the 1st few months, according to Deutsche Telekom CSO Thomas Tschersich, who also noted that some software vendors and maintainers have asked Anthropic to slow down the rate of reporting because they physically cannot absorb fixes fast enough.3
The 2026 Verizon Data Breach Investigations Report (DBIR) confirms the pattern at the industry level. For the 1st time in its 19-year history, the DBIR found that vulnerability exploitation has overtaken credential theft and phishing as the top initial access vector for breaches, accounting for 31% of all incidents. The volume of vulnerability instances reached 527.3 million in 2025—an eightfold increase over 2022. Meanwhile, the median time to full patching worsened to 43 days, and the share of Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA)-known exploited vulnerabilities that were fully remediated dropped from 38% to 26%.4
Anthropic warned in June 2026 that other AI companies and developers would make equivalent offensive AI capabilities within 6 to 12 months. The window for service providers to prepare is narrow and closing.5
Why service providers are uniquely exposed
Telecommunications networks are among the most complex technology environments on the planet. They are also among the most targeted, and face a number of unique challenges.
Legacy infrastructure that predates modern security models. As Dave Harcourt, BT's Chief Security Authority, observed in 2024, much of the telecommunications infrastructure in operation today was designed in an era that never anticipated today's threat landscape.6 Service providers manage vast brownfield environments—decades of network elements, operating systems and protocols layered on top of each other through years of expansion, mergers, and technology transitions. More than 45% of discovered vulnerabilities in these environments remain unpatched after 12 months.4
An attack surface with few parallels in any industry. The service provider environment spans customer resource management (CRM) and billing systems, core network protocols such as SIP and Diameter, 5G service-based architecture application programming interfaces (APIs), routing and transport infrastructure, lawful-intercept systems, and millions of network devices. Much of this runs proprietary vendor software that service providers cannot independently audit or patch.
Systematic targeting by sophisticated threat actors. The Salt Typhoon campaign compromised at least 9 U.S. service providers, accessing lawful-intercept systems and call detail records for more than 1 million users.7 Dwell times of up to 2 years went undetected. In Singapore, the UNC3886 campaign breached all 4 national service providers, requiring an 11-month coordinated counter-operation.9 In Canada, a threat actor stole at least 700 TB of data from a major service provider.10 These are not isolated incidents—they reflect sustained, well-resourced campaigns specifically targeting telecommunications infrastructure.
Shared vendor dependency creates correlated risk. Service providers worldwide rely on a concentrated set of equipment vendors for radio access networks (RAN), as well as core and transport infrastructure. A vulnerability in one vendor's software affects multiple service providers simultaneously. Interconnection between carriers adds a 2nd dimension of correlated risk: in discussing why the industry formed C2 ISAC, T-Mobile cybersecurity lead Mark Clancy noted that in cases such as SIM box fraud, one operator may identify the device on its network while the command-and-control server sits on another carrier's infrastructure—requiring carriers to investigate both sides together.11
Current defenses: Strong progress with a critical gap
The industry has not been standing still. Three major initiatives have emerged in direct response to the evolving threat landscape. Each delivers real value, and each leaves a specific gap unaddressed.
Project Glasswing gives participating organizations access to Mythos for proactive vulnerability scanning. More than 200 organizations across 15 countries have joined, including service providers such as Verizon, AT&T, and BT. Glasswing has already surfaced thousands of critical findings in open source projects that underpin service provider infrastructure. But its reach has limits. Nokia, Ericsson, and other major network equipment providers (NEPs) are not members. The proprietary software that runs on RAN, core, and transport equipment, which forms the actual backbone of service provider networks, is not being scanned. Service providers cannot independently audit or patch this code. The remediation cycle remains entirely dependent on vendor timelines.
C2 ISAC brings the CISOs of 8 major U.S. service providers together for real-time, private-sector-only intelligence sharing. It fills a critical coordination gap, allowing them to share indicators of compromise, attacker techniques, and mitigation playbooks at operational speed. Early results include cross-service provider subscriber identity module (SIM) box detection techniques and coordinated responses to residential proxy networks. But C2 ISAC is currently U.S.-focused with no international service provider members, and no NEP vendors or operational support system/business support system (OSS/BSS) vendors participate. It is an intelligence-sharing mechanism, not a remediation engine.
Regional ISACs and frameworks, including GSMA T-ISAC (global), ET-ISAC (Europe), ICT-ISAC (Japan), and others, add layers of awareness, regulatory alignment and cross-border cooperation. Europe's ET-ISAC runs biweekly computer emergency response team-security operations center (CERT-SOC) threat intelligence calls and an annual security benchmark. GSMA T-ISAC includes vendors alongside service providers, which C2 ISAC currently does not. These are valuable structures for visibility and preparedness. But none of them deliver patches.
The commonality across all 3 is an improvement in how quickly the industry sees and shares threat information. However, these initiatives do not accelerate how quickly vulnerabilities are actually fixed.
Deutsche Telekom's Tschersich identified the core issue in a direct response to the Glasswing findings: "AI finds vulnerabilities faster than ever. But faster finding does not mean faster fixing. Every day saved in patching counts."3
The remediation crisis: Where the real risk lives
The data is clear. The industry's primary security challenge has shifted from detection to remediation.
90% of enterprise application code consists of open source or third-party dependencies. The average open source codebase audited by Black Duck now carries 581 known vulnerabilities—a number that doubled in a single year.12 The mean time to exploit has moved to negative 7 days, meaning attackers are routinely exploiting vulnerabilities a full week before patches become available.13
Current remediation approaches cannot keep pace. When a scanning tool flags a critical common vulnerability and exposure (CVE) in a transitive open source dependency, the typical response requires developers to investigate, pull a new version of the package, rebuild the application, test for breaking changes, and often rewrite code to accommodate the new version. In regulated environments, where service providers must maintain tested and certified software configurations, forced version upgrades can trigger full recertification cycles.
Scanning tools do important work. They tell security teams where the problems are. But they do not fix them. The output of a scanner is a dashboard of findings. The gap between that dashboard and a patched, signed, production-ready artifact is where risk accumulates.
Internal workarounds that involve forking packages to patch vulnerabilities manually, accepting risk backlogs, and delaying upgrades to preserve stability create their own problems. Every internal fork diverges from upstream, creating permanent maintenance burdens. Risk backlogs grow into audit failures. Delayed upgrades compound technical debt. None of these approaches scale when AI generates thousands of vulnerability findings every month.